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Abstract  
Since the 1960s the government of Burkina Faso has consistently sought to implement 
new development policies to improve the economic and social conditions of its 
people. Until the end of the 1990s these efforts have been disappointing and 
unsatisfactory. In the early 2000s there was a shift towards a knowledge-centred 
development policy and policy makers trusted that it would bring about the sough-
after improvements. In 2006 Burkina Faso chose to adopt the National Innovation 
Systems (NIS) framework as a policy tool to implement this new policy. 
Drawing on a broader definition of technology that covers social technologies, this 
thesis used the ST-Systems analytical concept to chart the adoption and diffusion of 
the NIS policy tool at two levels, namely at strategic policy level and at the 
operational level, focusing here on the case of Bt cotton which was officially 
introduced to Burkina Faso in 2003.  
Ethnographic methods, including in-depth interviews with policy makers, farmers, 
Monsanto representatives, civil society actors and researchers, were used to gain new 
insights into the difficulties encountered by these actors when trying to implement the 
NIS policy tool. 60 interviews were analyzed against a backdrop of detailed historical 
studies, based on examining a large amount of grey literature, published between 
1961 and 2016. 
Findings show that the implementation of the NIS policy for innovation diffusion for 
socio-economic development in Burkina Faso was shaped by local actors competing 
for control of financial resources and power positions. The new tool also had to 
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compete with older, more familiar tools. In the end, it failed to bring about the 
expected improvements in policy design and practice at sectoral level. 
The thesis is among the first to have studied empirically the transfer processes of the 
NIS policy tool for innovation diffusion in an African country (Burkina Faso) through 
a case study focusing on the introduction of Bt cotton. The results achieved should 
contribute to more informed development policy-making in Burkina Faso. 
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          Chapter 1: General Introduction  
  
1.1 What is this Research About?  
Burkina Faso is a country that achieved independence from France in 1960. It has 
been keen to develop its science and industry base for the last 20 years, specially its 
cotton industry. Various policies and frameworks have been used to stimulate growth 
in science and industry. Amongst them there is the most recent policy tool rooted in a 
concept called National Innovation Systems (NIS). This thesis takes Burkina Faso and 
its cotton industry as a case study to investigate the implementation of the NIS as a 
policy tool. In doing so it also examines how the concept of NIS has been used and 
adopted in various contexts and how it came to be used in Burkina Faso. It is a 
methodological requirement that justified the here study of the NIS at both strategic 
and operational levels along the policy continuum. The ST-Systems, a key analytical 
concept in Science and Technology Studies (STS) is the theoretical lens through 
which all this is examined. Methodologically, the thesis is based in ethnography, in 
particular on in-depth interviews with almost all key stakeholders involved in trying 
to use the NIS as a policy tool in Burkina Faso and with those trying to innovate the 
Bt cotton industry in this context.  
 
In the following sections, I shall first provide an overview of the NIS framework 
emergence and its use in different contexts and by different actors. Second, my 
research objectives and research questions will be made explicit. Third, I will justify 
the importance of the present study and finally, the methodology and the structure of 
the thesis will be stated.  
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1.1.1 The Emergence of the National Innovation Systems Framework 
Since the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 
landmark publication on Managing National Innovation Systems in 1999, the 
framework known as National Innovation Systems (NIS) has become increasingly 
popular.  It was first developed as a theory, concept, and analytical perspective used 
to study the flow of technology and information among people, enterprises and 
institutions.  The move to this theory represented a divergence from earlier ones 
which were characteristically linear. It was often through such linear theories that the 
process of economic growth was studied, and these theories typically viewed 
innovation as dependent upon scientific discoveries, followed by their application. 
The first version, according to Godin (2009), was called the Science-Push (Godin, 
2009), and was soon followed by another, known as Demand-Pull. These theories 
included demand, R&D, production, construction and sales, (Manley, 2003; Godin, 
2009). Use of these linear theories was predominant during the 1950s, 1960s, and 
early 1970s.  
By contrast, the first systemic theory, called ‘chain linked model’, focused on the 
inter-relationship between basic science, marketing, manufacturing and Research and 
Development (R&D) (Manley, 2003; Godin, 2009). Innovation was seen in this 
respect as an interactive and complex process.  
The National Innovation Systems theory and concept was first developed in the 1980s 
by Freeman (1982) and Lundvall (1985) to explain technological innovation as the 
result of the complex interaction between institutions (Lundvall, 2007). This 
conceptual framework began to be adopted in Science, Technology and Innovation 
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Studies in the 1990s to study innovation systems (Nelson, 1993; Freeman, 1995; 
Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall, 2007). Godin (2009) has shown that the ‘system approach’ 
developed thanks partly to the contribution of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in this area and its very early work from the 
1960s.  
 
In overall terms, the National Innovation Systemss theory stresses that the flows of 
technology and information among people, enterprises and institutions are key to the 
innovative process. Thus, innovation and technology development are the result of a 
complex set of relationships among actors in the system, which includes enterprises, 
universities and government research institutes (Godin, 2009). The inclusion of the 
country’s research system in this complex set of relationships is another distinctive 
element of this approach.  Godin notes that 
The National Innovation System framework [theory] suggests that the research 
system's ultimate goal is innovation, and that the system is part of a larger 
system composed of sectors such as government, university, and industry and 
their environment. The framework also emphasized the relationships between 
the components or sectors, as the ‘cause’ explaining the performance of 
innovation systems.  (Godin 2009: 476-477) 
Such a theory rests on the premise that understanding the linkages among the actors 
involved in innovation is the key to improving technological performance. Innovation 
and technical progress are the result of a complex set of relationships among actors 
producing, distributing and applying various kinds of knowledge (OECD, 1997). 
McKelvey (1998) sees it as a new way of doing things, or one which involves 
redesigning an existing product for a niche market, or changing how work is carried 
out in an organisation (OECD, 1997). The NIS concept also relates two main 
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categories – market and non-market institutions (Manley, 2003). Both are considered 
together in their potential to influence the direction and speed of innovation and 
technology diffusion in a country (OECD, 1997).  
It is important to note that this NIS theory developed principally from the study of the 
innovation systems of developed countries (Freeman 1987; OECD, 1999). In this 
connection, as Sharif puts it, “the national system of innovation is taken to be the 
totality of institutions and practices that interact to produce and diffuse new 
technology” (Sharif 2006:84).  Here the NIS is considered as an object of study in the 
sense of appellation of British NIS, America NIS, Burkina Faso NIS etc. to refer to a 
SYSTEM that one can study as an OBJECT. It is as Freeman, put it “…the network of 
institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, 
import, modify and diffuse new technologies” (Freeman, 1987 in OECD, 1999:10).  
During the 1990s and 2000s, the importance of the innovation system in relation to 
new technology was widely accepted and its use began to spread in developed and 
developing countries (OECD, 1999). In addition, the importance of knowledge in the 
process of innovation diffusion has become an object of significant attention. As a 
result, knowledge has been identified as a driver (OECD, 1997; 1999) for achieving 
and enhancing sustainable economic growth. This contemporary view has been 
widely adopted (OECD, 2005) and has had a significant impact on innovation strategy 
and policy, particularly in developed countries. The contributions of the individual 
institutions are not considered in isolation but with “how they inter-act with each 
other as elements of a collective system of knowledge creation and use, and on their 
interplay with social institutions (e.g., values, norms, legal frameworks)” (Smith in 
OECD, 1999: 24). In this interaction, the government can play a key role through its 
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policy options and regulations. Innovation system approaches, underpinned by 
framing assumptions and conventions formed in relation to developed countries’ 
experiences, came to be applied in developing countries without much in the way of 
modification in relation to the different context. 
Later the NIS is also used as a policy tool or model used to steer national innovation 
systems. The government’s interest in NIS policy tool is particularly useful for this 
thesis, as it points to a third definition of the framework where, in relation to policy 
circle, NIS is viewed as a ‘policy tool’ (Lundvall 2007:1) which gives a practical 
coherence to policy makers to design and implement their policies. It can be 
considered as a policy narrative through which policy makers frame their policies. 
Godin clearly captures this aspect when he says that “Policy-makers construct their 
problem through conceptual frameworks that structure policy action”. (Godin 
2009:5). It is in this respect that the NIS can be considered as a model, that is “a 
technology that allows us to […] make things work in the world” (Morrison and 
Morgan 1999:32). In the framework of this thesis, it is this dimension (NIS 
framework use as a policy tool in Burkina Faso, and sectoral development strategy) 
that is being investigated. In the specific case of Burkina Faso, a project was 
developed in 2006 by both the FRSIT (representing the government) and the IRDC 
which was intended to introduce the NIS framework as a policy narrative in order to 
improve what one might call the NIS of the country. 
 
1.1.2 Burkina Faso and Innovation Policy 
Burkina Faso, like a number of post-colonialist African states, sought to develop its 
economic base, especially in relation to agriculture. It recognised the importance of 
 6 
science and innovation at an early stage, and sought to boost development using 
institutional methods as well as market-based approaches.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, awareness of the place and role of science in development 
was being shaped through key policy debates and documents. The Symposium of 
Faracoba, the very first systematic review of scientific ambition and potential in the 
history of the country since independence in 1960, set out to ensure: 1) more 
independence in conducting and organising research; 2) the effective linking of all 
research programmes to social and contextual realities and needs; and 3) the linking 
of research activities to productivity (CNRST, 1987). The symposium’s strategy was 
to “make scientific research serve the real interests of society” (CNRST, 1987:4). In 
the early 1990s, a further political step was taken in line with this which consisted in 
the creation, by the decree n° 95-347/PRES/MESSRS on the 19thSeptember 1995, of 
the National Forum for Scientific Research and Technological Innovation (FRSIT) 
(MESSRS, 2010). The FRSIT was created by the Burkina Faso government with two 
main objectives1: 1) to value and promote research and technological innovation in 
order to increase interest from partners and funding bodies at national and 
international level in national research; 2) to establish a strong relationship between 
researchers and other actors in technological innovation. Concomitantly, a Strategic 
Plan for Scientific Research was developed to implement this emerging vision of 
                                                 
1 At its creation the FIRSIT set out to achieve these objectives:  1) to value (valorise) and disseminate results 
from research undertaken in Burkina Faso by national researchers or those doing research for the country but 
based outside the country 2) to promote technological innovation 3) to promote research and endogenous 
technological inventions. 4) to increase the interest of national and international communities in the research 
programme of Burkina Faso 5) to interest research partners and promote technology and diffuse research 
findings and results 6) to establish strong relationships between researchers and other actors in technological 
innovation 7) to involve development partners in research activities in a dynamic way 8) to allow policy makers 
to appreciate research on a concrete basis and to shed light on their strategic choices 9) to create a synergy and 
reinforce the relationship between research structures 10) to help young people to develop research and 
technological vocations 11) to evaluate the state of the research and 12) to give the public detailed and reliable 
information on research and technology and progress towards the twelve objectives. 
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development with the aims of: 1) updating the potential of research to contribute to 
the country’s development; 2) making the main research centre (CNRST) a tool and 
means to promote and coordinate research to realise the government’s development 
objectives (CNRST, 1995).  
 
Shortly after the creation of the forum (FRSIT) in 1995, which initially focused on the 
links between the government and researchers, there appeared the need to 
complement it by bringing industry into the network. This was accomplished by the 
creation of the Salon of Inventors and Innovators (SNII) by the Ministry of Industry, 
Trade and Craft. However, although one can detect some attention to the existence of 
systems through this initiative (all three key components, government, research and 
industry, are present), further analysis shows that the theoretical background is similar 
to the traditional linear way of approaching the innovation process (redolent of the 
‘science push’ and ‘demand pull’ models - Manley, 2003). As the Ministry of Higher 
Education has highlighted, “The different actors (inventors, innovators, researchers, 
users of research results and decision makers) work independently. Indeed, within an 
institution or actors’ group, the linkages are not perceived or even non-existent” 
(FRSIT/CRDI, 2008:1). None of the original objectives of the FRSIT show that the 
underlying model of the role of science and technology in the development of the 
institution goes beyond these traditional models to innovation processes.  
 
It is only from the early 2000s that the concept of NIS appears clearly in policy circles 
and with it a less linear approach to research and innovation. This new development 
strategy in policy discourse became explicit and was detailed through the five years of 
the FRSIT/CRDI collaborative research project on “the analysis of the innovation 
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systems and strengthening of linkages between actors for socio-economic 
development in Burkina Faso” (FRSIT/CRDI, 2008:1, 2009:1). The project was 
introduced into Burkina Faso as a specific project of innovation diffusion in 2006 and 
by IDRC/CRDI Canada, who themselves were inspired by the wider literature on 
‘national innovation systems’. The aim2 of the project was to understand3 innovation 
development and facilitate access to finance and loans. The project included a training 
workshop on “the analysis of innovation systems and the strengthening of linkages 
between actors for the socio-economic development of Burkina Faso”4 (FRSIT/CRDI, 
2008:3). Since 2010, the FRSIT which led the NIS project5 has been integrated into 
the policy department of the newly created Ministry of Scientific Research and 
Innovation (MRSI), with the effect of providing a policy narrative for the country’s 
developing science, technology and innovation policy6.  
 
1.1.3 Cotton in Burkina Faso: A Suitable Target for Research and Innovation 
As in many other developing countries, agriculture is the main economic sector in 
Burkina Faso. It employs almost 90% of the total population. It is also the sector 
through which research began in the country. Finally, it is one of the most dynamic 
                                                 
21) identify and understand the needs of the users of the research results 2) organise users and producers of 
innovation with respect to their competence 3) access more easily loans from banks 4) establish partnerships and 
negotiate contracts and 5) support policy making decisions. 
3 The project had two phases. First the researchers at the FRSIT were expected to familiarize themselves with 
the NIS framework, as a theory, by studying cases of sectoral innovation. The second phase was to support the 
translation of the NIS framework, as a policy frame-work, for socio-economic knowledge-based development.   
4 In French : analyse des systèmes d’innovations et renforcement des liens entre les acteurs au service du 
développement socio-économique au Burkina Faso 
5 This represents the outcome of the second phase of the project.  
6 Plan d’Action Prioritaires de la Politique Nationale de Recherche Scientifique et Technologique (PAP-
PNRST); Politique Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique et Technologique (PNRST) Plan d’Action 
Operationnel de la Strategie National de Valorisation des Technologies, des Inventions et des Innovations 
(PAO-SNVTII) ; Strategie National de Valorisation des Technologies, des Inventions et des Innovations 
(SNVTII). All these plans and strategies were adopted in 2012 and incorporate FRSIT/CRDI activities and 
plans. 
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sectors and is in some ways in advance of others with the implementation of state 
development policies.  
 
Within the agricultural sector, one specific crop has attracted my attention, cotton. 
Cotton production is an interesting case to investigate as it was the first cash crop in 
Burkina Faso, and now makes up about 60% of the country’s economy. Moreover, 
compared with other crops, cotton production involves a wide range of actors such as 
firms and knowledge providers, as well as large and small producers. The sector has 
also faced long-standing demands for innovations to improve productivity, as well as 
health and economic growth. The scale and importance of this sector, combined with 
the potential for improvement based on scientific research, suggests that the cotton 
industry is highly appropriate as a target for the application of the NIS as a policy 
narrative. Moreover, its size and significance means that it merits attention and 
analysis as a site for this investigation.  
 
1.1.4 The Sectoral Innovation System of Cotton  
Until the early 2000s, Burkina Faso had a strong sectoral cotton innovation system.  
However, this established innovation system faced a crisis from the early 1990s 
(Schwartz, 1996; 1997) when cotton crop productivity started to show signs of rapid 
decline. In addition to soil degradation and less rain resulting from climate change, 
the most significant problem was insect infestation which appeared in the 1980s and 
became worse in the 1990s (CNRST, 1995; World Bank, 2004; AFD, 2008). There 
was an increase in the volume of pesticides used due to the growing numbers of 
insects. These infestations can sometime be disastrous and lead to a high damage rates 
 10 
of up to 90%7 (CNRST, 1995; CNRST, 2007). All these issues deeply affected 
conventional cotton expertise which was losing its very promising position (Schwartz, 
1997; Roberts, 1997).  
 
The significant insect damage combined with the rainfall instability, soil degradation 
and chemical dependence called specifically for an alternative to using increasing 
amounts of chemicals to redress the declining trend of cotton cultivation and 
productivity. A clear alternative in the form of biotechnology cotton presented itself. 
Monsanto’s Bt cotton8 was identified as an alternative way to fight insects and a 
means of reversing the decline in cotton productivity, and seemed to be a relevant 
application in this particular context. With Monsanto’s Bt cotton, the aim was to 
improve the quantity and also the quality of production, with less damage to the 
cotton during its growth. For this reason, biotechnology cotton, i.e. genetically 
modified cotton, was seen as one of the solutions for increasing cotton production 
(CES, 2011).  INERA, the agricultural research centre, attests that “to play its role, 
there is a necessity for research to accept robust technology such as modern 
biotechnology” (INERA, 2011: 3).  
 
The shift to a Bt cotton solution originated in a meeting with Monsanto in Cameroon 
in 1999. This was followed by the first official meeting with Monsanto in 2000 and 
again in 2003 in Burkina Faso. The different interested parties (researchers, industries, 
farmers and the government representatives) acknowledged the extent of the insect 
                                                 
7 SOFITEX, presentation during workshop on biotechnology held in 29th March to 19th of April, Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso, in which I took part [29/03/2011 to 19/04/2011]  
 
8 Bt = Bacillus thuringiensis, a cotton genetically modified by the insertion of one or more genes from a 
common soil bacterium called Bacillus thuringiensis. These genes encode the production of insecticidal 
proteins, and thus, genetically transformed plants produce one or more toxins as they grow. 
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damage to conventional cotton and considered the solution brought forward by Bt 
cotton. “All the actors present at the first and second meeting had shown an interest 
towards biotechnology cotton to fight against insect damage” (042011#01). 
Additionally, during a workshop organized by the President’s advisors held between 
29th March to 19th April 2011, the National Union farmers, industries and government 
representatives all agreed that biotechnology cotton was one of the alternatives to 
fight against insects’ resistance. 
Of all the sectors subject to the use of the NIS as a policy narrative by the 
government, I was drawn to look at its implementation and effects in a system in the 
agricultural sector. More specifically, given the position of cotton as a main cash crop 
with a quite well organised system of actors, I decided to look at the innovation 
system in the cotton sector with a specific focus on the Bt innovation system.  
The focus on the Bt cotton innovation system brings into view the concept of a 
Sectoral Innovation System (SIS). An SIS is a specific form of innovation system. 
The innovation systems have been categorized into national, regional, local, 
technological and sectoral innovation systems. An SIS approach aims to analyse the 
innovation process, the factors affecting innovation, the relationship between 
innovation and industrial dynamics, the changing boundaries and transformation of a 
specific sector, and the determinants of the international performance of firms and 
countries in relation to a specific sectoral level, in this case, the cotton sector. An 
innovation system in a sector is considered to be affected by three groups of variables: 
knowledge and technologies; actors and networks; and institutions (Malerba, 2002; 
2004; 2005). For Malerba, the concept of a sectoral system of innovation is a 
multidimensional, integrated and dynamic view of sectors. He proposes that “a 
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sectoral system is a set of products and the set of agents carrying out market and non-
market interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products” 
(2002:247). 
The choice of Bt cotton innovation serves to highlight the underlying policy narrative 
which is used for its implementation in the cotton sector. My intention here is to show 
the extent to which the adoption of Bt cotton technology has been innovative or not, 
in terms of the existing innovation system (organisational system), bringing into 
existence a new way of interaction between the involved set of actors.  
 
This thesis therefore explores the SIS for cotton from the perspective of the operation 
of a pre-existing National Innovation System, and the impact of the introduction of 
the Bt cotton innovation. It examines how these two innovation projects, the NIS and 
Bt cotton, played out, given the socio-technical and organisational systems in place in 
Burkina Faso at the time. 
 
The study is carried out within the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), which sees the use of technology as a socially-embedded activity 
entailing specific forms of knowledge. In particular, the various analytical concepts 
within the STS field have relevance in relation to the attention paid to the nature and 
role of innovation. Of the main STS conceptual frameworks available, this thesis 
adopts the Socio-Technical Systems (ST-Systems) conceptual framework because it is 
capable of considering the whole system of innovation from production through to 
diffusion and use. This analytical concept will enable me to identify the social actors 
(niche, regime and landscape level actors) across the entire ST-System involved in the 
adoption and implementation of the NIS policy tool for innovation diffusion, as well 
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as the impact of the subsequent Bt cotton innovation. The relations between these 
actors form the social infrastructure necessary to successfully develop, diffuse and use 
innovation to meet developmental goals. These interrelations both at policy and 
operational levels thus form the basis of my analysis. 
 
This thesis concentrates on how these two innovation projects, NIS and the Bt Cotton, 
proved to be incompatible and incapable of enhancing Burkina Faso’s innovation 
policy. Rather than using and building on each other’s strengths, it will be shown that 
the two projects were prevented from inspiring each other, largely as a result of the 
way that the socio-technical and organisational systems in place in Burkina Faso were 
set up and operated. The thesis will evaluate the implementation of both the current 
National Innovation System framework as an innovation diffusion approach for socio-
economic development in Burkina Faso and the adoption and implementation of Bt 
cotton were being shaped by local actors in their competition for control of financial 
resources and power positions, resulting in significant problems with both projects. 
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The key aim was to investigate the two projects, the NIS inspired policy framework 
and the Bt cotton innovation system, in facilitating development in Burkina Faso at 
both strategic policy and operational levels by investigating the following specific 
aims: 
 To investigate the introduction, development and implementation of a 
National Innovation Systems (NIS) for innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso 
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 To demonstrate the application of the NIS with particular reference to the 
cotton industry, prior to 2003 
 To investigate the introduction of Bt cotton, as a case study of an attempt to 
address the shortcomings of the existing innovation system, and innovate it.  
 To evaluate the outcome of the implementation and interaction of both 
projects in Burkina Faso 
1.3. Research Questions 
 To what extent can it, or can it not, be claimed that the National Innovation 
Systems (NIS) framework adopted in 2000s to foster systemic innovation has 
facilitated socio-economic development in Burkina Faso, with particular 
reference to the cotton sector and the introduction of Bt cotton? 
 
o How has the NIS as an innovation diffusion approach been translated 
in Burkina Faso, with specific reference to the Bt cotton innovation 
system. Which institutions/actors played a key role in its 
implementation?  
o What expectations were there that the application of the NIS approach 
to the cotton sector in Burkina Faso would facilitate socio-economic 
development and to what extent were these met by the introduction of 
Bt cotton?  
o In what ways did the Bt cotton innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso 
challenge the existing NIS? 
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o What are the strengths and limitations of using the NIS framework as a 
policy tool for facilitating relations between the institutions and actors 
in an innovation system such as the Bt cotton system in Burkina Faso? 
 
1.4. Why this Research is Important 
 
1.4.1. The Limited Literature on the Translation of NIS Framework in Policy Circles in 
Developing Countries 
Within the African context, literature investigating the use of the as a policy tool has 
only recently begun to emerge. For example, Ecuru et al. (2011) have discussed recent 
policy design in Uganda by reviewing the country’s strategy to integrate science, 
technology and innovation in its development planning. A subsequent publication 
(Ecuru et al., 2012) shows that their interest in the issue is focused on NIS as an 
“analytical tool” for an African country such as Uganda (Ecuru et al., 2012). In other 
words, NIS is used as a research framework to investigate development planning, 
rather than NIS as an object of research. It is this similar focus which is found in the 
collected Putting Africa first: the making of African innovation systems by Mammo 
Muchie and collaborators (Muchie et al. 2003). This aspect (NIS as an “analytical 
tool” for researchers) lies outside the focus of the present thesis.  
 
To date I found only 3 major papers which investigate the NIS as a policy tool, in a 
way that is similar to the focus of this thesis. Indeed, Cambrosio, Limoges and 
Pronovost (1990), in their now classical paper, ‘Representing Biotechnology: An 
Ethnography of Quebec Science Policy’, have shown that policy practices are 
culturally and institutionally embedded, thus highlighting the importance of models in 
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the understanding of how policy practices operate. Building on this scanty literature, 
Albert and Laberge (2007) have investigated ‘The Legitimation and Dissemination 
Processes of the Innovation System approach: The Case of the Canadian and Québec 
Science Technology Policy’. They have shown through their case study that the NIS 
framework served as a guideline for science policy making in the country. According 
to the authors, the adoption of the innovation system by the Quebec government is 
related to the ‘symbolic power’ in the prestige of the OECD’s countries. In addition, 
the recognition of science as a means for economic growth has contributed to the 
formation of guidelines for science policy making in the country. Moreover, Sharif 
(2009) carried out research on ‘Rhetoric of Innovation Policy Making in Hong Kong 
Using the Innovation Systems Conceptual Approach’. Through his case study, he 
gives a better understanding of how the option of the ‘new strategy’ in the country’s 
innovation, technology and policy making is essential for the understanding of the 
NIS as a policy tool. As he said: 
 
the IS conceptual approach is being used as a rhetorical resource by the Hong 
Kong Government in its innovation and technology policy, making it an effort 
to persuade its perceived audience of the efficacy of its new strategy for its 
policies—policies that are in fact unrelated to the basic precepts of the IS 
conceptual approach. (Sharif, 2009: 1).  
 
In particular, for Sharif (2009: 21): “perhaps more fundamentally, the IS conceptual 
approach may itself be deficient, and its shallowness, ambiguity, and interpretive 
flexibility are precisely what has permitted its widespread dissemination”. In a quite 
different area, Ngoasong (2010) successfully examined the role of models in shaping 
policy practices through the study of the ‘Role of global health partnerships in 
shaping policy practices on access to medication in Cameroon’. 
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As can be seen, Cambrosio, Limoges and Pronovost (1990) were not interested in 
biotechnology, but instead focused on the way the NIS framework has been used to 
develop science policy in order to implement it. Also, Albert and Laberge (2007) 
were not interested in science and technology policy, but the NIS model embedded in 
such policy. In his turn, Sharif (2009) was not focusing on innovation policy but the 
NIS model which shaped the innovation policy. Last but not least, (Ngoasong, 2010) 
was not interested in malaria or HIV per se, but in the organisational model of global 
health partnership used to organise the delivery of medical services to combat HIV 
and malaria. Their focus here on the given sector was just a practical strategy because 
the model is related to the general development policy of each country. 
 
The present thesis sets out to address this knowledge gap, particularly in the African 
context. In the same way as the above literature, this research is not about 
biotechnology, but the policy narrative used at the operational level to implement 
biotechnology cotton. It is not about the agriculture sector, but about the model which 
shapes the development strategy of Burkina Faso as a whole. In other words, all 
sectors are informed by the same model, but for pragmatic reasons I selected a case of 
innovation in one sector. My choice of biotechnology cotton is therefore part of the 
methodological choice of the thesis. The main aim is to study empirically the 
implementation of the NIS policy tool. What matters here is to be able to study the 
implementation of the framework in a specific sector, which could equally well have 
been health or education. The choice of the agricultural sector here and biotechnology 
cotton in particular, is in recognition of the sector’s higher level of development than 
others, which do not have the same level of use of knowledge as a means of 
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development, with each sector under a specific ministry, with differing dynamics. 
Although national policy defines the framework for all sectors, some ministries have 
been slow to develop their own sectoral policy, based on the state’s general 
framework. In this regard, my choice was influenced by the active and dynamic 
nature of the Ministry of Agriculture and agricultural research department (INERA). 
Since independence, agriculture has been one of the first areas in which scientific 
resources have been deployed in order to increase agricultural productivity, which, it 
was hoped, would improve the well-being of the whole population.      
 
Adopting an STS approach to study the transfer and implementation of the NIS 
framework as a policy tool in developing countries such as Burkina Faso is as 
important as the flourishing theoretical debate on its use as an analytical framework 
by researchers. Because, if research on the latter is now common, the study of the NIS 
as a “development tool” in policy circles in Africa and in developing countries more 
generally remains scanty. The evolution of development policy strategies in Africa 
and particularly in Burkina Faso supports the policy relevance of such a study.   
 
 
 
1.4.2. Relevance to Policy in Burkina Faso 
Towards the end of the 1990s, innovation was increasingly considered as an 
alternative means of development within the framework of knowledge-centred 
development (Cimoli et al. 2009; Rist 1997). This makes the unpacking of the social 
assumptions behind the models that shape development planning highly important. 
The knowledge-centred development model is the third in the history of development 
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thinking and practice. Prior to moving to this third model, Burkina Faso made two 
unsuccessful attempts to implement innovation.   
 
The first attempt by the government of Burkina Faso conformed to the institutionalist 
model, which dominated development policy between the 1950s and 1970s (Rapley, 
1997). When the concept of ‘development’ entered international relations at the end 
of the 1940s, it was on the basis that the application of a western conception of 
market-based economics would produce the desired result – increased economic 
activity. It posited that high labour mobility from traditional to non-traditional 
activities is the driver of growth (Cimoli et al. 2009; Rist 1997). As a director of 
policy, the role of the state is to establish collaboration between the public and private 
sectors to overcome information and coordination failures; to develop institutions to 
support investment in self-discovery and the diffusion of new activities in markets 
(World Bank, 1988; 1999; OECD, 1999; Cimoli et al. 2009).  
 
Burkina Faso’s development policies9 from 1960 to 1983 were shaped by this 
institutionalist model and all aimed to improve people’s life conditions. They 
believed, as clearly stated in the 1963-1967 development plan, that to this end, the 
policies should “make sure people in Upper Volta move to a higher technical and 
cultural stage” (in Gerardin, 1964:111), and “put in place development structures, 
schools etc., proper administrative and political measures to modify behaviour, to 
                                                 
9 ‘Plan Triennal 1960-61-62’ [Three Year Plan 1960-61-62]; ‘Premier Plan Quinquenal de Development 1963-
1967’ [1stFive Year Development Plan 1963-1967]; ‘Plan Cadre 1968-1970’ [Framework Plan 1960-1970]; 
‘Plan Interimaire 1971’ [Interim Plan, 1971]; ‘Deuxieme Plan Quinquenal du Development Economic et Social 
1972-1976’ [2ndFive Year Socio-economic Development Plan 1972-1976]; ‘Troixieme Plan Quinquenal du 
Development Economic et Social, Avant Projet 1977-1981’ [3rdFive year Socio-economic Development Plan 
1977-1981]  
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make a certain number of public administrations work together or to facilitate an 
expansion...” (in Gerardin, 1964: 111). In line with the modernisation theory which is 
embedded in the institutionalist model, they expected that technical, cultural and 
administrative development and modernisation would be achieved through the 
importation of ready-made technology and trained staff from abroad, notably from 
developed countries (Gaillard, 1999). This view is supported by the data which shows 
that, during this period, higher education and research had not been mentioned in any 
of the policies. The technological transfer did not contradict the assumptions of the 
linear model of innovation which dominated this period (Manley, 2003). From the 
institutionalist perspective, indicators of development are the degree of diversification 
of the economy, and the degree of urban activities in the economic structure.  
 
However, by the end of the 1970s, the modernisation paradigm did not result in the 
general prosperity promised. Instead, developing countries continued to become 
increasingly poor, and within them only a small social category, representing the 
international capitalist branches and political elites, benefited from any wealth 
creation. The changes from traditional development strategies to more modern tactics 
did not happen. By the end of the 1970s, the policy measures taken by the Burkina 
Faso government based on this model had not resulted in the improvement of the 
living conditions of the majority of the population, as reflected in the key 
development indicators (World Bank, 1987; 1981).  
 
 Economic development  
In the 1970s, the proportion of the labour force employed in the agricultural 
sector was still high: 87% in 1975 compared to 92% in 1960. The structure of 
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exports shows 0% in 1960 and 6% in 1975 for manufactured merchandise; 
100% in 1960 and 94% in 1975 for primary commodities meaning that there 
was little improvement in the development of secondary sectors. During the 
same periods, average exports were respectively 48% and 24% in 
industrialised countries with a strong extraverted economy. Exports to 
industrialised countries rose from 4% in 1960 to 72% in 1976.  Indeed, at the 
end of the 1970s, the average annual growth of the GNP per capita remained 
very low. Between 1960 and 1976, it only increased by 0.8% well below the 
average of low income countries’ (0.9%) and industrialised countries’ (3.4%). 
This means that on average every individual had an income of $110 per year 
in Burkina Faso whereas it was $150 in low income countries and $6,200 in 
industrialised countries.  
 
 Health conditions 
There was little improvement in the health of the population. The crude 
mortality rate was 25‰ in 1975 whereas it was 31‰ in 1960. In industrialised 
countries, it was respectively 10‰ and 10‰. The average life expectancy in 
Burkina Faso was 38 years in 1975 whereas it was 72 in industrialised 
countries (World Bank, 1978; 1981).  
 
 Education  
Many people remained uneducated; only 14% received primary education in 
1975 while in industrialised countries it was 100%. In secondary school, there 
were only 2% of the population whereas it was 83% in industrialised countries 
(World Bank, 1978; 1981).  
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Burkina Faso sought to improve this situation by developing new policies10 
under the competing model of development based on dependency theory 
between 1980 and the 1990. Dependency theory interprets ‘development’ and 
‘underdevelopment’ as socially embedded and interrelated processes. It 
supports the idea that the economies of the countries of the South are better 
understood within the international economic system. For example, according 
to this theory, colonisation destroyed the social and economic features of 
countries under domination and blocked their natural evolution. Models based 
on dependency theory consider that market competition led to the formation of 
monopolies and ‘free’ trade arrangements enabled monopolies to continue 
their expansion through the internationalisation of domestic markets. 
Proponents of dependency theory-based models ‘concluded from their own 
observation that the international system, far from guaranteeing the South’s 
prosperity, brought the effects of domination to bear upon it and locked it in 
dependence’ (Rist 1997: 109).  In terms of policy these models advised that 
countries of the South should opt out of the system by developing their 
industry, including appealing for foreign capital, form regional groups and 
encourage state intervention to control inequalities through land reforms and 
the redistribution of investment. In most cases this would require radical social 
change (e.g. revolution) (World Bank, 1999). Several plans were designed 
                                                 
10‘Quatrieme Plan Quinquenal de Development 1982-1986’ [4thFive Year Development Plan 1982-1986]; ‘Plan 
de Base ou Programme Populaire de Development 1984-1985’ [Basic Plan or Popular Plan for Development 
1984-1985]; Rapport Sectoriel du Plan Quiquenal de Development Populaire 1986-1990’ [Sectoral Report on 
the 4th Five-year Development Plan 1986-1990]  
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within this framework. The revolutionary regime in place in Burkina Faso set 
out to achieve independence and economic autonomy.  
 
The policy option suggested that all development plans for the country would 
involve the engagement of each individual. The efficiency of mass labour 
relies on a clear framework of a planned economy. It applied to all national 
and regional sectors. The aim was to deal with the urgent and pressing needs 
of the population which are: food, water, housing, education, health, culture 
and sport. In relative terms, this strategy is considered by many analysts to 
have resulted in significant improvement in the living conditions of the 
majority of the population.  
 
 Economic development  
For instance, in 1988 the proportion of the labour force in agriculture has 
reduced to 56% from 87 % in 1975. The structure of exports shows 98% in 
1988 for manufactured merchandise, and just 1% in 1988 for primary 
commodities, meaning that there was some improvement in the development 
of secondary sectors to transform local primary goods. 
 
 
 
 Health conditions 
The average life expectancy in Burkina Faso was 47 years in 1988 whereas it 
was 38, 13 years before.  
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 Education 
Primary education increased from 14% in 1975 to 32% in 1988, almost 
doubled in 13 years. Enrolment rates in secondary school tripled (2% in 1975 
to 6% in 1988).  
 
However, this revolutionary experience was stopped at the end of the 1980s 
through political change, with the result of undermining the developmental 
achievements of the period. In a newly liberalising political regime the 
economy slowed down as it suffered from the international economic crisis. It 
is in this context that a new development paradigm based on economic 
orthodoxy made a comeback, and dominated development discourse. 
 
The institutionalist model was later displaced by the market model. The 
market model dominated development discourse between the 1980s and 
2000s. According to this model, markets have the potential to generate their 
own internal coordination (World Bank, 1999). For this reason, deliberate 
coordination of individual efforts is irrelevant and counterproductive, because 
competition provides opportunities for workers and producers and leads to 
high quality service (Ibid). The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
policy recommendations included the promotion of private investment in 
physical and human capital and new knowledge. Competition – market entry 
and exit, free-trade, export and foreign development investment would enable 
knowledge spill over (Rist, 1997).  
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The argument was that developing countries do not need to invest in advanced 
science and high technology, because free trade would enable their transfer 
from developed countries. Politically, the displacement of the problem of 
development from international negotiation, as required by the New 
International Order, to a humanitarian framework allows intervention by 
Western countries using political pressure to change political regimes that do 
not respect ‘human rights’. Essentially this conceptual shift owes much to the 
influence of a competing development paradigm commonly called 
‘dependency theory’ and civil society action. This has resulted in the 
redefinition of the development concept as ‘human development’ which goes 
beyond the initial neo-liberal understanding of development as growth.  
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the concept of development had become almost 
uncontested as it managed through the past decades of debate to integrate a 
wider view, so that in addition to being universal ‘development’ was 
becoming more and more trans-cultural. This is observable in the scope of 
indicators of measurement, which now included productivity growth rate, 
human rights (early 1980s), environmental protection (late 1980s), 
development as self-reliance, and human development (in 1990s). In the same 
way, Burkina Faso development policies11 at that time were shaped by the 
market. In 1991, the authorities decided in line with the financial crisis to 
make structural reforms with the help of international financial bankers and, 
                                                 
11 ‘Rapport Sectoriel du Plan Quiquenal de Development Populaire 1986-1990’ [Sectoral Report on the 4th Five 
Year Development Plan 1986-1990] ; ‘Programme d’Ajustment Structural, 1990-2000’ [Structural Adjustment 
Programme, 1990-2000] 
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from the beginning of the 1990s, the structural adjustment programme has 
dominated Burkina Faso’s development strategies. Many public sectors have 
been privatised and, until the end of the 1990s, development strategy was led 
by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SCADD, 2011). However, by the 
end of the 1990s, the achievements of the 1980s were lost.  
 
 Economic development 
The period 1990 to 2000 has seen a decrease in Burkina’s socio-economic 
development. Indeed, the market economy theory which informed the model 
adopted by the country following the political shift at the end of the 1980s did 
not result in an improvement in living standards for the population. Between 
1980 and 1990, the GDP was 3.6%, and between 1990 and 1998 it was 3.5%. 
 
 Health condition  
Life expectancy dropped from 47 years in 1988 to 45 years in 1997. The 
mortality rate per thousand children under 5 was 169 in 1997; Infant mortality 
rate per thousand live births was 99 per thousand in 1997; and maternal 
mortality 93 per thousand live births, higher than the 1980s. 
 
 Education 
Adult illiteracy in 1997 was about 80%. The net enrolment ratio in primary 
school was 31% in 1996 compare to32% in 1988.  
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In this context, at the end of the 1990s, Burkina Faso designed a policy12 to 
complement the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) known as ‘Poverty 
Reduction Strategic Papers’ to mitigate the drawbacks of the SAP. The key 
objective of such an enhanced framework was to “assist countries in 
developing and implementing more effective strategies to fight poverty” 
(World Bank, 1999:6). Nevertheless, little improvement was apparent from the 
new strategy 10 years later. For instance, nearly half of the population still live 
below the poverty line (43.9% of population lived below the poverty line 
108.454 in 2009/2010) despite the steady growth during the previous 10 years; 
average 5.2% (2000-2009) with 8.7% in 2005. The market model appeared to 
be undergoing a serious crisis as Joseph Stiglitz and his collaborators observed 
in their book, The Crisis of the Growth Paradigm: “We began this book with 
the inevitable reference to the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the damage done 
by the almost religious implementation of such an extremist version of 
economic orthodoxy. The times of the ‘Consensus’ are over, buried by the 
weight of its economic failures, in addition to its massive social disruptions” 
(Cimoli, et al.2009: 557). An opportunity had opened for a new model of 
development, this time based on innovation.   
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, innovation came to be increasingly considered 
as an alternative means for development within the framework of knowledge-
centred development. Many meetings were held in the African continent from 
1998 onwards to debate the extent to which scientific and technological 
advances could aid development in underdeveloped countries. The following 
                                                 
12 ‘Cadre Strategic de Lutte Contre la Pauvrete, 2000-2010’ [Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 2000-2010] 
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table gives a full list of chronological events which took place in Africa in the 
process of the use of knowledge (innovation) as a key for development.  
Table 1: Key events in the construction of Africa’s innovation systems 
 Organisation  Event/meeting Location  
1998 World Bank Report on Knowledge for Development Africa (not 
specified) 
1999 UNESCO  Conference on The Role of Science in 
the Twenty First Century, the New 
Commitment 
Africa (Not 
specified) 
Knowledge 
Management 
Africa (KMA)  
Conference on Knowledge to Address 
Africa’s Development Challenges 
South Africa  
2001 NEPAD Creation of NEPAD to create new 
conditions for development in Africa. 
 
2003 The African 
Ministerial 
Council on 
Science and 
Technology 
1st meeting aiming to put in place the 
National Science and Technology 
Innovation (STI) policies 
Johannesburg 
(South Africa) 
2005 The African 
Ministerial 
Council on 
Science and 
Technology 
Put in place the National Science and 
Technology Innovation (STI) policies 
Dakar (Senegal) 
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(AMCOST) 
2007 OECD Made available some guidelines for 
African countries  
This sentiment was expressed in the 
Addis Ababa Declaration on Science, 
Technoloy and Scientific Research for 
Development at the African Union 
Summit in January 2007.  
 
Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia) 
2009 OECD and 
UNESCO 
Organised a joint workshop which was 
held on Innovation for Development: 
Converting Knowledge to Value. 
Not specified  
OECD  A meeting on Innovation out of 
Poverty  
Not specified  
2010 OECD Publication on Innovation and the 
Development Agenda. 
 
 
 
Source: Processed by author  
 
As shown in Table 1 above, research and development as mechanisms to 
improve policy and promote technological innovation became part of the 
development agendas in Africa, as reflected in the titles of the World Bank 
report (1998) on Knowledge for Development; and the 1999 UNESCO 
conference on the Role of Science in the Twenty First Century, the New 
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Commitment. The first meeting of the African Ministerial Council on Science 
and Technology (AMCOST) held in November 2005 emphasised that, as a 
matter of priority, all countries should have comprehensive national Science 
and Technology Innovation (STI) policies with emphasis on the development 
of effective National Systems of Innovation. In Addis Ababa in 2007, the 
OECD made available some guidelines for African countries. The sentiment 
was expressed as follows: 
 
We, the Heads of States and Government of the African Union, recalling our 
millennium commitments to achieve sustainable development for our 
Continent, ...realizing that the achievement of these goals depends on our 
countries’ abilities to harness science and technology for development and 
also an increased and sustained investment in science, technology and 
innovation, ...commit ourselves to promote and support research and 
innovation activities and the requisite human and institutional capacities 
(UNESCO, 2007: 5-6)  
 
Later, in January 2009, the OECD and the UNESCO organised a joint 
workshop which was held on Innovation for Development: Converting 
Knowledge to Value. In April 2009, a meeting of experts on Innovation out of 
Poverty, was held, by the OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate. And 
in 2010, the OECD laid down a framework “for putting innovation on the 
development agenda” through its publication Innovation and the Development 
Agenda. 
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The NIS narrative, in particular, provides the framework for intervention in 
this regard. A number of countries, national and international bodies have used 
the NIS policy tool to implement their innovation policies. As for the countries 
which have used such tools to develop their national policy strategy, they 
include for instance, the USA, Japan, Russia, Brazil, China, South Africa, 
India (Lundvall, 2007). Similarly, Canada and Quebec have both implemented 
the NIS tool for their science and technology policy (Albert and Laberge, 
(2007). Hong Kong has applied the NIS conceptual approach in its innovation 
policy formulation (Sharif, 2009). In addition, international organisations such 
as OECD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the World Bank and the EU commission have adopted the 
concept to inform their innovation policy strategies (Lundvall, 2007). Even in 
the least developed countries, the model is becoming increasingly popular in 
policy circles. For example, more recently, the government of Uganda 
attempted to use the model (NIS as a development tool) to integrate science 
technology and innovation in its development planning process (Ecuru et al., 
2011; 2012). 
 
The literature in development studies has already shown that many developing 
countries embrace global models of development for financial purposes 
independently of the effectiveness of such models in bringing about socio-
economic development. The high interpretive flexibility of the NIS (different 
meanings associated with the framework) makes it even more interesting to 
investigate.  
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1.5 Research Methodology 
I used Geels’ ST-Systems analytical framework to study the NIS as a policy narrative 
to transform the existing NIS (physical reality) of the country. This analytical 
framework will help understand the case of the NIS innovation approach adoption and 
outcome. In addition, the nature of the problem addressed in this thesis made it 
necessary to adopt a qualitative approach, drawing on ethnographic techniques to 
collect and analyse the data. 
 
Ethnography here will be considered in its ‘modern’ sense, in a way that will enable 
me to investigate not only the historical dimension pertinent to this research, but also 
to consider it as a network. For example, in the case of the NIS policy tool 
implementation, there are researchers, policy makers, cotton industries, cotton 
farmers, other users of research results, inventors/innovators, and multi-national 
actors interacting in a network. This wide range of actors cannot be simultaneously in 
one specific space for a long enough period, therefore the nodes (laboratories, offices, 
firms, hospitals, business centres, private residences) (Latour and Woolgar, 1996) of 
this network of actors are going to be investigated in this research because it appears 
unnecessary and unreasonable for me as a researcher to travel to all these places and 
follow actors’ everyday routines as ethnographers may have done in the past. Thus, 
ethnography is going to be considered in this thesis as it is used in science studies as 
well as in its neo-modern sense (Comaroff 1992: xi). This has implications for the 
data collection strategy through interviews and meetings. In addition, in my 
application of the ST-Systems analytical concept it was necessary to complement it 
with concepts from other approaches, particularly Techno Economic Network (TEN), 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) and Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) for the 
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additional insights they offer in relation to networks, and in relation to the weaknesses 
of the ST-Systems analytical framework 
  
Documentary and interview data will be transcribed and subjected to thematic 
analysis. It is this scheme of analysis which will enable me to understand the shaping 
of the ST-Systems of the current NIS policy tool and the Bt cotton innovation system 
in the course of their transfer and implementation.  
 
 1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
In addition to the introductory and concluding chapters, this thesis is organised into 
three parts. Each part is composed of two Chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 will demonstrate that the processes involved in the NIS policy tool for 
innovation diffusion adoption with multiple interlocking actors call for a multi-level 
perspective (ST-Systems) of the kind that Geels (2004), Geels and Kemp (2007) offer. 
As a result of that, taken as a social technology, the analysis of the NIS policy tool 
adoption and implementation is going to be treated in the light of the S-T Systems 
analytical framework.  
 
Chapter 3 will give a detailed description of the research design and methods to be 
used for collecting and analysing data. It will make clear that an ethnographic 
approach was the most appropriate approach among the available qualitative research 
approaches for the study of the NIS policy tool for innovation diffusion adoption in 
Burkina Faso. This approach is considered suitable because the methods it provides 
are the most appropriate given the kinds of processes which are the focus of the thesis. 
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These methods will involve documentary analysis, direct observation, and semi-
structured interviews, consistent with the practices of STS research.  
 
Chapter 4 will investigate the crisis in the socio-technical regimes as a result of the 
pressure from the socio-technical landscape in order to address its implication for the 
adoption of the NIS policy tool as a new approach to innovation. Three different 
approaches to innovation have been investigated for some insufficiencies on the level 
of participation of the involved actors. The lack of participation in the integrated 
approach around cash crop will make explicit the linear process in innovation 
diffusion as shown with mechanisation in the agriculture sector. In addition, the 
Training and Visits approach, which was more or less participative, has centred the 
job of the technical support agent as an intermediary between end users and 
researchers. The level of participation is limited to moving with information instead 
of open dialogue between innovation actors. The latest participative approach named 
Farming Systems (systems approach) will give credit to participation as essential for 
successful innovation diffusion. This will lead me to examine the changes in the 
corresponding innovation approaches and the science policies of the period, as well as 
the organization that was put in place for their management.  
 
Chapter 5 is going to investigate the process through which the NIS policy tool was 
adopted and its diffusion at policy level. In so doing, the chapter first of all will 
describe the Forum of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation (FRSIT), as 
a niche within which the NIS policy tool for innovation diffusion was transferred, by 
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describing its context of creation, its missions and its organisational set up for 
innovation management. Secondly the chapter will look at the process of stabilisation 
of the NIS policy tool at niche level, by highlighting the learning processes, the 
experimentation and the network building involved in its stabilisation. Such learning 
processes consisted in undertaking training sessions, meetings, symposiums, 
workshops and conferences in order to evaluate it and build up the network of 
relevant actors who are interested in adopting the technology. It will at the end make 
an appreciation of the institutionalisation of such a policy tool to diffuse innovation, 
through an analysis of its adoption and diffusion process as manifested in the policy 
design.  
 
Chapter 6 will identify the three main ST-Systems in relation to cotton growth in 
Burkina Faso and explore the way in which the shift from one system to another took 
place. These ST-Systems will be: the pre-colonial; the colonial; and the postcolonial 
(which officially ended in 2003). The analysis reveals that the co-evolution of cotton 
production, the political economy of Burkina Faso, forms of social organisation, and 
institutions with human actors, gave specificity to each ST-System at a given time. In 
other words, the type of cotton, the growing techniques, the organisation, the involved 
actors and the purpose of cotton growth will all be considered as specific to each 
historical epoch. The findings will enable us to make evaluative statements on the 
nature and extent of the impact of colonisation on the development of a modern 
economy in Burkina Faso. This chapter will prepare the way for Chapter 7, which 
considers Bt cotton adoption and evaluates the framework which informed actors’ 
interactions.  
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Chapter 7 will then give the context of the diffusion of construction of the Bt cotton 
innovation system, it will analyse the translation process and implementation of Bt 
cotton in order to highlight the underlying innovation approach which backed up such 
processes and thus shaped the outcome of Bt cotton technology. What is important is 
to investigate the extent to which the NIS approach did or did not manage to displace 
the existing innovation approach in order to establish itself as the new approach which 
would increase productivity through Bt cotton innovation implementation. By looking 
at the linkages of actors in the Bt cotton innovation implementation, it will be possible 
to evaluate if it is the NIS policy tool or another approach behind the behaviour of the 
involved actors.  
 
Finally, conclusions which bring together the findings of the whole thesis, an 
evaluation of the two projects, the NIS policy tool and the Bt cotton innovation 
system. The theoretical contributions of the present thesis and some proposed possible 
future research will be presented in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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Part I 
Research Methodology 
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Chapter 2: Understanding the Use of the Framework in 
Facilitating Socio-Economic Development: A Review of the Key 
Literature 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The introduction and use of the NIS as a policy tool in Burkina Faso represented a 
significant shift of policy focus, given the history of previous policy models in 
relation to economic development. The fundamental change reflected a move to a 
knowledge-centred model. For this new policy narrative to have a reasonable chance 
of being successful, the NIS, as a policy tool, needed to be translated – understood, 
interpreted, and tailored to fit Burkina Faso’s socio-political, economic and 
developmental realities – and then applied and implemented effectively. 
 
Accordingly, the review of relevant literatures in this chapter has the objective of 
choosing an appropriate analytical approach, design and methods to examine the 
result of the process of adoption of the NIS. 
 
This present chapter therefore is going to first of all briefly define the key concepts 
(National Innovation Systems, Development, Knowledge Centred Development 
policy and Social Technology) which are going to be used throughout the thesis. A 
brief overview of the Innovation System of Burkina Faso will also be given here. In 
addition, and more importantly, this chapter will show that STS theories such as 
Techno Economic Networks (TENs), Actor Network Theory (ANT), and Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) remain individually neither sufficient nor 
adequate for a study of the particular phenomenon of the National Innovation Systems 
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(NIS) as a policy tool adoption in Burkina Faso for its socio-economic development. 
However, one STS-informed approach, the Socio Technical Systems (S-T Systems) or 
known as the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) approach, does stand out for its ability 
to focus on innovation’s social and technical environment processes and its impact 
within the context of socio-technical systems, and so provides a coherent and incisive 
basis for this case study of the NIS policy tool adoption in Burkina Faso, including an 
analysis of its outcomes for actors involved in the cotton sector.  
 
2.2. Definition of Key Concepts 
2.2.1. National Innovation Systems 
2.2.1.1 National Innovation Systems as an Object of Study 
One definition of the expression ‘National Innovation Systems’ is that which refers to 
a concrete system, that is where it is an object of study. It is that which the OECD 
refers to in the following collection of definitions from OECD (1999:10):  
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It is in this sense that one can read Freeman’s use of the term as ‘The British national 
system’ or ‘The United States national system of innovation’. In the same way, one 
can talk about ‘Burkina Faso’s innovation system’ to refer to the system out there as 
an object that one can study. 
 
2.2.1.2 National Innovation Systems as a Theoretical Concept 
There is some uncertainty regarding the origins of the National Innovation Systems 
concept; even the writings of Freeman and Lundvall who are claimed to have 
developed the concept do not make its history obvious. While Freeman gives the 
credit for the first use of the expression ‘National Innovation Systems’ to Lundvall 
(Freeman, 1995), the latter, in his turn, attributes paternity of the concept to Freeman 
Box 1 
National innovation systems:  definitions 
 
A national system of innovation has been defined as follows: 
 • “ .. the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies.” (Freeman, 1987)  
 
• “ .. the elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and 
use of new, and economically useful, knowledge ... and are either located within or 
rooted inside the borders of a nation state.” (Lundvall, 1992)  
 
• “... a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance ... 
of national firms.”  (Nelson, 1993)  
 
• “ .. the national institutions, their incentive structures and their competencies, that 
determine the rate and direction of technological learning (or the volume and 
composition of change generating activities) in a country.” (Patel and Pavitt, 1994) 
 
 • “.. that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the 
development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework 
within which governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation 
process.  As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and 
transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies.” 
(Metcalfe, 1995) 
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(Lundvall, 2007). Nevertheless, the available literature supports a view that traces the 
first use of the concept back to an unpublished paper by Freeman in 1982 (Sharif, 
2006). In this paper Freeman casually used the concept National Innovation Systems 
to highlight the key role that institutions play in innovation processes (Freeman, 
1982). This shift from the Schumpeterian perspective on innovation in which the 
entrepreneur as an individual plays a key role in the innovation process is well 
expressed by Akrich and collaborators as follows:  
 
The bringing together of market and technology, through which both 
inventions and the outlets which transform them into innovations are patiently 
constructed, is more and more a result of a collective activity and no longer the 
monopoly of an inspired and dedicated individual (Akrich et al. 2002:189). 
 
The NIS concept Freeman referred to was in fact a paraphrase of List’s concept of 
‘The National System of Political Economy’ coined in 1841 (Lundvall, 2007). As he 
stated, “the idea actually goes back at least to Friedrich List's conception of ‘The 
National System of Political Economy' (1841), which might just as well have been 
called 'The National System of Innovation'” (Freeman, 1995:5). Later this concept 
received its first systematic treatment in 1985 by Lundvall in his book Product 
innovation and user-producer interaction (Lundvall, 1985).  In this book, Lundvall 
first used the concept ‘Innovation Systems’ but without the term ‘National’. 
According to the author, “a system of innovation is constituted by elements and 
relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and 
economically useful, knowledge…” (Lundvall, 1992: 2). The idea of ‘Innovation 
Systems’ was present in Lundvall and his colleagues’ work in the IKE (Innovation, 
 42 
Knowledge and Economics Dynamics)13 group from Aalborg University since the late 
1970s during which time the group developed a distinctive approach to international 
competitiveness by integrating “a French structuralist approach to national systems of 
production with the Anglo-Saxon tradition in innovation studies to national systems” 
(Lundvall, 1992: xii).  
 
Before the use of the concept of ‘Innovation Systems’ in 1985, the standard phrase of 
the group was ‘innovation capability’ of the ‘national system of production” 
(Lundvall, 1985). There appears to be a similarity between the way Freeman found 
his inspiration from List and the way Lundvall connected his concept to the IKE 
‘System of Production’ (Lundvall, 1985). The formulation of the full concept of 
‘National Innovation Systems’ in its modern version has to wait until 1987 thanks to 
Freeman’s book on Japan (Freeman, 1987). The large diffusion of the concept 
benefited from an edited book by Dosi et al. (1988) entitled Technical Change and 
Economic Theory in the framework of reflections at IFIAS (International Federation 
of Institutes for Advance Studies) on ‘rethinking economic theory’ (Sharif, 2006). In 
parallel, policy discussion was initiated at the OECD under TEP (Technology 
Economy Programme) which was launched in 1988 with the aim of integrating 
“science and technology policies into other aspects of government policy, particularly 
economic, social, industrial, energy, education, and man power policies” (Sharif, 
2006: 751). Lundvall’s and Freeman’s reflections benefited from their interactions 
with colleagues at OECD (Chesnais) and in academic circles which included Smith, 
Dosi, Edquist, and Nelson. The OECD’s report (1992) on the NIS together with 
                                                 
13 The IKE Group is a research group at the Department of Business and Management. The group has evolved 
into a long-term research program in innovation studies, industrial economics, and entrepreneurship at Aalborg 
University 
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several key publications by Freeman and Lundvall (1988), Lundvall (1992), Nelson 
(1993) and Edquist (1997) have also contributed to the wide diffusion of the concept. 
In the OECD’s report, the NIS is defined as:  
 
the set of institutions that (jointly and individually) contribute to the 
development and diffusion of new technologies. These institutions provide the 
framework within which governments form and implement policies to 
influence the innovation process, as such, it is a system of interconnected 
institutions to create, store, and transfer the knowledge, skills, and artefacts, 
which define new technologies” (Metcalfe in OECD, 1999: 24).  
 
From this perspective, the innovation capacity of a country reflects its innovation 
system as derived from its firms’ capabilities and networks, science system, 
supporting institutions, and other research bodies to the extent that they are the 
sources of the generation, diffusion and use of knowledge (OECD, 1999). 
Distinctively focussing on the level of the nation-state, the National Innovation 
Systems considers that the dynamics of these institutions are inter-related with the 
broader macro-economic and regulatory context (communication infrastructures, 
factor market conditions, product market conditions, education and training system) 
(OECD, 1999). The contributions of the individual institutions are not considered in 
isolation but “how they inter-act with each other as elements of a collective system of 
knowledge creation and use, and on their interplay with social institutions (e.g., 
values, norms, legal frameworks)” (Smith in OECD, 1999: 24). In this inter-action, 
the government has a key role through its policy options and regulations. In sum, 
Lundvall has identified three key variables which are government, universities 
(knowledge producers) and firms/industries/business actors (users of knowledge) 
(Lundvall, 1985; 1992; 2007).  In fact, “Innovation and technology development are 
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the result of a complex set of relationships among actors in the system, which 
includes enterprises, universities and government research institutes” (OECD, 1999: 
7). As underlined by Goto, “The national innovation system essentially consists of 
three sectors: industry, universities, and the government, with each sector interacting 
with the others, while at the same time playing its own role” Goto (2000:104). The 
role of each of these is now explained in turn. 
 
 Government’s role 
First, many of the innovation system scholars made explicit the fact that government 
should be actively involved (Freeman, 1995) in fostering innovation. The acquisition 
of the technology, its use and diffusion involve the government, whose role in the 
system is essential. Through its policy makers, the government plays a key role by 
making choices which inform strategies at national level (Freeman, 1987). Indeed, the 
government is considered as a lead actor that influences on the one hand the Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) because, “despite their limited size, FDI inflows have had a 
positive impact, as much as they generated employment in the formal sector and 
generated local value-addition” (Nations Unies, 2009:2). On the other hand, such a 
flow is supported within the framework of government IPR [Intellectual Property 
Right] regulation in which “processes are decomposed into three stages, innovation 
process, commercialisation process and IPR protection process” (Sudsawasd and 
Chaisrisawatsuk, 2014: 1). By designing the IPR system for the sake of business and 
government direct scientific research such as financing universities, supporting 
business Research and Development (R&D), “the Government has a responsibility to 
contribute to the formation of the human and social capital needed to evaluate, 
choose, implement and modify foreign technologies” (Feinson, 2003:23). R&D can 
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be used for knowledge assimilation and national technological creation as shown by 
Freeman from his Japan case study (Freeman, 1987). The incentives created by the 
government are necessary to set these aspects at the level of national policy direction 
in order to provide administrative support as well as facilities and equipment for 
enhancing and legitimising networking between the producers and users of knowledge 
(Lundvall, 1985; Freeman, 1995; OECD, 1999). The commitment of the government, 
as well as specific actions to provide actors with such a context, is thus required in 
order to produce a favourable social and political context for networking between 
firms and knowledge producers. 
 
 Universities’ role  
Second, the knowledge producers are also essential for the creation or invention of 
any innovation because the performance of the system depends on human capital and 
capability. These knowledge producers are produced by universities and technical 
organisations and schools, for example (Lundvall, 2007). Universities in particular 
have their own research units which play a facilitating role in the formation of the 
market by providing new knowledge and skills and by undertaking research 
(Lundvall, 1985; 2007; Freeman, 1987; OECD, 1999). These knowledge producers’ 
institutes are centres for basic research and also scientific training (Lundvall, 1985; 
OECD, 1999). In other words, universities as knowledge producers undertake in this 
regard, basic science and technological research. At the same time, the universities 
provide higher education to scientists as well as technologists so that they can 
generate the innovation needed by both business and government. This role of the 
universities was also underlined by Nelson: “[Universities provide] higher levels of 
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scientific training and the management skills to coordinate what is inevitably a multi-
person or multi-firm affair” (Nelson, 1990 in Feinson, 2003: 24). 
 
 Industry’s role 
The third important variable includes enterprises/firms/industries. They are all 
considered as business actors who are the users of the innovation created by the 
knowledge producers from universities and research centres (OECD, 1999). In the 
NIS, firms contribute to the diffusion of the market knowledge (OECD, 1999). The 
idea of a system whereby firms are in interaction with the two above variables was 
discussed by Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), and Edquist (1997). As demonstrated 
by the OECD (1999), business or industry does not function alone because 
government as well as universities are also integral parts of the system in the 
innovation process. As for the firms/industries, they are considered as business actors 
whose role is to conduct R&D for the purpose of developing products for 
commercialisation. They launch the different innovative products and exploit the new 
scientific discoveries (OECD, 1999). 
 
The NIS framework is displayed as follow. 
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Figure 1: The conceptualisation of the NIS framework 
 
Source: OECD (1999). Managing national innovation systems. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, p. 23. 
 
As institutionalists, the founders of the NIS reject the way the mainstream economic 
theories consider knowledge, technology and technical change.  In their publications, 
they criticized and rejected the orthodox economic theory for the study of innovation. 
They believe that the knowledge economy has a distinctive character and that only an 
institutionalist approach can uncover the role and the special character of technical 
change. The adjective ‘national’ is the way to underscore this institutional dimension 
of innovation.  As Chesnais points out in an interview, it is ‘national’ because, 
  
we were saying ‘national’ when the trend was already saying governments 
must bow out…the importance was political, really and it became one of the 
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rallying flags for people who continued to say that national economics systems 
are not just markets, they are institutions, they are systemic relations, there are 
linkages (Chesnais in Sharif, 2006:753).  
 
In relation to the academic origin of the concept, the analytical model the authors 
developed comprises the following key variables related to the above conceptual 
framework (figure 1): 
 
Table 2: Key Variables of the NIS theoretical concept 
Firms’ 
characteristics 
Firms' interactions  Context of the NIS Performance and 
characteristics of 
the NIS 
- Firms’ mode of 
innovation 
o Organisati
onal set-up 
o Human 
resources  
o Sector 
specialisati
on   
- Local interaction 
among firms  
- International 
interaction 
among firms  
- Local interaction 
between firms 
and knowledge 
infrastructures  
- International 
interaction 
between firms 
and knowledge 
infrastructures  
- National 
education 
system 
- National labour 
market 
- National 
financial market  
- Welfare 
regimes 
- Intellectual 
property 
regimes  
- Innovation 
System 
specialisation 
and 
performance 
o Firms 
organis
ational 
position
ing  
o Firms 
network 
position
ing  
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Source: Process by author from: OECD (1999). Managing national innovation 
systems, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, p. 24. 
 
Based on this model, a number of case studies have revealed some empirical studies 
on successful uses of the NIS concept by other countries as ‘best practices’ in policy 
circles (OECD, 1999). Indeed, the NIS concept has influenced innovation practices 
and the OECD has evaluated such practices and on the basis of this established a ‘best 
practice’ guide for policy makers. These practices are perceived as standard for 
innovation for economic growth. Thus, every country aiming to use the NIS as a 
development tool for economic growth could follow these previously certified and 
tested standards. The NIS concept can be presented in its key aspects as follow: 
 
 
  
Table 3: Standards indicators of the NIS theory 
Firms characteristics Firms interactions  Context of the NIS Performance and characteristics 
of the NIS 
Character
istics 
Standards Interactions  
 
Standards Structure  
 
Standards Performance 
and 
characteristics  
 
Standards 
Firms’ 
innovation 
 
 
 
Local 
interaction 
among firms 
 
-internet based 
business 
information 
network  
-Building networks 
between public 
research actors and 
firms 
National 
education 
system  
 
-reform post-secondary 
education  
-increase government 
and industry  
support to professional 
education  
-Technology foresight 
for policy  
Firms 
organisational 
positioning  
 
-making 
evaluation 
obligatory 
-developing new 
methodologies   
 -Public-private 
partnerships 
-Building networks 
of competitive 
domestic firms 
--raising the co-
ordination function 
to the highest 
policy level  
setting. 
 Regulatory reform 
(university- 
industry interface) 
-Systemic upgrading of 
the S&T 
 infrastructure  
Organisati
onal set-up 
 International 
interaction 
among firms 
-internet based 
business 
information 
network  
- Building 
networks between 
public research 
National 
labour 
market 
-Brokering and 
procurement  
policies 
Firms network 
positioning 
-making 
evaluation 
obligatory 
-developing new 
methodologies   
 actors and firms 
-Public-private 
partnerships 
-raising the co-
ordination function 
to the highest 
policy level  
Human 
resources  
 Local 
interaction 
between 
firms and 
knowledge 
infrastructure
s  
-internet based 
business 
information 
network 
- building networks 
between public 
research actors and 
firms 
 -Public-private 
National 
financial 
market  
 
-establishment of legal 
framework for venture 
 capital   
-Funding greater use of  
benchmarking and  
diagnostic tools.  
 
-Public investment in 
venture  
  
 partnerships 
-raising the co-
ordination function 
to the highest 
policy level  
capital 
-Co-financing of 
consultants to upgrade 
firms’ organisational 
ability 
-co-financing of 
technology uptake via 
public/private 
partnerships. 
-competition among 
regions for funding of  
cluster initiatives 
-co-funded centres of 
excellence to facilitate 
university-industry 
linkages 
 $$-Increase government 
spending on basic R&D 
-Increase public support 
to R&D 
 
Sector 
specialisat
ion   
-Building 
innovation 
clusters  
International 
interaction 
between 
firms and 
knowledge 
infrastructure 
-internet based 
business 
information 
network 
- Building 
networks between 
public research 
actors and firms 
-Public-private 
partnerships 
-raising the co-
Welfare 
regimes 
 
   
 ordination function 
to the highest 
policy level  
 
 
   Intellectual 
property 
regimes  
   
 
Source: processed by author from: OECD (1999). “Managing National Innovation Systems.” 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, p. 70. 
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During the diffusion process of NIS, there has been what Lundvall described as “some 
distortion of the concept [NIS]” (Lundvall, 2007: 2). From the 1990s, policy makers 
and scholars started to apply a narrow understanding to the NIS theoretical concept 
(Lundvall, 2007), leading to the emergence of other competing systems theories and 
studies about innovation systems. Among them are four theories which have attracted 
a following in academic and policy circles alike.  
 
1) The ‘Technological Systems’ concept developed by Carlsson and Stankiewicz 
(1995). This is seen as a more dynamic approach, compare to previous ones, in which 
technological change depends on technological systems. Such systems include 
technical objects, natural resources, people, organisations, knowledge, legislations and 
norms (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1995).  
 
2) The ‘Regional Systems of Innovation’ concept of Cooke (1996) has more 
characteristics in common with NIS. Indeed, in this perspective, as with NIS, 
knowledge is tacit and locally shaped (Lundvall, 2007).   
 
3) Breshi and Malerba, (1997) have developed the concept of ‘Sectoral Systems of 
Innovation’. This concept offers a multilevel integrated system and an active view of a 
specific sector. It is proposed by Malerba that “a sectoral system is a set of products 
and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market inter-actions [understood as 
interactions amongst people] for the creation, production and sale of those products. A 
sectoral system has a speciﬁc knowledge base, technologies, inputs and demand” 
(Malerba, 2002: 247). 
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4) More recently, the ‘Triple Helix’ was developed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
(2000). For the authors “the Triple Helix denotes not only the relationship of the 
university, industry and government, but also internal transformation within each of 
these spheres” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000: 118).  
 
These systems theories recognised, as does the NIS, that interaction between users and 
producers of knowledge in a favourable political context leads to economic growth. 
All the systems approaches agree on something fundamental: the existence and 
importance of interactive characteristics. However, Lundvall (2007: 97) considered 
these approaches which emerged after the NIS as “crude interpretations and examples 
of misunderstandings” of what exactly the NIS theory incorporates and means. For 
him, the Innovation System concept is shaped by the local and national imprints given 
its national characteristic. Seen from this perspective, the sectoral innovation system, 
the regional innovation system, and the international innovation system are namely 
versions of the NIS theoretical concept. For Lundvall, “to compare sectoral, regional 
and technological systems across nations is often an operational method for 
understanding the dynamics at national level” (Lundvall, 2007:100).  
 
In other words, the analytical concept of a National Innovation Systems began to take 
shape as a narrative for policy – a description of the rationale for a policy direction, 
and the elements making up policy tools and actions. There is a significant difference 
between the two. While the academic analysis retains qualities of openness and 
reflexivity in the search for understanding or exploration (depending on the 
epistemological approach), a policy narrative is associated with closed definitions and 
set assumptions, and is oriented toward outputs and outcomes. 
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2.2.1.3. National Innovation Systems as a Policy Tool 
The NIS has also come to be associated with and defined in terms of policy rhetoric 
which can “provide policy makers a reasonably coherent “World View” and with 
basic principles of policy making on innovation in the new context” (Lundvall and 
Borras 1997:3). Thus, the NIS is used in policy circles as a rhetoric through which one 
can narratively frame policy. The objective of this use is practical -to enact policy and 
thus turn the NIS into what can be called a ‘policy tool’ in Lundvall’s (2007:1) point 
of view. The use of the NIS as a policy tool is not as commonly known by academics 
as its use as an object of study or its use as a theoretical concept. Miettenen (2013) 
considers it as ‘A transdiscursive term’ (2013:18) because, for him, “it [is also] a 
political term uses by national and international (OECD and EU) policy makers” 
(Miettenen, 2013: 8).  In the same way of thinking, Feinson (2002:14) mentions that  
 
the concept of National Innovation Systems (NIS) has been gaining […] 
practical coherence [policy tool] over a number of decades, enjoying initial 
strong adoption by OECD and developed countries, and more recently 
becoming the focus of increased attention as a means to address some of the 
more profound issues for developing nations.   
 
As a result, policy makers view NIS as having prodigious descriptive power in terms 
of a source on how a country’s economy develops, as well as a potential conceptual 
framework that can be used in order to design and produce policies and institutions 
capable of implementing innovation and boost the economy (Miettinen, 2002). 
Understood in this way, the NIS also “provide[s] the framework within which 
governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As 
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such, it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store, and transfer the 
knowledge, skills, and artifacts, which define new technologies’ (Sharif, 2004:84). 
This use of the NIS within policy circles is considered by Lundvall (2007:96) as the 
‘original agenda’. Godin (2009:17) sees such a role of the NIS as an ‘umbrella 
concept’. He suggests that “the concept of knowledge based economy is simply a 
concept that serves to direct the attention of policy makers to science and technology 
issues [and the OECD is a] research think tank that feeds policy makers” (Godin, 
2009:3). In other words, the OECD is the institutional frame within which the NIS was 
developed in order to provide countries with practical tools to help solve the economic 
crises they were facing.  
 
For these reasons, this thesis accepts the proposition that the NIS is a tool for 
intervening in the economy for the purpose of development; indeed, Sharif, (2004) 
argues that:  
 
The concept arose simultaneously in academia and policymaking (with regards 
to the latter, specifically in the OECD) at around the same time. This was 
possible because many of the key proponents of the concept occupied roles in 
both academia and policymaking (Sharif, 2004:11).  
 
Thus, the NIS is used by policy makers to design their policies. Originally, the concept 
was not only developed as an ‘analytical concept’ (Lundvall, 2007:1) for scholars to 
understand and explain innovation dynamics and countries’ performances, but also as 
a ‘development tool’ (Lundvall, 2007:1) for policymakers as a means to promote 
growth, job creation and competitiveness. Miettenen (2013) believes that the idea of 
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the innovation system was developed in the 1980s by researchers who were trying to 
formulate a useful concept for policy design.   
 
The key aim in this thesis is to investigate two projects, the NIS inspired policy tool 
and the Bt cotton innovation system, in facilitating development in Burkina Faso at 
both strategic policy and operational levels. Indeed, for the specific case of Burkina 
Faso, a project was developed in 2006 by both the FRSIT (representing the 
government) and the IRDC that intended to introduce the NIS framework as a policy 
narrative in order improve what one might call the NIS of the country.  
 
In doing so, they created a specific object of study – namely the Burkina Faso 
Innovation System – and applied to the existing ways that innovation has played as 
part of Burkina Faso’s economic history. 
 
2.2.2 Overview of the Burkina Faso Innovation System  
 
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in West Africa which was colonized by France 
from the early 1900s before becoming an independent state in 1960. Social, economic, 
political and historical reasons have shaped the innovation system of the country 
known as Upper Volta since the 1900s until 1984 when it became known as Burkina 
Faso.  This section will briefly describe the existing innovation system of Burkina 
Faso before the introduction of the NIS project, in relation to three key elements: 
science, industry and the state. 
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 Scientific research and its institutions  
The characteristics of the existing innovation system in Burkina Faso differed in 
comparison to the national innovation systems with regard to the roles of science, the 
key actors, the industry and the research and, most importantly, the role of the State 
within the system. Some accounts argue that scientific research in Burkina Faso began 
with colonization. It started with the Voltaic Centre of Scientific Research (CVRS), 
the nationalized name of the French Institute of Black Africa (IFAN) which was 
created in 1937 (IFAN, 1960). IFAN had its headquarters in Dakar and a branch 
located in Burkina Faso since 1949. It changed its name to CVRS in 1965 (Lill and 
Gaillard, 2013). Long before IFAN, the French set up the first experimental 
agricultural research Station of Saria in 1923 at Niangologo in the western part of 
Burkina Faso (Notes Africaines, 1961). Thus, science in French West Africa, 
specifically in Burkina Faso, was canalized and controlled by France to fulfil the 
immediate needs of French people. Jezequel (2007) considers the 1910s as the period 
which marked Africa’s entry into ‘research’. This period was characterized by some 
indigenous research and the institutionalization of training. 
 
In addition, investment in scientific research and higher education in the colonial 
period was significantly weaker because this was not a priority for the colonizer. 
Therefore, indigenous research was partly motivated by the colonizer wanting to know 
and study that primitive society for better administration and exploitation (Notes 
Africaine, 1961). Basic knowledge was given to a small number of people. For 
example, the Institute of Black African Studies (IFAN) focused on human, social and 
natural sciences (Notes Africaines, 1961).    
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In French–speaking Africa, the vast majority of authors were local 
schoolmasters trained at the prestigious Ecole Normale William Ponty in 
Senegal. Only a handful of these authors were officially recognised as such by 
either the colonial administration or the scholarly community. Thus while a 
few actually had careers as researchers, for the vast majority their ethnographic 
investigations boiled down to a few pages published in a local journal. 
(Jezequel, 2007: 145) 
 
The result of the above processes was the development and creation of very few 
research and training institutions during colonisation. Ecole Normale William Ponty 
trained school teachers from 1910 until the 1950s in all French West African colonies 
(Notes Africaines, 1961; Jezequel, 2007). This was the first colonial training institute 
in addition to IFAN, the research institute (created on August 19, 1932) to which 
Burkina Faso was linked (Note Africaines 1961). The creation of the research centre 
(ORSTOM) contributed to scientific research and knowledge development in West 
Africa (Bonneuil and Petitjean, 1996). Thus, scientific research was slowly promoted 
and had begun finding its way by the late 1950s. This led to the conversion of William 
Ponty’s school in Senegal to the University Cheick Anta Diop on the 24th February 
1957 (IFAN, 1961). Later on, the research institute and the university both were 
reorganised and linked to each other as a system in order to enhance the development 
of scientific research.  Scientific research in Upper Volta as a dependent colony began 
with Station de Saria in Niangologo in 1923 and the IFAN centre in Ouagadougou in 
1949. But there was a mismatch between research and development activities and 
national industrial development strategies and goals.  
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Higher education in its modern meaning did not exist until 1970s after independence 
because there was an awareness of the need for a solid intellectual base for the 
consolidation of independence, as well as a means to meet the overwhelming 
requirements for high-level manpower (Yesufu, 1973). This awareness led different 
African countries to create their own national universities to promote higher learning 
in the 1970s. Among them was the University of Ouagadougou, the first and the 
biggest University of the country established in 1974 to create and teach new 
knowledge. Even with the creation of the university, research fields were limited to 
Ethno-sociology, Geography, History, Linguistics, Zoology, and Botany.  
The agricultural sector was the most developed sector, more specifically the cotton 
sector was the most developed agricultural sector in terms of research and industry. 
Like the agricultural sector, the industrial sector was very weak in Burkina Faso. 
 
 Industries 
The industrial sector contributes 3% of the GDP in Burkina Faso, which remains very 
weak (Sidwaya, 2007, Tieba, 2016). As stated by one specialist, "We are almost 
exclusively dependent on the export of our raw materials. Well, cotton is, according to 
2006 and 2007 report, nearly 70% of [the country export] exports.” (Sylvanus Traoré 
in Sidwaya 2009: 2). This means there is a lack of industries to transform products 
before export. In terms of commodities, the country exports animals to Côte d'Ivoire, 
Ghana and Nigeria. These animals could have been turned into meat for a greater 
benefit. That is to say, "Many companies are craft industries” (Sylvanus Traoré in 
Sidwaya 2009: 2) with more focus on many SMEs mainly in the food sector. 
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However, “beside this, there are some major industrial companies that have made the 
country proud when they were under the control of the state before being privatized” 
(Sylvanus Traoré in Sidwaya 2009: 2). Among them is the cotton industry 
(SOFITEX).  This industry, between 1900 and 1960, was based in France and known 
as CFDT, the French fiber company. From 1960, the independent state had no choice 
other than to continue the initiative of the colonizer by building up its economy on 
cotton. As can be seen, until 1990, the innovation system of cotton which benefited 
from specific research and industry had a functional innovation system. However, in 
general terms, until 2006, the industrial sector was still very weak and limited.  
 
 The state 
The role of the State at that time in the system was more or less absent. Indeed, 
Burkina Faso’s development policies14 from the 1950s were shaped by the 
institutionalist model based on a “move to a higher technical and cultural stage” 
(Gerardin, 1964:111). As a result, the State did not encourage any development of 
highly educated people able to create new knowledge and technology for the 
industries. The impact on policy based on the critical perspective of modernization 
policy provided by dependency theory (supports the idea that the economies of the 
countries of the South are better understood within the international economic system) 
during the 1980s resulted in some substantial changes in the country’s socio-economic 
                                                 
14 ‘Plan Triennal 1960-61-62’ [Three Year Plan 1960-61-62]; ‘Premier Plan Quinquenal de Development 1963-
1967’ [1stFive Year Development Plan 1963-1967]; ‘Plan Cadre 1968-1970’ [Framework Plan 196801970]; 
‘Plan Interimaire 1971’ [Interim Plan, 1971]; ‘Deuxieme Plan Quinquenal du Development Economic et Social 
1972-1976’ [2ndFive Year Socio-economic Development Plan 1972-1976]; ‘Troixieme Plan Quinquenal du 
Development Economic et Social, Avant Projet 1977-1981’ [3rdFive year Socio-economic Development Plan 
1977-1981]  
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development (World Bank, 1999). Higher education was promoted and endogenous 
research was the priority. However, this approach, which gave an active 
interventionist role to the state, was displaced by the market model at the end of the 
1980s.  Such a shift in policy led to some changes in the policy options through 
privatization of government industries such as SOFITEX. The State could not play the 
facilitator role in the context of a free market. In such a context, the Strategic Plan of 
Scientific Research of Burkina Faso, was developed in 1995 by policy makers, 
national and international scientists and specialists, aimed through the National Forum 
for Science and Technological Research (FRSIT) and the National Agency for 
Valuing Research Results (ANVAR) to adopt innovations able to support the 
country’s development (Université de Ouagadougou, 2004). However, even with the 
development of higher education, the country was still facing serious difficulties due 
to the fact that research outcomes were not adequately disseminated to the industries. 
 
 Existing Linkages Between Actors  
Up to 2006, the innovation system in Burkina Faso was still weak (MRSI, 2012) 
despite the effort that the government and other related actors put into it. Indeed, like 
the different science policies since the 1960s, the existing institutions, enterprises and 
human actors were considered inadequate to promote innovation systems in Burkina 
Faso. In addition, they lacked government support. Thus, the existing linkages 
between the actors of the innovation system were either weak or did not exist at all. 
The innovation system as an interaction between users and producers of knowledge 
was not strong enough to bring about sustainable outcomes. The FRSIT was created 
and institutionalized in September 1995 (FRSIT/CDRI, 2008) to promote the use of 
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research results and innovations at national and international levels, and to encourage 
research collaboration through biennial events. To fulfil these aims, The National 
Agency for the Use of Research Results (ANVAR) is the sub-structure created in 1997 
whose task was to promote the use of research results generated in Burkina Faso, 
neighboring countries and worldwide (FRSIT, 2009). Pure research is still 
predominant compared to applied research. Up to 2006, the FRSIT has failed to bring 
users and producers together as a strong network to implement innovation for 
development in Burkina Faso (Nacoulma et al., 2005). 
 
With regards to these difficulties the country, in relation to how to promote science, 
technology and innovation, to bring together users and producers of innovation, was 
looking for alternatives. Thanks to the long standing collaboration between 
(International Development Research Centre) IDRC and FRSIT who have been 
working together in order to solve this issue, a collaborative project was formulated. 
Indeed, they both came to the conclusion that there is a need for an interactive tool. In 
their search for a new and interactive framework to bring actors together in order to 
promote innovations and boost the country’s economy, the NIS was proposed by 
IDRC as a tool to improve the country’s developmental sectors through interaction 
between users and producers. Thus a specific project was put into place to adopt the 
NIS as a policy narrative to improve/transform the existing weak innovation system 
for socio-economic development.  
 
2.2.3. Development 
The concept of development has a long history and has given rise to considerable 
controversy (Rostow, 1960; UNDP, 1991; Escobar, 1991, 1992; Rist, 1997). Gilbert 
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Rist (1997), a specialist in development theory, offers the most comprehensive 
discussion about the concept, and as such provides the main source for the present 
conceptual discussion. According to Rist’s historiography, the concept can be 
understood in three ways.  
 
First, development, in its intransitive sense, can refer to a natural phenomenon of 
growth. This definition is reflected in processes such as growth from small to big, 
young to old, immaturity to maturity, child to adult, that is, humans, animals and trees 
grow physically and naturally. Referring to the evolution of western thought, Rist 
(1997) underlined that this natural development is thought to happen in three ways: 1) 
God’s intervention, 2) spontaneity, or 3) just a natural phenomenon.  This earlier 
conception of development has influenced the history of the concept. Considering 
western society as the highest stage of development, this definition came to scale the 
history of all societies as passing from savage to barbarism before reaching the stage 
of civilisation. Rist shows how such a conception underpins western imperialism, and 
is played out through colonisation. In this respect, development is seen to be 
synonymous with another term - civilisation.  
 
Second, in its transitive sense, development is considered as a process with the 
objective of modifying a reality in order to improve it. Development conceived as 
process emerged in the 1940s. This is strongly connected with European colonisation 
and the fight for decolonisation. Indeed, colonisation is the beginning of the 
emergence of the difference between two different worlds: one is civilised and the 
other non-civilised.  Such a distinction between the two worlds led to repeated 
invasions by the ‘civilised world’, which conquered the ‘non-civilised’; this period of 
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colonisation was “a transitional period, then in which brutal power relations existed 
alongside paternalist feelings of responsibility towards ‘natives’ who needed to be 
civilized” (Rist 1997:47). It was within this context that the concept of development as 
process enters policy circles. According to Rist, US president Truman first employed 
the concept in 1947. Since then and afterward, the concept has been widely used and 
promoted throughout academia and policy circles. Truman regarded development as a 
process, a way to help underdeveloped countries in their fight against poverty. This 
definition implies a purposive intervention, as is reflected in the following from the 
South Commission’s report that defines development as:   
 
a process which enables human beings to realise their potential, build their 
self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment. It is a process which 
frees people from the fear of want and exploitation. It is a movement away 
from political, economic, or social oppression. Through development, political 
independence acquires its true significance. And it is a process of growth, a 
movement essentially springing from within the society that is developing 
(Rist 1997: 8-9). 
 
What is stressed here is both the purposive intervention and the endogenous character 
of any development which aims to be sustainable. Then, development consists of 
changing a reality by implementing activities. It is expected that these activities will 
result in a given desired state. Such a desired state is the third meaning of the concept 
of development. Studies in development studies have been generally concerned with 
this dimension of development. In this respect, authors such as Lipton (2005) 
underlined the contribution of biotechnology to the reduction of poverty. 
Biotechnology is seen here as a means to reach a desired state (development). As he 
stated,  
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Family farming, crop science and ‘globalisation’ together largely determine 
progress against poverty […] and science-based rises in small farmers’ staples 
food productivity, […] Most of the world’s poor are in, or employed mainly 
on, family farms. Big gains for all main groups of dollar-poor need, first, a 
special type of growth in farm productivity; partly by luck, the Green 
Revolution was of the right type (Lipton, 2004: 1). 
 
It is believed that crop science will alleviate poverty in poor countries. It is also 
believed that biotechnology will bring about development by increasing the quantity 
and quality of agricultural products, thereby increasing the income of farmers in 
developing countries and raising their living standards.  For biotechnology proponents 
Bt cotton appears in this respect as a way for African’s farmers to alleviate their 
poverty (2003; Glover, 2010). At policy level it is this understanding of development 
that underlies all technical cooperation for development (Gaillard, 1999).  
 
Nonetheless treatments of development as intervention often ask questions about the 
impacts of such intervention.  This aspect concerns the third meaning of development, 
which refers to a change from position A to position B (B being better than A) (Aron 
2006). For example, developed countries contrast with underdeveloped ones, as each 
refers to a particular point in a rank.  Aron claims that the objectives for all countries 
are the same; they all aim for higher economic growth. It is from this perspective that 
the differences between rich and poor countries become more observable. This way of 
seeing development reduces it to increases (or not) in productivity; development in 
reality consists in producing goods in increased quantities and also different products 
with enhanced processes. For example, tools changed from manual to machines and 
increasingly complex machines in order to increase productivity. Underdevelopment 
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was therefore characterised by a low level of GDP. Low individual income is another 
consequence of underdevelopment.  
 
Today, definitions of development are not limited to a simple reference to increases in 
GDP.  Instead, the basic objective of human development is to enlarge the range of 
people’s choices to make development more democratic and fully participatory. These 
choices are believed to include access to income and employment opportunity, 
education, health, a clean and safe environment (Rist, 1997). Such a definition of 
development which includes the second definition of the concept goes back to the 
1980s. This should enable individuals to enjoy human, economic and political 
freedoms in a sustainable way. Thus, there was an awareness of the interrelationship 
between modernisation and the culture of people. Development became “a process of 
profound structural transformation-it cannot be simply imported” (Rist, 1997: 202). In 
other words, 
 
development is a process which enables human beings to realize their 
potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment. It is a 
process which frees people from the fear of want and exploitation. It is a 
movement away from political, economic and social expression. Through 
development, political independence acquires its true significance. And it is a 
process of growth, a movement essentially springing from within the society 
that is developing ...the base for the nation’s development must be its own 
resources, both human and material, fully used to meet its own 
needs...Development has therefore to be an effort of, by, and for the people. 
True development has to be people-centred (Rist, 1997: 202). 
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From this standpoint, development becomes more than just an increase of income and 
wealth. It focuses more on individuals’ wellbeing and freedom. This calls for a more 
critical assessment of the potential of technological intervention to improve the 
welfare of societies which receive it. This is another aspect which is strongly 
addressed by the literature in development studies. For example, with respect to 
biotechnology, authors point out that its potential as a new technology need to be 
related to its use by people; because to reach a state of development (quantitatively 
and qualitatively) with biotechnology, it will require some radical reforms which 
prevents small farmers from domination for the rise of the pro-poor farm science. The 
necessary reforms to be carried out if the green revolution has to alleviate poverty in 
developing countries has been discussed by other authors such as Scoones (2006); 
Chataway, (2005) and Glover, (2010). Indeed, in the literature there is commonly 
shared view that: 
 
Pouring money into science and technology however without recognizing 
institutional and systemic complexities associated with creating ‘pro-poor’ 
technologies is unlikely to deliver much for those farmers. Moreover, there are 
a range of economic and political contextual factors which further complicate 
efforts to put the technology to use for poorer farmers. (Chataway 2005:597).  
 
In this connexion, with regard to the environmental aspect, while the use of GM crops 
may bring environmental benefits through reduced use of agricultural chemicals, there 
is concern that they also threaten environmental stability. A prominent concern is that 
cultivation of GM crops will lead to reductions in biodiversity. Biodiversity is 
essential for environmental stability, and is recognised as an essential resource base, 
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valuable for food security and sustainable development.  GM crops may push their 
wild relatives out of ecosystems. There is also the risk of horizontal gene transfer 
(transfer of the novel genetic trait to other plants), which could result in weeds 
developing insect resistance or herbicide tolerance. Or the genes may transfer to 
insects or bacteria causing them to take up resistance too. There is evidence to support 
these concerns. Increased use of glyphosate herbicides on tolerant GE crops has also 
promoted resistance in weeds. As Levidow and Carr (1997) underline: 
 
…herbicide-resistant crops will perpetuate or even increase agrochemical 
usage (e.g., BWG 1990). More fundamentally, some NGOs criticize 
biotechnology for taking agriculture further down a misguided route. It 
develops single-gene solutions for problems that derive from a monocultural 
farming system, designed on industrial models of efficiency [...] Levidow and 
Carr (1997: 33).  
  
The critique of GM is typically limited solely to biotechnology in agricultural 
production and homogenizes ‘farmers’ instead of appreciating the myriad ways in 
which different classes of farmers organize their production and reproduction (Glover, 
2010). Another weakness is the failure to address the ways in which changes to 
intellectual property rights and other regulatory issues might open up innovation in 
GM and related technologies to broaden both the range of GM crops available and 
their delivery and accessibility to various categories of farmers. Furthermore, indirect 
shortcomings of technological innovation, such as those risks arising from 
biotechnology agriculture, are virtually absent from economic assumptions. From a 
development perspective however, these aspects cannot be ignored in the investigation 
of benefits of scientific and technological innovation in agriculture. The best studies 
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on the matter come from sociology, as illustrated by the cogent study by Kloppenburg 
(2005). Indeed, in First the Seed, the Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-
2000, the rural sociologist analysed the process of expropriation of farmers by 
capitalist enterprise through agricultural research and technological innovation. 
 
The disappearance of family farm, the concentration of farm ownership and 
production, the displacement of labour, the decline in the quality of food, the 
deterioration of the environment, the rise of the agribusiness, the 
marginalization of small producer, and the exacerbation of income inequalities 
in farming. (Kloppenburg, 2005:4).   
 
He sets out to explain how the increasing subordination of agricultural science to 
capital has been achieved and addresses some of its complex effects. Traditional 
histories of science have emphasized chronological order as an organizing principle. 
For Kloppenburg: 
 
Technology does not necessitate. It merely consists of an evolving range of 
possibilities from which people choose. A social history of technology that 
explores beneath the appearance of necessity to illuminate these possibilities 
which technology embodies reveals as well the contours of the society that 
realizes or denies them (Kloppenburg, 2005: 8). 
 
As a result, the aspiration to a development stage could fail if, in the case of 
biotechnology, environmental, safety, economic and technical issues are not taken into 
account.   
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In conclusion, three fundamental definitions can be applied to the concept of 
development: 1) development as a natural phenomenon of growth, 2) development as 
processes which necessitate human intervention (e.g. green revolution as a scientific 
discovery to foster development) and finally, 3) development as a state which is the 
outcome of such processes such as biotechnology innovation processes. For the 
purpose of the present research, the second and the third dimensions of the concept of 
development are going to be discussed throughout the thesis. 
 
From the end of the 1990s, some have argued that to achieve development (as a state) 
there is a need to develop new types of economies based on knowledge within which 
the NIS policy tool and biotechnology were both a choice to fulfil the desire outcome 
(development).  The shift is the knowledge based economy implementation is the 
subject of the next section. 
 
2.2.4. Knowledge-Centred Development 
Because of its failure, enthusiasm for ‘market fanaticism’ has given way to a new 
consensus that Stiglitz and his collaborators have called the ‘knowledge-centred 
development agenda’ (Cimoli, et al. 2009:557). The World Bank in its first report at 
the beginning of the third millennium acknowledged that “Poor countries—and poor 
people—differ from rich ones not only because they have less capital but because they 
have less knowledge” (World Bank 1999:2). ‘Knowledge’ has taken the place of 
‘capital’ as a production factor. The knowledge-centred development approach 
conceives of: 
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development as a process that links micro-learning dynamics, economy-wide 
accumulation of technological capabilities, and industrial development. 
Different knowledge and different national ‘political economies’, of course 
yield different patterns of industrialization. However, it happens that all the 
countries which are nowadays developed undertook relatively high degrees of 
intervention to support their accumulation of technological capabilities and the 
transformation of their organizations of production especially in the early 
period of industrialization (Cimoli, et al.2009:543).  
 
Slowly taking off from the start of the current millennium, its establishment as a 
dominant discourse on development was prompted by the economic crisis of 2008 
(Cimoli et al., 2009), which reaffirmed that the role of knowledge in the economy is as 
old as economics. Smith (1937), List (1885), and Schumpeter (1934) had all addressed 
this basic problem.  
 
Similarly, the ‘development age’ was opened with the feeling of duty to “embark on a 
bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial 
progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Rist 
1997:71). The institutionalist model which was promoted particularly by Rostow 
(1960) made technological progress the key to the diversification, specialisation and 
modernisation of economic sectors. The dependency model of development embraced 
by a large number of countries in the South were attempting to de-link from 
international systems in order to benefit more from the science and technology that 
they expected would result from a package of endogenous policy strategies. The 
UNESCO information policy in the early 1990s provided a framework for these 
initiatives. The period between the late 1970s and the late 1980s saw the development 
of the first science and technology policies and the erection of higher education 
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institutions in many countries in the South and in Africa in particular (World Bank, 
1990). However, the institutionalist development regime developed earlier in the 
introduction of this thesis, 
 
the role of learning (how to discover, how to identify opportunities and 
constraints, etc.) and the product space literature highlight the role of 
capabilities in defining the direction of diversification. They fail to address the 
process of learning and the link between structural transformation and 
accumulation of capabilities. Learning itself and the evolution of capabilities 
remain in a black box (Nübler 2011:7).  
 
In other words, “The thrust of institutional economics in the catching up debate is on 
the productivity-enhancing role of structural transformation” (Nübler 2011:7). 
Catching up is defined as a process of diversification into higher productivity and 
value added activities, and of enhancing the complexity of economic structures and 
sophistication of the production and export structure’ (Nübler 2011).  
 
In 1990, African states developed their own strategic plans, with the support of the 
UNESCO fully-fledged program, which terminated in 1994. The strategic position of 
the World Bank gave it the power to shape the initiative to fit the market paradigm, 
resulting in it prescribing for the states a program of internal reorganisation aiming to 
boost African countries’ economic development (Nübler 2011:5).  This was consistent 
with the structural adjustment policy, which prescribed liberalisation and squeezed the 
role of the state and social sector, including higher education.  For the first time the 
Burkinabe government in the 1990s defined strategic lines of scientific research which 
enumerated the country’s development sectors, including: (1) more independence in 
doing and organising research; 2) the linking of all research programmes to social and 
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contextual realities and needs; and 3) the linking of research activities to productivity. 
The 5-year strategic plan for scientific research in Burkina Faso set out in 1995 to both 
actualise the potential of research to contribute to the country’s development and make 
the main research centre (CNRST) a tool and means to promote and coordinate 
research in order to realise the State’s objectives (CNRST, 1994, 1995). It was 
considered that research should contribute to solving local and immediate economic 
and social problems, and that external financial support, although costly, remained 
very necessary. However, the World Bank kept a hold on the training of technical staff 
for government and training for private actors while building its own knowledge bank, 
anticipating or implementing a commercialisation policy of expertise in development 
techniques, which it considered would become the most important activity. 
 
The prospect of a knowledge economy animated several debates towards the end of 
the 1990s, but it was particularly after the economic crisis that the knowledge-centred 
development paradigm found its opportunity (Rist 1997; World Bank, 1999; Cimoli et 
al., 2009). What is distinctive about the knowledge-centred development policy is that 
“Learning is viewed as the essence of development and the major rationale for 
industrial policies is to facilitate and shape the learning process for a rapid 
accumulation of domestic capabilities” (Nübler 2011:9). Over the last fifteen years, 
this regime has moved increasingly to the centre of the development agenda. 
Knowledge-centred development is realised through innovation. The challenge then 
for all states is to find the best approach for catalysing innovation for sustainable 
socio-economic development. The National Innovation Systems framework is one of 
the approaches for this process of change.  
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2.2.5. Social Technologies  
The adoption of the NIS as a policy narrative and a policy tool in Burkina Faso can be 
seen as a case of technological transfer. Yet, to consider the NIS policy tool as a 
matter of technology and then investigate its transfer in Burkina Faso requires a 
broader definition of the concept of technology that goes beyond its traditional 
understanding. In this traditional sense, as Ellul pointed out, “Whenever we see the 
word technology or technique, we automatically think of machines. … we commonly 
think of our world as a world of machines” (Ellul, 1964: 3). Understood in this way, 
technology would be confined to its material aspect as associated with tangible 
products (e.g., tangible artefact, systems, and networks, etc.). Certainly, “the machine 
is the most obvious, massive, and impressive example of technique, and historically 
the first.” (Ellul, 1964: 3). However, reducing the concept of technology to its material 
aspect is misleading, because such a definition would exclude social relations and 
social practices (e.g., organisation of work), or knowledge, skills and techniques 
(Ellul, 1964; Sharif, 2004) that help shape and are shaped by technology., In other 
words, as Sharif put it cogently,  
  
…the definition of technology is one where technology has three parts. First 
are artefacts, systems, and networks. This is the material aspect of technology, 
and this is the traditional definition of technology associated with tangible 
products. Second are knowledge, skills and techniques…. The third component 
of technology is related [to] social practices and social relations (e.g. 
organisation of work) (Sharif, 2004: 89). 
 
The NIS policy tool is thus not restricted to material technology of a tangible nature; 
but it is a social technology of the kind of ‘knowledge, skills and techniques’ or ‘social 
practices and social relations’. Therefore, as “a way of analysing an economy to 
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determine how innovations can be promoted (for the purposes of economic growth)” 
(Sharif, 2004: 89), the NIS policy tool can be studied in the same way as STS 
approaches do for tangible artefacts. For example, the domestication of the scallops at 
St Brieuc Bay in France (Callon, 1986) entailed a transfer of social technology15, 
raising similar problems (the social context such as the actors and their needs) as the 
diffusion of bicycles studied by Pinch and Bijker, (1984). As with any technology, the 
NIS is not neutral; it is embedded in the social context within which it is developed. 
This social context is not necessarily the same in the context of adoption. This 
socially-constructed character of technology raises a series of questions regarding the 
challenges that the social context of Burkina Faso poses in relation to the adoption of 
NIS too for innovation diffusion to improve existing innovation systems.   
 
STS approaches have usually been used for the analysis of things that are more 
technical/tangible, however we believe the NIS, as an example of an intangible 
technology, is a model which can be studied. It can be used to explore non-tangible 
technology of the kinds of NIS policy tool adopted in Burkina Faso to implement 
knowledge-centred development policy regimes centred on innovation. Such hybrid 
networks such as the NIS have been categorised as 'social technologies' in recent 
studies (Sharif, 2004).  
 
                                                 
15 It is about understanding the heterogeneous processes of social and technological change, focusing on the 
dynamic networks of actors and intermediaries involved in the production, use and diffusion of a new 
technology. Callon explores the way the networks converge, leading to unified links. The TENs’ approach is 
therefore used to analyse coordinated sets of heterogeneous actors (human actors and intermediaries) which 
interact more or less successfully 
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2.3. Literature review 
The question in hand here is how policy rhetoric/narrative/tools such as the NIS 
emerge and how this leads to a redirection policy making, which becomes 
institutionalised and implemented in development sectors. In other words, human 
action depends on the context, and presents some specific characteristic in relation to 
the context. Thus, policy formulation and policy implementation are shaped by their 
social context, and this is the case in relation to the use of the NIS policy tool when it 
is translated for use at policy and implementation levels. In such processes, the 
motives for action are different from one actor to another.  
 
In this regard, the constructivist approaches in STS became relevant here. The pattern 
in these approaches can be seen as a reflection of the shaping character of the socio-
technical milieu of technological practice (Sharif, 2004). The National Innovation 
Systems policy narrative (an intangible artefact) can be studied in the same way STS 
is for tangible artefacts. The studies by Callon and Bijker offer practical suggestions 
for this study. For Callon, Actor Network Theory (ANT) “consists of four moments 
which can in reality overlap. These moments constitute the different phases of a 
general process called translation, during which the identity of actors, the possibility 
of interaction, and the margins of manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited.” (Callon 
and Blackwell, 2007: 59). Such a detailed set of steps is essential to the investigation 
of the implementation process of the NIS. In the same perspective, Callon developed 
the idea of Techno-Economic Networks (TENs) which focus on the dynamic networks 
of actors and intermediaries involved in the production, use and diffusion of a new 
technology. Through this he explores the way the networks converge, leading to 
unified links. The TENs approach is therefore used to analyse coordinated sets of 
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heterogeneous actors (human actors and intermediaries) which interact more or less 
successfully. It is important to underline that as in the NIS, actors in TENs are 
independent.  
 
Bijker shows how the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), another 
constructivist analytical framework, supports the idea that human action shapes 
technology and vice versa. In other words, the way society is organised impacts on the 
way technology is developed and used. The proponents of this approach also argue 
that the ways in which a technology is used cannot be understood without 
understanding how that technology is embedded in its social context (Bijker et al. 
2012) 
 
The constructivist approaches such as TENs, ANT, SCOT all give significance to 
social and political factors. These analytical frameworks therefore offer in this respect 
a theoretical foundation for the present research because these constructivist 
approaches highlight that, as in the NIS, both science and technology are matters of 
social negotiation. Thus, an empirical study needs to be able to take into account the 
socio-cultural and political situation of the social group which shapes its norms and 
values, which in turn influence the meaning given to the artefact and how the artefact 
influences them in turn (Bijker et al, 2012). 
 
From this perspective, authors have conducted their studies to focus on the process of 
the implementation of the NIS policy tool using constructivist approaches. Indeed, 
Sharif (2004) has demonstrated the ‘contributions from the Sociology of Technology 
to the Study of Innovation Systems’. He demonstrates in his paper the extent to which 
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SCOT is a useful framework for the study of a National Innovation System as a policy 
tool. The main argument that he highlighted is that SCOT would help to understand 
the innovation systems by analysing a variety of social, political, cultural, 
environmental, and economic matters “surrounding the development of the concept as 
an analytical tool” (Sharif, 2004:90). In other words, as he puts it: as an ‘analytical 
tool’, the NIS can benefit from: 
 
a social construction of technology (SCOT) analysis. One of the main reasons 
for this is that the IS concept (as a social technology) is open to interpretive 
flexibility. The workability of the IS concept is subject to radically different 
interpretations which are coextensive with social groups. Different social 
groups apply this IS concept differently. Depending on which social group 
uses the IS framework (government, policymaking / influencing bodies, firms), 
different outcomes can accrue (depending on how they apply it). SCOT is 
valuable as it focuses attention on what counts as a viable working 
technology… (Sharif, 2004:90). 
 
Additionally, Sharif has demonstrated that the actor-network theory framework is one 
with only a cluster of actants where it is possible to “break down the barrier between 
micro and macro level concepts and events by linking them together” (Sharif, 2004: 
94). Sharif therefore credits ANT as also suitable for the analysis of the NIS. He 
claims that Law’s (1992) and Callon’s (1986) analyses are also applicable to the 
innovation systems development tool. Sharif did not limit himself to proposing STS 
approaches as suitable for the study of the National Innovation Systems model. He 
also conducted an empirical study using the NIS model (policy tool) in Hong Kong 
(Sharif, 2009), in his ‘Rhetoric of Innovation Policy Making in Hong Kong Using the 
Innovation Systems Conceptual Approach’. Based on the constructivist approach, 
Sharif came to the conclusion that the IS of Hong Kong has little to do with the IS 
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frame developed by its originators in the 1980s. The author suggested that Hong Kong 
policy makers have used the IS tool in ways that diverge from its conceptual approach. 
Such flexibility, according to the author, makes its worldwide use possible (Sharif, 
2006; 2009). In addition to Sharif, Cambrosio et al. (1990) have used the input and 
output measures from STS as their main analytical tool, accepting through this 
strategy the view that most studies treat science policy as a 'black box': hence their 
study attempted to analyse the actual day-by-day processes of science policy definition 
and implementation in the Quebec context. Before these authors’ studies, only a 
limited number of people had studied in detail the construction and application of 
particular science policy programmes. In order to retrace such a construction process, 
ANT has been used as a suitable theoretical framework for examining the translation 
of biotechnology which is a concrete case study of science policy episodes intended to 
look not at why it happens but most importantly how this translation has developed.   
 
The result of their analysis shows that policy definition processes are different due to 
administrative cultures and different governments’ specificities in the way they shape 
innovation processes. This clearly highlights the extent to which innovation policy is 
culturally embedded in connection with the local nature of practices. In the same 
perspective, Albert and Laberge (2007), in ‘The legitimation and dissemination 
processes of the innovation system approach: the case of the Canadian and Quebec 
science and technology policy’, reveal that their study draws its theoretical framework 
from Drori et al (2003) on the notion of cultural authority of science.  Such a 
framework is developed through two interconnected phenomena: 1) that in modern 
society, science is seen as a main rational cultural framework - that is to say, that 
science structures and shapes the way modern societies view the world; and 2) that 
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science is believed to be able to provide rational interpretations of the social and 
natural world orders from the larger political, economic, and environmental domains 
to the individual, taking into account personal behaviours and individual or groups 
practices, such as healthy lifestyle and parenting. In the paper, the authors argue that 
science acquires cultural authority through social actors’ adherence to a ‘scientized’ 
view of the world. This cultural authority of science creates an increased demand for 
scientific knowledge. Their findings showed that the high level of adherence to the IS 
tool by public sector employees can be largely explained by the prestige, or symbolic 
power, of the OECD and its associated epistemic community, as well as by the 
cultural authority that science exerts on them (Sharif, 2009). These empirical studies 
have taken into account the socio-cultural and political situation of the social groups 
which shape its norms and values, and which in turn influence the meaning given to 
the artefact (in this case the NIS model).  
 
However, as Cozzens (2002) and Geels (2007) have demonstrated, there are very few 
scholars who studied in addition to the process, the outcome derived from such a 
process in the implementation of science and technology. As Cozzens (2002:101) 
observed more than a decade ago, “the majority of [the literature] has studied the 
process of innovation and not its outcomes. Traditional innovation studies still focus 
narrowly on making new things in new ways, rather than on whether the new things 
are necessary or desirable, let alone their consequences for jobs and wages” Similarly, 
Geels pointed out: 
 
The sectoral systems of innovation approach has a strong focus on the 
development of knowledge, and pays less attention to the diffusion and use of 
technology, impacts and societal transformations. Sometimes, the user side is 
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taken for granted or narrowed down to a ‘selection environment’. Hence I 
propose a widening from sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical 
systems. This means that the fulfilment of societal functions becomes central 
(e.g. transport, communication, materials supply, housing). This indicates that 
the focus is not just on innovations, but also on use and functionality (Geels 
2007:898).  
 
There is an urgent need for a more comprehensive framework that not only takes the 
process aspect into account, but is also capable of integrating an account of outcomes. 
In other words, the constructivist approaches are limited to the understanding of 
development as a state or ‘as social kinds of goal-orientated action’ (Knight, 
2008:317). This specific societal reality could be found in the case of the NIS which is 
a social technology, is shaped by human, economic and environmental context 
because, even in a context where rules exist to regulate actors’ actions, “a practice 
cannot be sustained if its participants do not normally act in accordance with its rules”, 
because, “those rules may be broken” (Knight 2008:318). Taking this aspect into 
account, it is particularly relevant to understand the outcome from the translation and 
also from the implementation of the NIS, drawing on the case of the introduction and 
impact of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso. This is particularly important in order to 
understand the exact aim of the involved actors through their actions and behaviours; 
because as can be seen with the previous development models, policy-makers can 
adopt a specific development strategy for financial support purposes, with a 
subsequent downgrading of development as the prime concern. This possibility is 
confirmed by Sharif’s finding regarding Hong Kong, which he qualified as, ‘a rhetoric 
of innovation policy making’ (Sharif, 2009). It is what Albert and Laberge (2007) also 
found through their case study on Quebec, Canada, where the adoption of the IS 
approach by public sector employees can be largely explained by the prestige or 
 86 
symbolic power of the OECD. In this case the symbolic power has overshadowed the 
goal of the policy practice.  
 
To date the majority of the constructivist approaches that I reviewed above (ANT, 
TEN, SCOT) have shown a certain limitation in their ability to be used for the analysis 
of the outcomes derived from the implementation of a model/technology. The best, 
which is capable of combining both dimensions namely 1) the shaping and 2) the 
outcome from such shaping, is Frank Geels’ Socio Technical-Systems (ST-Systems) 
or Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) framework. In the following I shall explain why it 
is best suited as analytical framework for my thesis. 
 
2.4. Using ST-Systems approach to study the adoption, implementation and 
impact of the NIS as a policy narrative in Burkina Faso 
There is a need for an analytical framework which in addition to what ANT, TENs, 
and SCOT have contributed in terms of the construction of networks can also locate 
these within broader socio-economic structures – such as the national systems of 
innovation described above. Geels (2004), a specialist in innovation systems and 
sustainability, therefore proposed: 
Look[ing] at socio-technical systems which encompass production, diffusion 
and use of technology, I define ST-Systems in a somewhat abstract, functional 
sense as the linkages between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions 
(e.g. transport, communication, nutrition). As technology is a crucial element 
in modern societies to fulfil those functions, it makes sense to distinguish the 
production, distribution and use of technologies as sub-functions. To fulfil 
these sub-functions, the necessary elements can be characterised as resources. 
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ST-Systems thus consist of artefacts, knowledge, capital, labour, cultural 
meaning, etc. (Geels 2004:900). 
 
Within the various STS approaches, the S-T Systems approach is more relevant to 
understanding the outcomes of a technological innovation. This approach originated 
from Geels, who argues that: 
 
Socio-technical systems do not function autonomously, but are the outcome of 
the activities of human actors. Human actors are embedded in social groups 
which share certain characteristics (e.g. certain roles, responsibilities, norms, 
perceptions). In modern societies many specialised social groups are related to 
resources and sub-functions in ST- Systems (Geels 2004:900).  
 
From this perspective, the ST-System approach therefore drew from existing 
approaches in STS (ANT, SCOT, NIS) to capture technological processes that, 
considered individually, are not adequately addressed by the existing array of 
approaches.   
 
2.5. Socio-Technical Systems 
The ST-Systems shares some features with TENs, ANT, SCOT and the NIS 
framework. The emphasis on the ‘national’ context reflects a tacit recognition of the 
insufficiency of the potential of market mechanisms ‘for stimulating accelerated rate 
of technical innovation and deriving the benefits from knowledge accumulation at the 
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level of organizations and individuals’ (Sharif 2005:84).  At the same time the 
efficiencies of organisations and individuals:  
 
depends on numerous and often country-specific institutional, infrastructural, 
and cultural conditions with respect to relationships among the science, 
education and business sectors, accounting practices, corporate governance 
structures, and labour relations (Sharif 2004:84-85).  
 
This conceptual move from the linear model, where the state is absent, led to the 
integration of the government as a key actor in the system. Indeed, “governments are 
seen to have a responsibility for improving the institutional framework for knowledge 
exchange among organizations and between market and non-market organizations in 
addition to correcting market failures (e.g., providing public goods, intellectual 
property rights, subsidizing R&D)” (Sharif 2004:85).  
Another element around which the ST-System approach meets the NIS framework is 
the use of the metaphor of ‘system’. Like the ST-System approach, the NIS: 
 
[A]llows emphasis to shift away from the organization as the sole vector of 
technological innovation in a society to the role of government policy, legal 
institutions, education and training institutions, and even norms and regimes. 
That the interactive processes and feedback loops between these institutions 
are emphasized is a strong point of the framework (Sharif 2004:87).   
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This institutional component is particularly emphasised by Geels (2004), who gives it 
a deeper conceptualisation compared with its discrete status in the NIS framework. 
Porter and Whitley’s work on innovation and in particular Whitley’s study of national 
business systems, which focused on the culturally embedded character of business 
practices, contributed to this strong attention to institutions.  For Geels, drawing on a 
Mertonian insight, “the articulation of medium range patterns and stylized conceptual 
models may enhance STS’s policy relevance, especially if they address issues that 
policy makers struggle with” (Geels 2007:630). 
 
Geels adopted the Sectoral Innovation System and then extended it into the more 
specific “Sectoral Innovation of Socio-Technical Systems” (Geels 2007:898), in which 
the ‘fulfilment of societal functions becomes central’ (Geels 2007:898). This received 
less attention in the conceptualisation of Sectoral Innovation Systems (Geels 2007). 
By doing that, he therefore took part in an old debate among NIS analysts. Indeed, 
several scholars questioned the use of ‘national’ innovation systems, at different levels 
of analysis - such as technological, regional sectoral or trans-national - might be more 
appropriate. The move instead for the notion of system since the 1990s by some 
authors, such as Carlson et al (1995) (‘technological systems’) and Malerba (‘sectoral 
systems of innovation’), as alternatives to the concept of national innovation approach 
shows the existence of the debate prior to Geels. This reflects the need for 
‘emphasizing the systemic characteristics of innovation but with focus on other levels 
of the economy than the nation state’ (Sharif 2005:91). The argument is that with 
respect to modern innovation, interactions of significant relevance tend to take place 
across borders. Nevertheless, some contend that “Innovation systems also exist at 
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other levels, e.g. there are world-wide, regional or local networks of firms and clusters 
of industries. These systems may or may not be confined within a country’s borders, 
but national characteristics and frameworks always play a role in shaping them.” 
(OECD 1997:23). 
 
It appears, from these similarities, that what is distinctive about the ST-Systems 
approach is its aim to contribute to the analytical and instrumental improvement of the 
NIS rather than questioning the relevance of the content of the framework. And this 
contribution, which is of particular interest to this thesis, is to provide an answer to the 
question ‘how do new sectoral systems emerge, and what is the link with the previous 
sectoral system. Geels gives his multi-level, ST-Systems perspective a coherent 
content that enables the understanding of socio-technical transitions, shifts from one 
socio-technical system to another at the level of societal functions (Geels 2007).  He 
addresses the theoretical problem at the landscape level and at institutional levels. For 
him the shifts do “not only involve artefacts, but also infrastructures, regulations, 
cultural changes, mobility patterns and markets” (Geels 2007:641). In this perspective, 
Geels strongly supported the idea that: 
 
Landscapes provide even stronger structuration of activities than regimes. This 
does not necessarily mean they have more effects than regimes, but refers to 
the relationship with action. Landscapes are beyond the direct influence of 
actors, and cannot be changed at will. Material environments, shared cultural 
beliefs, symbols and values are hard to deviate from. They form ‘gradients’ for 
action (Geels, 2004:913). 
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The ST-Systems framework is appropriate for study because it takes into account 
processes such as translation (diffusion of NIS and Bt cotton), and collaboration 
systems analysis (NIS and Bt cotton innovation systems)), which makes it more 
relevant for this thesis, particularly with regard for example to the shift from a 
conventional cotton system to the Bt cotton system in Burkina Faso. As Freeman and 
Louçã (2001) suggested, “It is essential to study both the relatively independent 
development of each stream of history and their interdependencies, their loss of 
integration, and their reintegration” (Freeman and Louçã (2001) cited by Geels 
2007:127).  Nonetheless, if Geels has been able to achieve this theoretical 
improvement, it is thanks to detailed historical studies, which lead to an understanding 
of differences between periods of what, as well as drawing from the broader 
constructivist approaches such as SCOT, and ANT. The S-T Systems is:  
 
[A] process theory instead of variance theory. Ad 1) Transitions are enacted by 
different social groups. Ad 2) Actors change their perceptions of interests, 
preferences, and identity during transitions. Ad 3) the timing of events and 
multi-level linkages is important, influencing the type of transition pathway. 
Ad 4) Explanations in the MLP are layered and involve the tracing of twists 
and turns and alignments of event sequences and trajectories. Ad 5) The MLP 
has generality because it is versatile and maintains its basic character in 
different case studies and transition pathways (Grin et al., 2010:8) 
 
The global explanation provided by the Socio-Technical Systems is about alignments 
and linkages between different processes. Within levels this explanation follows socio-
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technical logic, investigating interactions between heterogeneous elements and actors 
(weaving a seamless web) (Grin et al., 2010). The focus is on co-evolutionary16 
interactions between ongoing trajectories: developments in one trajectory (e.g. 
regulations) may hinder or stimulate developments in another trajectory (e.g. 
technology or markets). Positive and negative feedback play a role here. Between 
levels, the explanation is evolutionary, in the sense that the diffusion of niche-
innovations depends on ongoing dynamics in the broader societal environment 
(regime and landscape). Selection is multi-dimensional, because it not only involves 
markets, but also regulations, cultural and social movements, infrastructure and 
legitimacy. So, evolution is a linkage process, which consists of making alignments 
between niche-variations and the constraints of societal selection environments (Grin 
et al. 2010). 
 
Last but not least, what the ST-Systems approach can do that the constructivist 
approaches cannot is to suggest a clear way for addressing the outcomes of 
technological innovation for those who use it. With regard to this contribution of the 
ST-Systems approach, Geels suggests that: 
 
The first contribution is to include both the supply side (innovations) and the 
demand side (user environment) in the definition of systems. The sectoral 
systems of innovation approach has a strong focus on the development of 
knowledge, and pays less attention to the diffusion and use of technology, 
impacts and societal transformations. Sometimes, the user side is taken for 
granted or narrowed down to a ‘selection environment’. Hence I propose a 
                                                 
16 The process by which 2 or more interaction species evolved together  
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widening from sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems. This 
means that the fulfilment of societal functions becomes central (e.g. transport, 
communication, materials supply, housing). This indicates that the focus is not 
just on innovations, but also on use and functionality (Geels 2007:898). 
 
The ST-Systems approach is a relevant conceptual framework because it derives from, 
and builds upon, the three main approaches usually used to explain the systemic and 
collaborative aspects of innovations:  the Sectoral System of Innovation (Malerba, 
2002), Technological Systems (Carlson, 1997) and Large Technical Systems (Hughes, 
1987) (Geels, 2004). The merit of Geels’ work has been to derive from these 
individual approaches an integrated analytical tool which goes beyond discrete 
categories, to further understand the issue of dynamics. He views it as an integrative 
framework in innovation studies which includes users in the process, previously 
neglected by existing frameworks. In particular, Geels made four main contributions 
of relevance to investigating technological transitions and innovation benefits 
distribution which would be of use in investigating the present case study.  
 
The first concerns understanding the processes through which the need for a new 
technology develops, which the above theories (ANT, SCOT, NIS) do not adequately 
integrate. In other words, the above theories felt it unnecessary to include such detail. 
Geels uses two related notions to characterise this process. On the one hand, there is 
the notion of the “socio-technical landscape”, which includes “material environments, 
shared cultural beliefs, symbol and value”. This also depends on the regime, a concept 
that will be explained below. Geels argues that: 
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the transition [from niche level to regime level] occurred as a shifting mosaic 
of elements, as changes building upon each other, and processes gradually 
linking up and reinforcing each other [.…] New opportunities opened up which 
guided actors in different directions (Geels, 2002:1272). 
 
On the other hand, there is the concept of ‘technological niches’, defined as “a loosely 
defined set of formal and informal rules for new technological practice, explored in 
societal experiments and protected by a relatively small network of industries, users, 
researchers, policy makers and other involved actors” (Geleen, 2005:48). This means 
that niches are places where solutions are developed for practical problems created by 
the landscape’s pressures. As Geels put it, “The work in niches is often geared to the 
problems of existing regimes […]. niche-actors hope that the promising novelties are 
eventually used in the regime or even replace it” (Geels, 2004:913). This contribution 
of Geels is a scene setting which helps to provide context including, landscape, regime 
and niches, which are important in new technology adoption. What is important is to 
explore the pre-existing system of the NIS framework in order to draw the niches and 
the possibilities of adopting the NIS framework to meet previously unmet needs. 
Before the discussion on Geels’ second contribution, it is important to give some 
detail on these relevant key concepts (Landscape, Regime and Niche), which provide 
the framework for the identification, collection, organisation and analysis of data in 
relation to the NIS framework. 
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a) Landscape (Macro) refers to the overall socio-technical setting that encompasses 
both the intangible aspects of social values, political beliefs and world views and the 
tangible facets of the built environment including institutions and the functions of the 
market place such as prices, costs, trade patterns and incomes (Geels, 2004, 2007). 
These processes occur within the wider political, cultural and economic background 
termed the socio-technical landscape. The landscape is an external backdrop to the 
interplay of actors at the regime and niche level. Changes can occur in the landscape 
but much more slowly than regime level. One such change is the increase in 
environmental awareness. This socio-cultural process is leading to pressure on 
numerous regimes (aviation, agriculture etc.) whilst providing openings for new 
technologies to establish themselves. The Multi-level Perspective presents the 
interplay between regime, niche and landscape concepts as a multi-level perspective 
depicting technological transitions. The model is heuristic rather than ontological, and 
is an aid to better understand the process. The model proposed by Geels shows how 
the success of a new technology requires developments across all levels to support the 
processes occurring within the niche.  
 
b) Regime (Meso) refers to the dominant practices, rules and technologies that provide 
stability and reinforcement to the prevailing socio-technical systems. For him, taking 
the example on a case study (Geels, 2006), technological regimes are defined as a set 
of rules embedded in an engineering community’s institutions and infrastructure 
which shape technological innovations.  Geels also includes a wider range of social 
groups such as policy makers, financiers and suppliers. This web of inter-linking 
actors, following a set of rules was termed ‘socio-technical regime’, in effect, the 
established practices of a given system. Drawing on evolutionary economics, socio-
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technical regimes act as selection and retention mechanisms, filtering out the 
unsuccessful while incorporating more worthy innovations into the existing regime.  
 
c) Niche (Micro) is the level or 'area' at which the space is provided for radical 
innovation and experimentation. This level is less subject to market and regulation 
influences and can facilitate the interactions between actors that support product 
innovation. Radical innovations occur in niches, which act as safe environments in 
which breakthrough developments can grow, sheltered from the selection process that 
occurs at regime level. A regime may host a range of niches which generate 
innovations to challenge the status-quo. The military is seen as a primary niche for 
major technologies of the last century, supporting the development of radio, aircraft, 
computers and the internet. The framework of support provided can be financial (most 
early ventures being commercially unviable); establishing learning processes and 
facilitating the social networks that lead to growth.  
 
In the article where he analysed the breakthrough of rock ‘n’ roll (1930–1970), Geels 
(2007) showed how the transition to rock ‘n’ roll came about through mosaic elements 
of landscape, regimes and niches, and how technical and social elements, e.g. radio 
sets, record players, jukeboxes, record companies, radio stations, advertising schemes, 
recording technologies and studios, radio programming, airwave regulations are all in 
interaction. In addition, in another article, Schot and Geels, (2008) analysed the long-
term innovation policies and development trajectories of four renewable energy 
technologies: wind energy, biomass, fuel cells and hydrogen, and photo-voltaics. He 
described the innovation journey from 1970 to 2006. This journey was characterised 
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by a number of niche-level occurrences, such as failures, setbacks, hype and 
disappointment cycles, tensions, and struggles. In another study with Raven, Geels 
again discussed the innovation trajectory in Denmark’s biogas development 1970-
2002. They demonstrated the dynamics and interaction of emerging technological 
trajectories in the pre-market phase (Geels and Raven, 2007). So far most of Geels’ 
case studies are about historical innovation shifts which describe how the innovation 
came about and what trajectory it took to be introduced within the context of 
landscape, regimes and niches. 
 
Geels’ second major contribution concerns the regime of actors involved in ST-
Systems which relates to the perceived weakness of TENs, ANT, NIS/SIS and to some 
extent SCOT. Either the identification of the problems or the definition and 
development of solutions engage actors. As demonstrated by Geels (2002, 2004, 
2007), the ST-System does not function automatically but is rather the outcome of 
human actors and institutions who usually belong to different social groups which 
share certain roles, responsibilities, norms and perceptions. Geels’ (2002, 2004) 
suggestion is that the users’ side needs to have a proper place in the analysis. In 
addition to the users with recognisable roles in the process, there is a need to consider, 
as Pinch and Bijker (1986) suggest, other less obvious social groups, such as those 
opposed to the technology. It is this heterogeneous network of actors that Pinch and 
Bijker (1984, 1986) call “relevant social groups”. This notion “is used to denote 
institutions and organisations […], as well as organized and unorganized groups of 
individuals. The key requirement is that all members of a certain social group share 
the same set of meanings attached to a specific artefact” (Pinch and Bijker, 1986:30). 
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Thus, Geels’ observation about the need to include the key actors was supported and 
extended earlier in the 1980s by Pinch and Bijker (1986), who draw attention not just 
to who they (the actors) are, but how they are involved. Accordingly, it means that 
once the different relevant social groups are identified, it is equally important to 
provide a detailed description of each of them, in order to highlight dimensions such 
as power or economic strength. This process of translation is described in Geels 
different case studies (Geels, 2007; Geels and Raven, 2007; Geels and Schot, 2008). 
 
The third contribution of Geels is related to the rules through which actors’ activities 
are coordinated, by considering that rules and institutions are the same in terms of 
their functions (Geels, 2004, 2006). With respect to their function of coordination and 
structuring of activities, Geels distinguishes three dimensions of rules. First, the 
regulative dimension which ‘refers to explicit, formal rules’ (Geels, 2004, 2007) 
includes, for example, government regulations. Second, there is the normative aspect 
of rules which includes “values, norms, role expectations, duties, rights, 
responsibilities” (Ibid). What distinguishes these rules from the former set is that they 
are internalised through actors’ socialisation process. The third dimension comprises 
cognitive rules. The reality by itself does not have any meaning. It is the social context 
which provides the meaning to that reality by producing shared symbols associated 
with it. It is through these systems of rules that actors’ activities are coordinated. For 
Geels, these rules constitute “the ‘deep-structure’ or grammar (in the Chomskyan 
sense) of ST- Systems” (Geels, 2004:905). 
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As members of social groups, social actors share a set of rules or regimes, 
which guide their actions. These rules are the outcome of earlier (inter)actions. 
Social actors knowledgeably and actively use, interpret and implement rules 
systems. They also creatively reform and transform them. (Geels, 2004:907).  
 
These processes lead to the maintenance or transformation of part or the whole of ST-
Systems which catch on. Another contribution therefore concerns the dynamic 
interaction between systems, actors and rules. Indeed, “As members of social groups, 
actors share a set of rules or regime, which guides their actions” (Geels, 2004:907).  
 
There is flexibility in how people think of or interpret the artefact but there is also 
flexibility in how the artefact is designed. This observation is supported by Pinch and 
Bijker (1986), who stress that there are several ways of interpreting the same artefact. 
For them, “different social groups have radically different interpretations of one 
technological artefact” (Pinch and Bijker, 1986:41).  
 
Moreover, Geels (2004; 2006; 2007) addresses the issue of power relationships. In this 
regard he shows that actors such as firms, public authorities, users, scientists, and 
suppliers use regimes and rules for their own interests. A description of the relevant 
social groups in more detail is necessary to aid understanding of this power 
relationship. In the words of Pinch and Bijker (1986:34), “this is also where aspects 
such as power or economic strength enter the description, when relevant”. It appears 
that the relevant social group can be homogenous with respect to the meaning given to 
the artefact, but the actors’ intentions inside the same group are different. A detailed 
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description of the relevant social group is important in order to perceive these 
dimensions because the relevant social group is not completely homogenous. The 
different actors involved in (inter)action do not have equal power. The resources and 
opportunities they have to realise their purposes are unequal in terms of money, 
knowledge, and techniques. Therefore, as with institutions, there is a need to 
specifically inquire into the organisational dynamics of ST-Systems. There are, what 
Geels terms, ‘ongoing games’ (Geels 2004). 
 
The explanation provided by the ST-Systems is related to alignments and linkages 
between different processes including human actors and ‘intermediaries’ (Callon, 
1986). Within levels this explanation follows a socio-technical logic, which 
investigates the interactions between heterogeneous elements or ‘intermediaries’ and 
actors. “The focus is on co-evolutionary interactions between ongoing trajectories: 
developments in one trajectory (e.g. regulations) may hinder or stimulate 
developments in another trajectory (e.g. technology or markets)” (Grin, et al., 
2010:96). Between levels, the explanation is evolutionary, in the sense that the 
diffusion of niche-innovations depends on ongoing dynamics in the broader societal 
environment (regime and landscape) (Geels, 2004; 2007). 
 
2.6. Criticism and discussion of the ST-Systems 
The ST-Systems known as a Socio-Technical System framework has been criticized in 
recent articles for its heuristic and descriptive nature and a presumed lack of attention 
to politics and agency (Smith, 2005; Genus and Coles, 2008). The Socio-Technical 
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System framework conceptualisation of transitions has been constructively criticised 
on three general points.  
 
The first concerns empirical and analytical levels which were raised by (Berkhout et 
al. 2004), who argue that “it is unclear how these conceptual levels should be applied 
empirically”. By this “we mean that a socio-technical regime could be defined at one 
of several empirical levels” (Berkhout et al. 2004: 54).  However, in the electricity 
domain one could study a regime at the level of primary fuel (coal, oil, gas) or at the 
level of the entire system (production, distribution and consumption of electricity). 
What looks like a regime shift at one level may be viewed merely as an incremental 
change in inputs for a wider regime at another level. From this point of view, such a 
framework remains suitable for the understanding of Bt cotton in this case study 
investigation. 
 
The second criticism is the relative neglect of agency, especially in representations. 
Smith et al., for instance, argue that the Socio-Technical System is:  
 
overly functionalistic. Despite the breadth of the regime concept, there is a 
tendency to treat regime transformation as a monolithic process, dominated by 
rational action and neglecting important differences in context. […] existing 
approaches tend to be too descriptive and structural, leaving room for greater 
analysis of agency (Smith et al., 2005: 1492).  
 
 102 
The third criticism is that the Socio-Technical System approach places too much 
emphasis on technological niches as the principal aspect for regime change. For 
instance, Berkhout et al. claim that MLP-approaches are:  
 
unilinear in that they tend unduly to emphasize processes of regime change 
which begin within niches and work upwards at the expense of those which 
directly address the various dimensions of the socio technical regime or those 
which operate ‘downwards’ from general features of the socio technical 
landscape (Berkhout et al, 2004:62). 
 
However, despite all of the above criticisms, one can still agree with Geels (2006) and 
Schot and Geels (2008) who gave credit to the framework in relation to its simplistic 
design, that is to say, the ST-Systems is too simplistic and does not acknowledge the 
specificity of the transitions as a research topic. Grin et al. (2010) acknowledge that 
they could easily turn the criticism around to address this well-rehearsed micro-macro 
dilemma. They characterized their work on the MLP and transition pathways as a 
global theory that addresses the overall course of long-term change processes, but also 
acknowledged that this needs to be complemented by local theories which help to 
analyse how actors navigate, struggle and negotiate on specific alternatives. Van Driel 
and Schot (2005), Raven and Geels (2005) and Geels (2005, 2006, 2011) all agreed 
that the critics of the MLP are right in pointing at the heuristic value of the approach. 
As attested by Grin et al., (2010), 
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we take this as a compliment, since we have pushed for a process theory in 
which theories are used as tools for the development of narrative explanations 
as explained above. Research of complex phenomena such as transitions 
cannot be reduced to the straitjacket of a variance theory, and will always 
contain elements of creative interpretation by the analysts (Grin, et al. 2010: 
101).  
 
Such a reply fully applies to this present research, which found in the ST-System an 
integrative framework which not only looks at the landscape, the niche and the regime, 
but also includes the translation and the way the NIS policy tool is constructed. 
 
In order to understand individual trajectories one first needs to investigate the context 
within which, actors’ a) draw on structural contexts, b) interact with each other, c) 
aggregate and select outcomes, and d) institutionalize outcomes in new structures 
(reproduction or change) (Grin, et al., 2010). One also needs to show that these 
trajectories are socially embedded games, where actors make moves, change tangible 
elements, and reproduce or change the rules of the game (Geels, 2007). The 
explanation then comes both from the rules of the game and the moves actors make 
(Grin et al., 2010). 
 
The second explanation is evolutionary in the sense that pass processes impact on 
current and future processes. The Socio-Technical System framework provides 
detailed process explanations by analysing how actors draw upon structures in which 
they are embedded. Motivations, perceptions, aims, and interests of specific actors 
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play a role here. While such detailed explanations may be useful for the analysis of 
local projects and niches, they are less practical for entire transitions which Pinch and 
Bijker (1984, 1986) and Callon (1986) have explored. With regard to the present 
study, there are three observations to make. 
 
First, with the concept of landscape I can investigate the macro-level processes 
involved in the shift to the NIS policy tool for innovation diffusion in the Burkina 
Faso development policy regime. Such a landscape is described through the different 
development models shifts described in the introduction. In this connexion, the 
knowledge-centred development model, which is adopted by the Burkina Faso’ 
government in the early 2000s, can be referred to as a “Socio-Technical Landscape”. 
Its establishment at global and national levels as a development model will have some 
implications on the transformation of Burkina Faso’s own development policy 
regimes. These implications are measured as pressures from the landscape on the 
development policy regimes, referred to as “Socio-Technical regimes” at the meso 
level.  
 
Second, the concept regime developed by Geels is important here as through the 
concept of “Socio-Technical regimes” it interplays with the Socio-Technical 
Landscape, to illuminate the extent to which innovation at niche level can succeed or 
not at this meso level. Socio-Technical regimes “include scientists, users, policy 
makers and societal groups besides engineers and firms. These social groups interact 
and form networks with mutual dependencies, resulting in the alignment of activities. 
This inter-group coordination, is represented with the concept socio-technical 
 105 
regimes” (Geels and Kemp, 2007:443).  A socio-technical regime is “stable in many 
ways (e.g. institutionally, organisationally, economically, culturally)” (Geels, 
2004:913), thus making it difficult to replace. The concept of regime and its interplay 
with the landscape helps investigate crises in socio-technical regimes as a result of 
pressure from the socio-technical landscape, because the instability of such regimes 
create ‘windows of opportunities’ in the socio-technical regimes and has some 
implications for the adoption of the NIS policy tool as a new approach to innovation 
diffusion (Geels, 2004). In other words, this section analyses the windows of 
opportunity for new innovation approaches created following the emergence of the 
knowledge-centred development policy regime in Burkina Faso in early 2000s. In this 
strategy, as Geels highlighted, “Niche-actors hope that the promising novelties are 
eventually used in the regime or even replace it” (Geels, 2004:913). 
 
Third the concept of niche is useful in studying the adoption of the NIS policy tool at 
strategic policy and operational level through Bt cotton case. Niches are characterised 
by Geels as the spaces where innovations are developed. The concept of niche will 
help identify the ‘protected spaces’ where the NIS emerged. The Forum of Scientific 
Research and Technological Innovation (FRSIT), where the NIS policy tool has been 
transferred and tested, is such an innovation niche, because, in this context like all 
innovations at niche level, the NIS policy tool is similar to those “experimental 
projects involving heterogeneous actors (e.g. users, producers, public authorities)” 
(Geels, 2004:912). The importance of the niche for the NIS adoption is because it 
describes the place where the learning and stabilisation processes of the NIS 
development and its specification took place. This process of diffusion has its own 
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dynamic and needs to be understood in order to appreciate the transition between 
innovation approaches.  
 
The interplay of landscape, socio-technical regimes, and niches provides therefore a 
coherent conceptual framework to investigate the adoption of the NIS framework as a 
development policy tool in Burkina Faso, and to appreciate how it is shaped through 
this process. This interplay of the landscape, regime and niche levels of analysis of the 
framework can be seen in the following figure. 
 
Figure 2: A dynamic multi-level perspective on system innovations 
 
Source: Geels and Kemp (2007:444) 
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2.7. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that the complexity of the processes 
involved in the NIS policy tool translation, the multiplicity of actors, the interlocking 
sets of rules, the dynamic interactions between all of these elements and the issue of 
power relations between actors calls for a systems analysis in general, and in particular 
a multi-level perspective of the kind that Geels offers, which also integrates the 
contributions of Pinch and Bijker (1984; 1986) Callon (1986) and Malerba (2004, 
2005). For these reasons, this analysis of the NIS is treated as a Socio-Technical 
System. What is now needed is to find the best way for operationalizing this 
theoretical framework of a ST-Systems through appropriate research design and 
methods. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methods 
3.1. Introduction 
Having argued in the previous Chapter that the ST-Systems approach is the most 
suitable analytical framework for the present research, it is now time to make explicit 
the research design and methods to be used for defining the broader approach of the 
study and for the data collection and analysis in line with my research questions. In 
this Chapter, I present a justification for the methodological choices in relation to data 
collection and analysis. This is crucial because it will show why an ethnographic 
approach within the qualitative research approach has been chosen as a component 
part of the investigation of the NIS policy tool translation. Here, the study’s 
characteristics, orientations and aims concern not only the ‘how’, but also and most 
importantly the ‘why’; it is about the claim that the National Innovation Systems (NIS) 
framework adopted in 2000s to foster systemic innovation has facilitated socio-
economic development in Burkina Faso, with particular reference to the cotton sector 
and the introduction of Bt cotton. More specifically, interview and documentary 
review will also be used as methods, with open-ended interview guides and reading 
grid respectively, for collecting data from participants and documents. Analytical 
strategies provided by STS will help analyse and interpret the data collected.  
 
The chapter is organised into three main sections. I will begin by examining the 
research design, description and justification in addition to the motives for the case 
study selection. The next section describes the field work process, settings for 
interviews and strategies for the analysis. The section makes explicit the use of the 
 109 
data collected and how the research has been undertaken in practice. Finally, the 
chapter discusses the ethical implications and the limitations of the study.  
 
3.2. Research Design 
3.2.1. Case Selection 
The overview of the 3rd edition of the Handbook of Science and Technology Studies 
notes that: “Science and Technology Studies is a flourishing interdisciplinary field that 
examines the creation, development, and consequences of science and technology in 
their cultural, historical, and social contexts” (Hackett and al. 2007). This definition 
highlights aspects of the discipline which are of relevance in the choice of the design 
of this thesis, specifically scientific research, technological innovation and their 
interrelationships with the cultural, historical and social contexts of their production, 
use, and consequences.  The present research can be located within the realm of 
technological innovation. It is about investigating the extent to which it can, or it 
cannot, be claimed that the National Innovation Systems (NIS) framework adopted in 
2006 to foster systemic innovation has facilitated socio-economic development in 
Burkina Faso, in the context of a general aim to reduce poverty, with particular 
reference to the cotton sector and the introduction of Bt cotton. 
 
As we have observed, the NIS is the latest policy tool for innovation diffusion in 
Burkina Faso, following the failure of a number of promising innovation diffusion 
tools which did not manage to boost socio-economic development. I have observed 
that, since the 1960s, the results of every new innovation diffusion tools have proved 
disappointing and unsatisfactory. Poverty has persisted for the majority of the 
population in Burkina Faso despite these efforts.  As such, Burkina Faso represents a 
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potential case to study the most recent policy tool (NIS) which aims to foster systemic 
innovation in order to facilitate the country’s socio-economic development.  
 
3.2.2. Qualitative Research 
Considering Silverman’ hypothesis that “our research problem defines the most 
appropriate method” (Silverman, 2005:6), I decided to use a qualitative approach 
because such an approach is suitable for research concerned with processes of a kind 
of the current research where, in addition to documentary review, field work with 
interviews appeared to be necessary to gain a more comprehensive understanding. 
Indeed, the ST-Systems conceptual framework has enabled me to unpack the network 
of organisations, individuals and institutions involved in the adoption of the NIS and 
its implementation in the cotton sector in Burkina Faso. These complex interactions 
cannot be adequately studied through a quantitative approach, since quantitative 
analysis of variable relationships lacks the capacity to consider the actions and 
interactions of individuals. It focuses on the isolation and control of variables. For 
example, quantitative approaches are unable to provide compelling accounts of “the 
ways that people engage structural conditions” (Puddephatt and Sprus, 2007:267).  
 
The wider range of options provided by using a qualitative approach enables 
researchers to demonstrate “how people actively enter into the causal process through 
individual and joint action” (Puddephatt and Sprus, 2007: 265). Qualitative research 
enables the generation of answers to questions which involve complex phenomena 
with the objective of investigating the phenomena from the point of view of the 
participants. Qualitative approaches offer an interpretative capacity to analyse social 
facts with a specific focus on in-depth details. In this research, I wanted to see the 
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social phenomena under consideration through the eyes of those being studied 
(Bryman, 2008), and qualitative research helps achieve this. It allows one to 
investigate in depth and detail the complexities surrounding the extent to which the 
NIS, as policy tool, could achieve socio-economic development using biotechnology 
cotton as a case study. 
 
Among the various qualitative approaches, ethnography offers quite particular 
advantages for the present thesis. Even though they underline the difficulty of finding 
a clear definition of the term, because of its complex history (it spread to other 
disciplines from anthropology), Hammersely and Atkinson (2007:2) have sought to 
overcome the problem by adopting a practical approach consisting in focusing “on 
what ethnographers actually do, on the sorts of data that they usually collect, and what 
kind of analysis they deploy to handle those data” (Hammersely and Atkinson, 
2007:2). It follows that for them  
 
ethnography usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, 
in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, 
listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal 
interviews, collecting documents and artefacts –in fact, gathering whatever 
data are available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of 
inquiry (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:3). 
 
3.2.3. Why an Ethnographic Approach? 
The move from ethnography in general to ethnography as applied to science and 
technology requires some caution. Indeed, the laboratory which is the field in which 
ethnography was first applied in STS shares some characteristics with the face-to-face 
communities of anthropologists. Even though one might also point out that the lab 
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nowadays can be very different to the following definition, Latour and Woolgar have 
pointed out, “The laboratory chosen, with walls all around, well deep-rooted in its 
paradigm, gathering inside all the necessary disciplines, held by an authoritative 
director resembles a classical field. In it, the geographical location and the function to 
be studied coincide…” (Latour and Woolgar 1996:30). However, it should not be lost 
sight of that science and technology have long been outside of ethnologists’ preferred 
field of interest. This classical interest is best read in the following long quotation 
borrowed from Latour and Woolgar (1996:30), the first to have brought ethnography 
into the field of science studies: 
 
It was the first time that hundreds of ethnologists have visited all the 
imaginable tribes, they have penetrated deep forest, enumerated exotic 
customs. They took pictures and documented family relationships and complex 
beliefs. In contrast, our industry, our techniques, our science, our 
administration have not been well studied. In fact, ethnologists only felt 
capable of studying traditional society’s traditions, witchcraft, symbolic 
representations, countryside, the marginalized […]. It is with fear and fright 
that they move forwards in our cities [...] they study the sociability of the 
people, but they don’t analyse the urban and the engineers’ everyday life […] 
they have more courage when it is about medicine, this is their well-known 
science. Even in this case, they like to study ethno-medicine […] (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1996:30). 
 
A good deal of research in the laboratory has been carried out since, and ethnography 
established itself in the area. The approach is now used in other areas of science and 
technology studies, such as science policy. Nonetheless, as Latour and Woolgar 
acknowledged “it would be dangerous not to measure the limitations”. This thesis 
offers a case in point. The NIS policy tool translation in Burkina Faso, at both policy 
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and operational levels, involved a wide range of actors who belong to different 
workplaces and geographical settings dispersed throughout the country, while some 
are outside of the country. For example, there are researchers, policy makers, cotton 
industries, cotton farmers, other users of research results, inventors/innovators, and 
multi-national actors. So many actors cannot be simultaneously in one specific space 
for a long enough period. The challenges that science and technology studies raise for 
ethnography is well underlined by Latour and Woolgar, as follows: 
 
The big difference between classical ethnography and that of science comes 
from the fact that the field of the first one is similar to territory, and that of the 
second one takes the shape of a network. The Alladians studied by Auge live 
between the lagoon and the ocean except for some incursion on the land and 
the big city of Abidjan. But the stimuli in the brain of our laboratory are in 
Sweden in a pharmaceutical firm, in London […], in Dallas […], in Paris, New 
York, and also in Jolla. […] this shows that the ethnographer must travel more. 
The nodes of this network are often laboratories, but also offices, firms, 
hospitals, business centres, private residences […] (Latour and Woolgar 
1996:29). 
 
This distinctiveness of the field of STS and the challenges it raises in relation to 
classical ethnography is important for the purpose of this thesis because it has 
significant implications regarding the data collection strategy. In addition to this 
aspect related to the setting, this case study on the NIS policy tool translation involves 
some events which have already happened, and so cannot be observed directly. 
Finally, even where this process regarding the NIS is current, organisations may not 
disclose some information about themselves, resulting in the refusal of external actors 
to take part in some meetings or even to be informed about some processes related to 
the subject of the study. Regarding this temporal aspect, it is in what Commaroff has 
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termed, its “neo-modern” sense that the ethnographic approach is relevant to this 
thesis. For Commaroff the idea of “neo-modern” ethnography, "seeks to construct 
imaginative sociologies of terrains both near and far, more or less complex, familiar 
and strange, local and global” (Comaroff 1992: ix). Contrary to its classical 
conception, which tended to restrict it to the present, the neo-modern ethnography 
supports the idea that ethnography cannot aim “to penetrate beyond the surface planes 
of everyday life, to plumb its invisible forms, unless it is informed by the historical 
imagination” (Comaroff 1992: xi). 
 
In summary, ethnography is considered in this thesis as it is used in science studies as 
well as in its “neo-modern” sense. This has implications for the data collection 
strategy.  
 
3.3. Methods 
Given the aim of this research is to investigate the two projects, the NIS inspired 
policy framework and the Bt cotton innovation system, in facilitating development in 
Burkina Faso at both strategic policy and operational levels, it was considered that 
both documentary and interviews data were necessary. However, before reviewing the 
documents (grey literature and literature review) and before going to the field to 
conduct the interviews with relevant participants, there is a need to select the sample 
of documents and to identify the kind of participants to be interviewed. As defined, the 
“document [or participants] selection is a decision process in which the user evaluates 
a retrieved document [individuals] based on its [their] surrogate […] the most 
important question is what are the processes and factors involved in arriving at a 
decision?” (Wang and Soergel, 1998:115-116).  
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3.3.1. Data and Sources 
Such an investigation requires a process to select the documents and the interviewees. 
Thus, I decided to review systematically all the available documents in relation to the 
aim of this research. As a result, after the identification of the main themes related to 
the topic with regard to the historical context of innovation and development in 
Burkina Faso, the transition between the farming system innovation diffusion tool to 
the NIS diffusion tool and the transition from a conventional cotton to a Bt cotton ST-
System in Burkina Faso, related sub-themes in line with the main themes were 
identified. Among them were the political, social and economic histories of Burkina 
Faso, the tools used for innovation, the history of key institutions such as the IDRC 
(International Development Research Centre), UNI-MERIT and FRSIT (National 
Forum for Scientific and Technological Innovations), and the history of biotechnology 
and development in Burkina Faso spanning cotton regimes before 1900 to the late 
1900s.  
 
The sources of data in relation to these themes were identified. First the university of 
Nottingham library online search through the web of knowledge and available books 
in the university catalogue was the potential source of data. In addition, some relevant 
institutional websites (IDRC, UNI-MERIT17, CNRST: the national research centre, 
INERA: the agricultural research centre, FRSIT, cotton industries: SOFITEX, 
                                                 
17 United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and 
Technology 
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SOCOMA and Faso Coton) were investigated, and key reports, presentations, 
workshops and conference papers were identified.  Finally given that my study is 
conducted within Burkina Faso, relevant institutions such as ministries and other 
institutions’ reports and policy documents were accessed during fieldwork directly in 
hard copies. This included newspapers. As specified in the tables below, the specific 
documents from the grey literature were identified and used as potential sources of 
data in addition to the interview data which covers the everyday processes in the 
adoption of the NIS as a policy tool and on the Bt cotton innovation system. The 
interview guide is in the annex of this thesis. The following table makes explicit the 
method, the kind of the data needed and their sources. 
 
Table 4:  Historical context of Innovation and Development in Burkina Faso 
Data  Data sources  Methods  
 Political history of BF 
 Social history of BF 
 Economic history of BF 
 Tools used for innovation  
o Content 
o Objectives of the 
innovation 
o Assumptions/theories 
o   Results 
Published books 
published papers 
world bank reports 
CNRST reports  
MESS reports 
MRSI reports 
Science Policy documents 
Documentary 
review 
Source: Processed by author  
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Table 5: Translation of the NIS Policy tool in Burkina Faso 
Data  Data sources  Methods  
 History of the IDRC 
o History of its programme on 
science, technology and 
innovation policy 
o Key actors which led institution 
o IDRC’S Regions of Intervention  
o Interpretation of Innovation 
Systems  
 History of the institution UNI-MERIT 
o History of its programme on 
science, technology and 
innovation policy 
o Key actors which led institution 
o UNI-MERIT’S Regions of 
Intervention  
o Interpretation of Innovation 
Systems  
 History of the institution FRSIT 
o History of its programme on 
science, technology and 
innovation policy 
o Key actors which led institution 
o FRSIT’S Regions of Intervention  
Project description 
Workshop reports  
Research reports 
Training reports 
Institutional newspapers, 
Mission reports   
Technical reports 
Conference papers 
review reports 
FRSIT different editions 
reports Organisations’ 
website Internet  
 
Documentary 
review  
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o Interpretation of Innovation 
Systems  
 FRSIT-CRDI’s Project 
 Project development 
 Justification of project  
 Composition of project team 
 Organisation set up for project 
implementation in  
 Trainings based in BF 
o Content  
o Objectives 
o Trainers 
o Trainees  
o Training justification  
 Trainings which took place outside the 
country 
o Place/country of training  
o Institutions of training  
o Mode of knowledge of the 
institutions   
o Reason for choice of training 
institutions 
o Content of training 
o Objectives of training  
o Trainers 
Project description 
Workshop reports  
Research reports 
Training reports 
Institutional newspapers, 
Mission reports   
Technical reports 
Conference papers 
review reports 
FRSIT different editions 
reports 
Organisations’ website 
Internet  
interviews 
 
Interview 
Documentary 
review  
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o Trainees 
o Training justification  
o The initiators of training  
 Project implementation  
o Activities undertaken 
o Justification of implemented 
activities 
o Objectives of these activities  
o Involved actors 
o Justification of  actors’ selection  
 Project evolution to date  
o Project duration  
o Project’s institutional affiliation 
o Lessons learnt from project  
o Appreciation of project’s 
achievement  
o Project’s contribution to policy 
formulation 
o Justification of achievement  
 Interaction between key actors in BF 
with UNIT-MERIT and CRDI’s actors 
 Existence of other innovation 
approaches in BF 
o Content of the approaches,  
o Similarities and difference with 
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regard to the NIS 
Source: Processed by author  
 
Table 6: Transformation of cotton regime in Burkina Faso from traditional to Bt 
cotton ST-Systems 
Data  Data sources  Methods  
 Cotton regimes before 1900 to 2000 
o Work organisation 
o Variety of cotton grown 
o Tools and tools makers 
o Cotton usages 
 
 Bt cotton regime 2000 to 2012 
o Problems 
o Efficacy of old methods in 
relation to the problem 
o Occasion of meeting of 
Monsanto  
o Interposition of local actors in 
the solution   
o Mobilisation of local actors  
o Identification of actors 
o Actors’ consent   
o Interest in the other actors in the 
network 
Published books 
Published papers 
INERA reports 
CNRST reports 
Presentation reports  
Research reports 
Institutional newspaper,  
Technical report 
review report 
Burkina Biotech 
Association 
 different editions reports 
Local news and news 
papers 
Organisations’ website  
Interviews  
 
 
 
Documentary 
review 
Interview 
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o Actors’ expectations 
o Technological transfer strategy 
 Activities undertaken   
 Justification of activities   
 Objectives of activities  
 Concerned actors’ role  
 Concerned actors’ role  
 Justification 
o Position of actors in the network 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Processed by author 
 
Table 7: Bt cotton Innovation System: actors, institution and benefits 
Data  Data sources  Methods  
 Actors 
 Producers of knowledge in 
cotton biotechnology 
o Identification  
o Equipment 
o Organisation  
o Specialisation 
o location 
 Users of knowledge in 
cotton biotechnology  
o Identification  
Published books 
Published papers  
INERA reports 
CNRST reports  
Workshop reports 
Presentation reports  
Research reports 
Institutional 
newspaper,  
Technical report 
review report 
Interview 
Documentary review  
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o Equipment 
o Organisation  
o Expertise/knowledge 
o Location 
 Linkages and their mechanisms 
 Mechanisms  
 Objectives  
 Set up date 
 Initiators 
 Reasons/circumstances  
 Mode of coordination 
 Previous mechanisms  
 Reasons for changes in the 
mechanisms 
 Involved actors in the 
implementation of current 
mechanisms 
 Difficulties 
 Mode of resolution 
 Support from another actor 
in the network  
 Actor’ reaction 
 
 At policy makers level  
BBA different 
editions reports 
Local news and 
news papers 
Internet  
Interviews 
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 Existence of innovation policy 
o State of research 
o State of higher education  
o Existence of sectoral 
innovation policy 
o Agricultural higher 
education  
 System performance in terms of 
networking 
Source: Processed by author 
 
3.3.2. Data Collection 
After the identification of the themes and sub-themes, and having defined the methods 
(interview or documentary review), it was important to specify how each of them is 
used practically in this research. Indeed, as already stated above in the design section, 
my research is qualitative research, which included an ethnographic approach. The 
aim of this section is to identify the appropriate method for data collection and 
analysis consistent with this approach (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
 
This thesis will rely primarily on interviews and documentary review, and will draw 
on participatory observations made at key conferences and meetings attended by the 
researcher. 
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 Documentary review 
Before getting into the field to conduct my interviews, I needed to “set the scene” with 
regard to the problem in hand and the fieldwork to be conducted, so preliminary data 
were collected in order to increase my understanding of the subject and enable me to 
design a guide for the interviews. As stated by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), 
“documents can provide information about the settings being studied, or about their 
wider contexts, and particularly about key figures or organisations” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007:122). These sources include primary as well as secondary or grey data. 
I accessed some material from the Internet, to supplement articles on the NIS policy 
tool translation. In the course of the interviews, interviewees themselves provided me 
with further documents to clarify aspects they discussed or they thought could be 
relevant to the matters under discussion. These particular documentary data sources 
collected in the event of the field work would corroborate, or contradict, some of the 
data collected through interviews, given that because of impact of time and interest, 
research participants can report selectively in interviews. As a result of that, as noted 
by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), “documents may play a key role in facilitating 
comparative analysis; both generating a sense of how the case (s) investigated are 
similar to and different from others” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 123). 
Additionally, as in the case of the present research, documentary review stimulated the 
analysis of the data by giving more details on some key ideas. This possibility has also 
been raised by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), “Equally important, documents may 
be of value in stimulating analytic ideas. The development of generic concepts 
demands a broad and eclectic reading of textual sources […] on differing substantive 
topics” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 122). 
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 Interview 
The NIS as a policy tool, which is the object of this study, is a socio-technical system 
(ST-System) involving actors (users of knowledge, producers of knowledge, policy-
makers and regulators) whose relationships are coordinated by institutions. As such, 
the processes involved in the NIS as a policy tool translation resemble those of any 
organisational system. In this regard, the interview is one of the key methods for the 
collection of information about these processes. As Beaud and Weber remark, “if the 
researcher cannot observe in situ, he asks the research participants to report to him 
their own observations” (Beaud and Weber, 1998:176). In addition, the interview 
enables the researcher “to obtain the intricate details about phenomena such as 
feelings, thought processes, and emotions that are difficult to extract or learn about 
through more conventional research methods [such as questionnaire]” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998:11). An in-depth semi-structured interview guide was used as a tool to 
conduct the interviews. The open-ended interview guide is particularly relevant 
because of its flexibility (Silverman, 2005). In total 60 interviews have been 
conducted. A breakdown of the interviewees who participated in the face to face 
meetings and their institutional affiliations are as follows: 12 researchers, 6 policy 
makers; 2 Monsanto representative; 3 cotton industry representatives; 15 small 
farmers; 7 large farmers, 9 civil society/NGO representatives, 1 NEPAD 
representative,1 ANB director, 3 IDRC staffs, 1 UEMOA representative. There was no 
pre-determined number of interviews to be conducted. The number of research 
participants is determined by the principle of saturation. For Strauss and Corbin “This 
term denotes that during analysis, no new properties and dimensions emerge from the 
data, and the analysis has accounted for much of the possible variability.” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998:158).  
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Concerning interviews with farmers, I decided that two regions of the country would 
be considered because of the contrast they present. These regions are the west of the 
country with large-scale farmers and the central part with small-scale farmers. The 
western part of Burkina Faso is the economic centre, and the rainy season is longer 
and heavier than in other parts of the country. Before meeting the farmers, I was 
granted permission to do so by the relevant cotton industry in charge of the region. 
Lastly, I was granted permission by SOFITEX, the main cotton industry, to conduct 
interviews with representatives of the three industries. 
 
With regard to language, many local languages co-exist with French, the country’s 
official language. It was decided that French and Moore (my own mother tongue) 
would both be used for the interviews. This would allow me to conduct the interviews 
personally and analyse the data without the need for a third person for translation. All 
the different actors interviewed spoke either French or Moore. I was personally hosted 
by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’s Africa Bio-safety 
Network of Expertise (ABNE). This institution is based in Burkina Faso because, the 
country was among the first to have to have adopted biotechnology cotton. This was 
negotiated prior to my arrival in Burkina Faso. Thus, during my fieldwork I benefited 
from their facilities (office space and transportation to some villages for interviews). I 
also used my motorbike, which is the most common means of transport in the country, 
to travel to meet interviewees (mostly researchers and policy makers) in the capital 
city of Ouagadougou. 
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 Direct observation  
Prior to my fieldwork, I was informed through the local news of a workshop on 
biotechnology which was taking place during my fieldwork time plan. Given that my 
study has two dimensions to investigate the NIS inspired policy framework and the Bt 
cotton innovation system, in facilitating development in Burkina Faso at both 1) 
strategic policy and 2) operational levels, I scheduled the fieldwork for three months 
(the beginning of March till the end of May) to coincide with the workshop. This 
three-week workshop involved a wide range of biotechnology actors in Burkina Faso, 
but was closed to the public. I ensured that I was in the country for the period in 
question. This strategy was informed by the expectation that this workshop, organised 
by the President’s advisors to discuss the impact of biotechnology on the country’s 
economic development would provide a platform for networking and, above all, an 
opportunity to meet the different actors involved in the implementation at operational 
level of the NIS policy tool especially Bt cotton, if I could gain permission to attend. 
At such an important meeting, there was also the possibility of getting referrals to 
other valuable contacts.  
 
My participation in the workshop was negotiated with the help of the general secretary 
to the president of the Economic and Social Council (CES). I was granted permission, 
after a long process of negotiation, even though, with the exception of the opening and 
closing ceremonies, the workshop was not technically open to the public. As a student, 
I went through the legal procedures required to gain access and was accepted as an 
observer but not allowed to ask questions during the workshop. This restriction was a 
fair price to pay for the opportunity to engage in observation and networking.  
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My expectations about the value of attendance were fully met. The number of actors 
eventually interviewed was significantly greater than initially expected, and I was able 
to derive significant ethnographic insights by being a part of the entire process. 
 
Some interviewees, whom I had contacted initially by email before coming for my 
fieldwork, were to be present at this workshop. Other people who were not initially 
part of my interviewees’ list were also present. I organised individual meetings with 
most of them and sometimes was able to talk with individual participants during 
breaks. My observations through attendance and participation in this workshop gave 
me a clear map of the different actors involved in the implementation of the NIS 
through Bt cotton technology, and a sense of the network and power relations which 
was not accessible through documentary review or from individual interviews, 
highlighting the significance of chance in successful fieldwork, besides the formal 
strategies. Beaud and Weber, added that fieldwork “depends essentially on 
“circumstances” “occasions” which happen on the field” (Beaud and Weber, 
1998:127). 
 
Although I was not able to ask questions in the conference room, the circumstances of 
the workshop provided a framework for speakers that constrained them to provide at 
least a minimum amount of information. At the end of the three weeks’ workshop, the 
combination of individual presentations gave a relatively full picture of the network of 
actors around biotechnology cotton innovation. Also, policy makers were not 
restricted in their discussion and could ask any questions in the workshop which was 
useful in promoting fuller information. 
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Being able to talk with participants during breaks and record these discussions 
deepened my understanding of the issues. More importantly I was able to make direct 
contact with policy-makers, civil society actors, researchers, industry representatives, 
bio-safety officers, the Monsanto representative in Burkina Faso, government 
advisors, and ministers. It was extremely beneficial as this workshop gave me a fuller 
picture of who was doing what, with whom.  
 
 
3.3.3. Field Work Process 
Hammersley and Atkinson observed that regarding the research process: 
 
[T]he case we might wish to select may not be open to study, for one reason or 
another; and if they are, effective strategies for gaining access to the necessary 
data will need to be developed. Similarly, not all the people we wish to observe 
or talk to, nor all the contexts we wish to sample may be accessible […]. The 
problem of gaining access to data is particularly serious in ethnography, since 
one is operating in settings where the researcher generally has little power, and 
the people have pressing concerns of their own which often give them little 
reason to cooperate. (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:39-40).  
 
This section tells the story of how the present research has been prepared and 
conducted in the light of the second of the potential difficulties Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007) point out in the previous quotation - in relation to individuals who 
may not have reason to want to cooperate. The first challenge was to identify my 
research participants. For this, my literature review in the course of defining my 
research topic, has been useful. During my first year, I reviewed Burkina Faso’s 
development policies, including the agriculture sector innovation diffusion strategies. 
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For this I used a number of reports (conference, workshops and policy reports) thanks 
to which I was able to track down key people such as researchers, policy-makers, 
users of research results, inventors, innovators, national and international actors 
involved in the NIS policy tool adoption and implementation processes. The phone 
numbers and email addresses of these potential research participants were all available 
in the reports. I sent emails to more than 50 people only, 10 of whom responded to this 
initial contact. When I reached Burkina Faso, I contacted those who did not reply by 
phone or met them at their work places. Almost all of them were willing to meet for an 
interview following agreement on the time and location. 
  
To access the participants, six ‘gatekeepers’ were used to get access to participants 
sometimes at different levels. Indeed, before my arrival in Burkina Faso, I had 
exchanged emails with two leading technical agents with whose help I was able to get 
in touch with four more gate keepers and some large cotton farmers whose details 
were not available on the reports. As for small farmers, most of the time they do not 
take part in the meetings, workshops and conferences. They are usually represented by 
their national union. One of the technical agents from the National Union of Cotton 
Farmers (UNPC-B), who is one of the six gatekeepers, helped me to get in touch with 
the union president and all his colleagues who are large scale farmers. He also led me 
toward his colleagues. I always agreed a timeline with this technical agent who was 
based at the UNPC-B office in Ouagadougou. All the six so called “gate keepers” 
facilitated my first contact with the cotton industries, cotton farmers and officers.  
These technical agents were indeed key people in the process of meeting with cotton 
farmers and cotton industries. The large-scale farmers on the committee (UNPC-B) 
and some of the small farmers were already aware of my research and willing to have 
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face-to-face discussions without knowing me in person thanks to these gate keepers. 
The officer at UNPC-B facilitated my meeting with the president of Faso cotton 
industry and another meeting with the technical agent in charge of the small cotton 
farmers in the central region. In addition, some interviewees also pointed me in the 
direction of colleagues whom they thought could give more details about some aspects 
on the NIS translation. This strategy of relying on some of the participants to get more 
participants is in line with standard practice in ethnographic research, as Beaud and 
Weber pointed out:  
 
[T] he fieldwork is therefore built with the interviewees help, or more exactly 
with the help of some of the interviewees. They are those who will overcome 
the main obstacle, those who will make you penetrate in the field, […] They 
will help you, open doors which, without them, would have always been 
locked, enter in contact with people that you would have not been to see 
otherwise. (Beaud and Weber, 1998:126)  
 
However, one must be cautious as to the “good faith [of an interviewee] in facilitating 
the research” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:104) because, “it may be designed to 
control the findings” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:104). In this study precautions 
were taken in this respect because most of my interviewees were contacted directly by 
me instead of through third party, even though the name and contact was given by a 
third person.  
 
The policy-makers, researchers and civil society actors were mainly contacted by 
email and times for meetings at their workplaces scheduled and agreed by both parties. 
The interviews with the minister of the newly created ministry (the Ministry of 
Scientific Research and Technological Innovation) provided me with the context for 
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the translation of the NIS policy tool. The key actors in this translation process were 
from the FRSIT and ANVAR who were active in the process of adopting such a new 
policy tool. Consultants who trained the policy-makers and researchers on the 
fundamentals of the NIS framework in the translation process were also interviewed.  
 
As a self-funded student, I had a limited budget, and my field work and most of the 
transcription were done entirely by myself, with the help of two colleagues 
 
3.4. Data Analysis 
The data collected were subject to thematic analysis. Before such analysis, the 
collected data from documents were organised and the data from interviews were 
transcribed into written materials.  
  
3.4.1. Production of Written Materials 
 Organisation of reading notes 
The notes from the documentary review were first manually summarised and then 
electronically saved. Particular effort was made to gather details about the context of 
the production of every piece of document in order to be able to characterise their 
content and through crossed-checking to highlight what each document includes and 
what it omits.  
 
 Transcription of interviews 
All interviews were transcribed word for word. This consisted for each recorded 
interview in listening and writing down systematically the oral statement. Systematic 
transcription is recognised as necessary to capture the detailed contextual elements of 
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the interview. As Beaud and Weber underlined, “interviews are richer and 
interpretable if the transcriptions are precise [...]: consider silences, underline 
hesitations and procrastination, note the inflexions of the voice, indicate differences in 
tone, note gesture and mimics associated with the speech etc.” (Beaud and Weber, 
1998:243-244). In total, the transcribed interviews made up more than 70,000 words. 
The transcribed interviews together with the reading notes were then subjected to 
thematic analysis. 
 
3.4.2. Analysis of Written Materials (Transcribed Interviews and Reading Notes)  
The analysis of themes emerged from both the interview and documentary review data 
drew on established analytical strategy in Science and Technology Studies.  
 
In this research, I used qualitative approach for collecting the data; ethnographic 
interviews have been used to collect the data. Once I gathered the information, I faced 
the next challenging process. As acknowledged by Aronson, “researchers are faced 
with the decision on how to analyze the data. There are many ways to analyze 
informants' talk about their experiences […] thematic analysis is one such way.” 
(Aronson,1994:3). In the framework of this study, thematic analysis was then used to 
analyze the data. A clear definition is given here by Aronson, (1994:4), for him, 
“Thematic analysis focuses on identifiable themes and patterns of living and/or 
behavior”. The analysis of these materials or themes was systematic. I have chosen 
what is call the “bottom up” analytical process at both semantic as well as latent level. 
Indeed, in the context of the thematic analysis that is used here, some metaphors are 
used by interviewees to symbolize or characterize a specific phenomenon. In this 
process, as recommended by Braun and Clarke, (2006: 82) “[…] steps [or stages are 
 134 
necessary] in this process”. Thus, after transcribing interview data, I proceeded in 
familiarising myself with the data collected and identifying the key dominant themes 
that emerge from the interview and documentary review. “A theme captures 
something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents 
some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set.” (Braun and Clarke, 
2006: 82). As a result, in the present research, the themes are identified by bringing 
together components or fragments of ideas or experiences, which often are 
meaningless when viewed alone. In other words, it is agreed that, stories are all pieced 
together to form a comprehensive picture of their collective experience.  
 
The preliminary main themes are related to the historical context of Innovation and 
Development in Burkina Faso, the translation of the NIS policy tool in Burkina Faso, 
the Transformation of cotton regime in Burkina Faso from traditional to Bt cotton ST-
Systems, and the Bt cotton Innovation System: actors, institution and benefits. From 
these major themes, some subthemes (description of the main themes) have emerged 
and been identified in relation to every theme. At this point of the study, I need to 
begin the reconstitution of the story line. As stated by Aronson, (1995:3), “Once the 
themes have been collected and the literature has been studied, the researcher is ready 
to formulate theme statements to develop a story line”.   
 
Consistent with this strategy, I reconstructed the network of the translation of the NIS 
policy tool both at policy and operational levels (with Bt cotton) in order to develop a 
story line. The frames used for this reconstruction are suggested by my problematic 
and provided by the conceptual framework (ST-Systems). That is, for each dimension 
of the ST-Systems concept, analysis consists in identifying from the body of 
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interviews and reading notes, actors and processes associated with them. This is 
similar to what Strauss and Corbin call in ‘Grounded Theory’ perspective, ‘open 
coding’, that is: 
 
data are broken down into discrete parts, closely examined, and compared for 
similarity and differences. Events, happenings, objects, and actions/interactions 
that are found to be conceptually similar in nature or related in meaning are 
grouped under more abstract concepts termed “categories” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998:102). 
 
To maintain confidentiality a randomly distributed number code is attributed to each 
interviewee. For instance, (interview#12) refers to interviewee number 12 that I met 
during the time spent on the field.  
 
3.5. Ethics 
The ethical guidelines provided by the University of Nottingham were followed. There are six 
key principles in the University of Nottingham ethical guidelines, which are as follows: 
 
 Ensuring that the ethical basis and design of research projects are ethically 
sound and have received the approval of relevant ethics committee(s) and all 
relevant statutory regulatory authorities before they commence;  
 
 Ensuring the safety of all involved in the research process by ensuring that the 
research is carried out in accordance with health and safety policies and 
legislative requirements;  
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 Ensuring that research is conducted in a suitable working environment with 
appropriate equipment and facilities;  
 
 Ensuring the probity of the financial management of all research projects, and 
seeking to provide optimum value for the public or private funding agencies 
who have invested in them, including effective project management of agreed 
project plans and appropriate quality standards, as well as the timely delivery 
of any scheduled tangible outcomes; 
 
 Management of research data in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 
and any other legal provisions, conditions and guidelines that may apply to the 
handling of personal information; 
 
 Undertaking professional development appropriate to the research. 
 
Indeed, Bryman (2008) summarizes the areas for ethical consideration as: Harm to 
participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception. Following 
consideration of these ethical aspects, it can be concluded that ethical considerations 
are key in this study. Prior to the interview, the objective of this research was made 
explicit to the interviewees. They were also informed that the findings would be 
presented in an academic thesis and published in scientific journals or books. They 
were assured that all the information used in the document, such as quotes and 
comments, would be anonymous to protect their confidentiality (all these steps follow 
the University of Nottingham’s research ethics framework). In addition, prior to 
interviews, interviewees were asked whether the interviews could be recorded. All the 
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interviewees agreed and most of them gave a written statement. I gave interviewees all 
my contact details (telephone number, email, home and university addresses) and 
asked them to contact me with any queries they had regarding this research.  Their 
quotes and comments were treated as anonymous in the thesis. 
Over and above the practices carried out in line with the guidelines, and although the 
interviews for the research did not require approval by any formal ethics committee, 
the present research did present one complicating factor in relation to consent and 
ethics.  
 
In the conduct of the research, two levels of consent were documented (oral and 
written). In Burkina Faso, there is a high likelihood of individuals who do not know 
how to read or write, and who do not agree easily to make a written statement – except 
for some special occasions such as wedding documents, family documents (birth 
certificates). These people may hold the view that a written statement can be used for 
other purposes and, given that they cannot read the content unless translated to them, 
they are very hesitant about signing a paper that might be used against them.  
 
It is interesting to note that they are likely to place trust in the individual researcher 
rather than an institution which offers assurances in relation to the kind of consent 
form which is in standard use in the UK, for example. For this research, I did not insist 
that every person sign the consent form in the first instance. I devoted my time 
explaining them who I was, what I was doing and why I wanted to have an interview 
recorded with them. Most of the time they gave clear verbal assent, and were happy to 
talk to me. The agreement took the form of an acknowledgement, with a “yes of 
course I can talk to you if it is for that”. For this research, this issue concerned mainly 
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small farmers who agreed to make an oral statement, and this was recorded at the 
beginning of the interview.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described the research design and method. I made clear that an 
ethnographic element enriched the available qualitative research methods for the study 
of the NIS policy tool translation in Burkina Faso. This approach was considered 
suitable because the methods used are most appropriate given the kinds of processes 
which are the focus of the thesis. These methods involved documentary analysis, 
participant observation, and elite and semi-structured interviews, consistent with the 
practices of STS research. 
 
Findings derived from the analysis will be organised into two main parts: Part two is 
about the NIS policy tool in the context of a knowledge-centred development regime 
in Burkina Faso. This will include 1) the historical context of innovation for 
development in Burkina Faso and from this standpoint 2) the translation of the NIS as 
a policy tool in Burkina Faso. Part three is about the implementation of the NIS policy 
tool at operational level in the cotton sector with Bt cotton innovation. This part 
includes 1) the transformation of Cotton system in Burkina Faso from traditional to Bt 
cotton ST-Systems, 2) Bt cotton Innovation System: actors, institutions  
and benefits.
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Part II 
National Innovation Systems 
and the Knowledge-Centred     
Development Policy Regime 
in Burkina Faso 
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Chapter 4: Crisis of Socio-Technical Regimes and the Quest for a 
New Innovation Regime in Burkina Faso 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the introduction to this thesis (Chapter 1), I traced the shifts in development policy 
in Burkina Faso since the 1950s (Section 1.4.2 of the chapter) in order to highlight the 
emergence of the knowledge-centred development policy from the early 2000s. The 
shift to this latter development policy is analysed in this thesis as a change in the 
overall socio-technical landscape. Applying the conceptual and methodological 
insights described in Chapters 2 and 3, the present Chapter investigates the ‘windows 
of opportunity’ (Geels, 2004) that have emerged at the level of the socio-technical 
regimes as a result of downward ‘pressure’ from the socio-technical landscape, and the 
implications for the adoption of the NIS policy tool.  It explores the socio-technical 
environment within which different innovation diffusion approaches for development 
were established. In this regard, the Chapter aims to investigate the socio-technical 
regimes, that is, successive networks of interactions between the human and the 
technical (knowledge, tools and technics), by taking into consideration their different 
approaches to innovation diffusion and their implications for science policy. Prior to 
the NIS policy tool, approaches to the diffusion of innovation in Burkina Faso 
included the ‘Integrated approach around a cash crop’, the ‘Training and Visits’ 
approach, and the ‘Farming System’ approach which will be explained in detailed later 
in this chapter. For each of the innovation diffusion approaches adopted, the 
incumbent socio-technical regimes show specific structures, which will lead me in 
Chapter 5 to interrogate which socio-technical regimes inform the NIS policy tool. 
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In this Chapter, I begin by investigating the nature of Burkina Faso’s social and 
political economy as this is key to characterising the specific role of the state in the 
process of adoption of the NIS policy tool. Then, keeping in line with the shifts in 
development policy at the landscape (or overall socio-technical setting as described in 
chapter 2) level (Chapter 1), I will examine the changes in corresponding innovation 
diffusion approaches and science policies, as well as the organisations put in place for 
their management. This will enable me to highlight in the conclusion why there is a 
need for the NIS as a policy tool for innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso.  
 
4.2. The Social and Political Economy of Burkina Faso 
One distinctive aspect of the NIS policy tool in comparison to other interactive18 tools 
for innovation diffusion such as the Farming Systems and the Multi-Actor Platform as 
it will be described later in this Chapter and in Chapter 6, is the role it attributes to the 
State as compare to the other (Lundvall, 2007). It is therefore important to know the 
nature of the social and political economy of Burkina Faso because it will help to 
clarify the socio-political context of the NIS policy tool at the macro-level.  
 
Burkina Faso is a landlocked Francophone country in West Africa. Its size is 274,200 
square kilometres (105,900 sq mi) with a current estimated population of more than 18 
million in 2015. Formerly called the Republic of Upper Volta, it was renamed on the 
4th of August 1984 by President Thomas Sankara to mean "the land of upright people" 
in the combined national languages Mooré and Dioula, the major native languages of 
the country. Figuratively, ‘Burkina’ may be translated as ‘men of integrity’ from the 
                                                 
18 Use here in contrast with the linear approach to innovation. In a systemic point of view it involves co-
operation and networking between producers and users of the innovation 
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Mooré language, and “Faso” means “father's house” in Dioula. The inhabitants of 
Burkina Faso are known as Burkinabè (Sissao, 2003). Bounded by Benin, Togo, 
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali and Niger, all of these countries, with the exception of 
Ghana, were under French colonial rule between 1900 and 1960.  
 
Burkina Faso is culturally diverse with more than 60 living languages spoken across 
the nation. With such a rich ethnic and traditional disposition, the country is proud of 
its cultural diversity (Ki-Zerbo, 1978; Nacanabo, 2003). Despite poverty and difficult 
living conditions, the people of Burkina Faso (the Burkinabé) are hospitable and 
tolerant of their cultural differences (Bourdet, 2004; Konate, 2003; Hazard, 2003). 
 
4.2.1. From Colony to State 
Colonial power is responsible for the establishment of the modern State in Burkina 
Faso. This colonial power also introduced changes in the way society was organised. 
A revision of the Organization of French Overseas Territories (OFOT) began with the 
passage of the “Loi Cadre” of 23rd of July 1956. This Reform Act was followed by re-
organizational measures approved by the French parliament early in 1957 that ensured 
a large degree of self-government for individual territories. Burkina Faso which was 
known as Upper Volta became an autonomous republic on the 11th of December 1958 
(Crowder, 1968; Sissao, 2003). On 5th of August 1960, it attained full independence 
from France and is now a member of the African Union (AU), Community of Sahel-
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Saharan States (CEN-SAD), La Francophonie19, and the economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS).  
 
4.2.2. Governance 
Since it gained independence in 1960, a number of political regimes have successively 
controlled the country. Between the 1960 and 1966 was the birth of the first republic 
presided over by Maurice Yameogo. Between 1966 and 1980, the Colonel Aboubacar 
Sangoule Lamizana took power through a military coup-d’état and led alternate 
military regimes: the second and a third republic. After this, four successive military 
regimes held power between 1980 and 1987. The first took place between 1980 to 
1982 led by Colonel Saye Zerbo; the second was between 1982 and 1983 with Colonel 
Jean-Baptist Ouedraogo; the third took place between 1983 and 1987, the 
revolutionary period with Captain Thomas Sankara, and the fourth with Captain Blaise 
Compaore since 1987 till 1992 (Sissao, 2003). From 1992 Captain Blaise Compaore 
built up the fourth republic and led the country until 2014. In October 2014, a popular 
insurrection led to the short military regime of Colonel Yacouba Issaac Zida which 
lasted only 20 days and on 21st of November 2014, Michel Kafando was chosen to 
lead the country for a transitionary period during the organisation of a vote to choose a 
president in October 2015.  Such transitory political regimes in Burkina Faso have 
obviously had a deep impact on the science and innovation policy for development 
evolution. In the next section I am going to make explicit the evolution of science, 
technology and development in Burkina Faso through the shift of the different 
innovation diffusion approaches. 
                                                 
19 Is the cooperation measures which have been taken to promote the French language, cultural diversity, 
sustainable development, education and training. La Francophonie was created in 1970. Its mission is to embody 
the active solidarity between its 75 member states and governments (56 members and 19 observers) in order to 
promote French language and culture 
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4.3. The Crisis in the Socio-Technical Regimes 
The implication of changes in one element of a socio-technical system for other 
elements has been well described by Geels (2004). This section will analyse the 
different innovation diffusion tools implemented in Burkina Faso until the end of the 
1990s followed by the emergence of a new systemic tool, the NIS, in 2006. In other 
words, this section analyses the windows of opportunity for new innovation diffusion 
tools created following the emergence of the knowledge-centred development policy 
in Burkina Faso in early 2000s which necessitated a well-designed systemic tool to 
implement it. 
 
4.3.1. Technological transfer: ‘Integrated Approach Around Cash Crop20’ 
The period from 1900 to the 1970s is marked by what is known as technological 
transfer from developed to underdeveloped countries (Gaillard, 1999). The main tool 
to such technology transfer was the ‘integrated approach around cash crop’ (Nauleau, 
1987; Sy and Bah, 1987). This integrated approach as an innovation diffusion tool 
consists of a process which spans the field level through to the transformation and 
marketing of derived products on the world market. In the agriculture sector, in which 
this tool was mainly applied21, vertical integration gives power to industries by giving 
them the role of mediators of innovation as well as the role of providers of insecticide, 
inputs, and credits etc. Within this approach, the firms provide farmers with 
                                                 
20 It is how it is called in Burkina Faso to reflect the Top-Down or linear model. There was no input from the 
farmers. 
21 Before the agriculture sector it was the health sector where this approach was usually implemented. (Rifkin, 
Kangere; Fournier and Potvin, 1995) 
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everything they need to grow their cash crop and are reimbursed by the farmers after 
harvest. This can be a standard price relative to every farmer’s need, who then 
reimburses what is used. In addition, research institutes, who conduct research to solve 
difficulties related to developing the growth crop, interact only with firms (industries) 
and not with farmers (Belloncle, 1987). The research institutes were oriented towards 
real problems and conducted field trials before any diffusion22 was undertaken 
(Mahdavi, 1987; Pickering, 1987). Researchers are informed of the needs of farmers 
by the technical support agents used by the firms. Therefore, in this approach to the 
diffusion of innovation there is a focus on the group of farmers at village level. The 
technical support agent’s attention is on the sharing of experiences learnt from their 
training and interactions with other farmers and researchers and attributing roles for 
the effective transfer of new technology. There was no direct, simultaneous contact 
between technical support agents, farmers and researchers (Evanson, 1987). This 
approach to the diffusion of innovation is explained by a researcher as a Top-Down 
model23: 
 
As I said earlier, it was a Top-Down model. Most of the actors were 
expatriates. It was called top-down method, that is to say, researchers cede 
back their findings to technical support agents for diffusion. The Regional 
Development Organisation (ORD) at that time was affiliated to the Ministry of 
Agriculture. It was a method which was more or less linear. That is to say, 
researchers search, find and give results to technical support agents at the 
Ministry of Agriculture for diffusion; the Ministry diffuses these results to 
farmers under the ORD framework. Each ORD had an administration. There 
                                                 
22 From French word ‘vulgarisation’ the closest word in English is “diffusion”. To make something well known 
by relevant actors and encourage them to adopt it. 
23 It was Top-Down because researchers findings were given to technical agents who transmitted it to the 
farmers. Researchers did not expect any feed-back from farmers. The information transmitted to the farmers 
were therefore meant to work and if it didn’t, they concluded that it was the farmers fault.    
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were five ORDs in Koudougou where I first served in the 1980s. They had 
their leader with their team of agents who provide training to farmers. These 
trainers are in direct contact with the farmers, they have their books with all the 
information to help them to follow up farmers. They were doing so many 
things at the same time. Not only they are in agriculture, but also they are 
present in gardening. At the end people were saying that the ORDs were even 
doing research!  (Interview#17). 
 
Conceptually the approach is structured as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Processed by author  
Burkina Faso has also applied this approach to the agriculture sector, as illustrated by 
the following case. 
 
 Description of an example of Integrated approach around cash crop in 
Burkina  
In Burkina Faso, this approach was implemented in the cotton sector with regard to the 
mechanisation of cotton cultivation (Nauleau, 1987). The only cotton firm, SOFITEX, 
Researchers 
Technical 
support 
agenddsagents 
Farmers 
Figure 3: Integrated approach around cash crop (Top-Down model to innovation) 
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led the project which was implemented in the west part of the country. By adopting 
mechanisation, cotton farmers became entrepreneurs. The process of implementing the 
mechanisation started with giving information to farmers who gathered around a 
single farmer who was successfully using the mechanisation technology. The aim was 
to make sure farmers witnessed how the technology worked, and through their visits at 
every step in the process they could see that mechanisation was a useful instrument for 
modernising the sector. Demonstration days were organised to allow farmers to see 
different mechanisation strategies, discuss their use and clarify information about the 
application in order to facilitate the wider adoption of the technology. During these 
days, information was shared and farmers who wanted to adopt the technology 
expressed their interest to a committee who later collected relevant information 
concerning their lands, family, financial situation, technicality, capacity to reimburse 
credits, agreement to follow rules etc. These applications then proceeded to the next 
step where an assessment committee decided either to offer financial support or not. 
When all of these preliminaries were met, further training was provided before farmers 
could receive their machines. After which ongoing training and visits were provided 
by the technical support agents for about six years. 
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Table 8: Increase in the number of farmers who adopted the mechanisation 
innovation 
Years  1980 1985 
Number of pilot 
farmers 
28 58 
Farms’ sizes 17,84 hectares 26,85 hectares  
Benefits in increased 
products 
7.3% 17% 
Benefits in CFA24 
currency 
276,073 CFA 1.545.000 CFA 
 
Source :  Processed by author from: Belloncle G (ed) Recherche, vulgarisation et 
Developpement rural en Afrique Noire, 1987, Ministere de la Cooperation 
 
Table 1 confirms that the ‘integrated approach around cash crop’ as a tool to diffuse 
innovation in Burkina Faso was a success in terms of increased quantity, larger farm 
sizes, and financial benefits to a greater number of farmers (Levi and Kam, 1987). 
Over the five-year period there was an increasing demand which demonstrates a 
degree of success of the mechanisation diffusion. Experts from the Institute of 
Agronomic and Tropical Research (IRAT) and the Institute of Research on Cotton and 
Textiles (IRCT) were involved in this diffusion process. The summary of the practical 
case is as follows: 
 
                                                 
24 CFA francs are used in fourteen countries: twelve formerly French-ruled nations in West and Central Africa, 
as well as in Guinea-Bissau (a former Portuguese colony) and in Equatorial Guinea (a former Spanish colony). 
These fourteen countries have a combined population of 147.5 million people (as of 2013), The ISO currency 
codes are XAF for the Central African CFA franc and XOF for the West African CFA franc 
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Source: Processed by author  
 
Figure 4: Integrated approach around cash crop to the implementation of mechanisation in 
the agricultural sector in Burkina Faso.  
Researchers from the agricultural sector 
IRCT, IRAT do research on 
mechanisation in cotton sector. Their 
research is connected with farmers’ 
needs. These researchers teach 
techniques to technical agents who 
themselves train farmers.  
There was no feedback from farmers on 
their experience with the innovation  
SOFITEX, the only cotton firm, 
provide the technical agents to 
give advice, deal with collecting 
data regarding farmers, give 
driving training and technical 
information on commercial crops.  
Cotton farmers receive technical training 
from agents, should follow techniques of 
motorisation, have at least 15hectares, be 
willing to reimburse, agree to follow 
techniques and methods. Get involved 
willingly. 
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This is supposed to integrate farmers’ needs, but here it remains very limited in 
practice. However, such a tool to diffuse innovation exposes the limits of the ways in 
which the different actors participate in the development of the agricultural sector. The 
farmers’ job is to receive and execute orders and messages from technical agents. 
They do not participate in building ideas or evaluating their own needs, they are mere 
‘robots’. As a result, they are passive instead of self-engaged in the decision making 
process. In other words, it is an ‘empowerment’ (Iqbal, 2007:61) of technical agents. It 
did not matter where the technology came from, and the role of researcher was 
ambivalent; sometimes they were high level technicians, whose role was to help 
transfer technology from other countries, generally Western ones. In other cases, they 
may have undertaken research themselves, but as the analysis below on science policy 
will show, indigenous research was not taken seriously by the State and there was little 
funding for research. Researchers played the simple role of high level technicians, 
which consisted of testing transferred technologies in local conditions before they 
were diffused by technical support agents to end users. 
 
Early Science and Technology Policy in Burkina Faso: From Colonial to the 
1970s 
The pre-colonial period up to the 1920s can be considered as a period of development 
for tropical sciences25 where it is believed that Africa did not need to ‘waste time’ on 
doing research but could instead focus on implementing ready-made technology 
developed in the North (Gaillard and Waast, 1992). This is also the reason why little 
research and high-level training were developed in West Francophone Africa during 
that time. Also, the economic theory of development provided a framework of 
                                                 
25 From French, ‘la science des tropiques’ to reflect the indigenous science 
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conscious organisation of science for development. During this period, the innovation 
model for science and technology development was linear in theory as in practice, as 
far as development is concerned. It was through ‘the linear model’ that the process of 
economic growth was studied. This model explained innovation as depending on 
scientific discoveries (Manley, 2003). The first linear model considers that high 
investment in R&D leads to productivity growth (Godin, 2009). This model includes: 
Basic science, R&D, production, construction and marketing (Manley, 2003).  
 
At the end of the colonial period, there was a real hope for African scholars that 
science and technology policies and strategies would lead to significant improvement 
in their living conditions (Gaillard and Waast, 1992). They felt, in French Africa, 
research was centralised and closely bound to the ’mother country’ (France), but with 
its new status of independence, Africa might finally be free to organise scientific 
research fitted to its own new targets. Historically, the 1960s was characterised by 
many African countries’ political independence. Nevertheless, during that period, 
scientific policies were still determined to a certain extent by Europe through the 
development of bilateral and multilateral partnerships, mostly in the economic sector. 
These partnerships would become a new way of colonizing scientific research in the 
African continent. 
 
It was from 1970 that African policy makers saw the great role that scientific 
development could play for the continent’s economic and social development. Even if 
science and technology strategies remained weak, there appeared to be a new way to 
frame scientific research policies (Nyerere, 1967; Ki Zerbo, 1973; Yesufu, 1973). The 
main aim was to make science serve African needs, and make training and research fit 
 152 
into contextual and cultural realities. In order to produce qualified scientists, higher 
education and advanced training were important (Gaillard and Waast, 1992, Yesufu, 
1973, Crossman, 2004). Although, the number of scientists remained very small, there 
was more freedom in scientific research compared to the colonial period. During the 
1970s, the idea of collaboration between research institutes and the university 
developed. Similar debates about this interaction between actors in the development 
process and cultural values were being introduced to the scientific debate in Europe 
(Edquist, 1997; Monley, 2002; Godin, 2009). National bodies responsible for science 
policies in almost all African countries were therefore emerging and gave birth to 
national science by the 1970s (Gaillard and Waast, 1992). 
 
Policies in the 1970s focussed on the reorganisation of higher education to increase 
African competitiveness in the scientific field, yet there was a general policy for all 
West African countries of defining and increasing the number and quality of 
researchers and programmes in order to meet development needs. However, political 
instabilities have considerably affected scientific progress in African countries since 
the 1960s. From the 1980s different governments started to co-ordinate a policy for 
scientific research by defining their priority development sectors (Gaillard and Waast, 
1992). Before that, there was no significant distribution between fundamental and 
applied research and different activities and plans related to scientific development 
were unsuccessful. The ground breaking discussion on ‘endogenisation’ in the early 
post-independence period aimed to make higher education fit into African needs and 
contextual, cultural, geographical realities. The main defenders of this ideology in 
French West Africa were Hountondgi Paulin, Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Jean-Marc Ela 
(Crossman, 2004). These and many other scientists across the continent supported this 
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idea of ‘endogenisation’ and they strongly recognised that Africa’s destiny depends on 
the success of its higher education system which will train the future scientific elites 
for high quality research. Higher education is therefore a key element in the 
development of science and technology.     
 
An additional objective of scientific research was to guarantee immediate basic needs 
(clean water, health and food) for the African population. This policy was supported 
by an elite committee (Yesufu, 1973) which addressed the way in which scientific 
research results would be used in order to enhance economic and social development. 
The adaptation of tertiary education to the African context in both structure and 
curricula was extensively discussed (Ki Zerbo, 1973; Yesufu, 1973, Crossman, 2004). 
The policy of promoting scientific research in order to achieve economic and social 
development in the republic of Upper-Volta emerged in the 1980s. The main focus of 
the new policy promoted by the independent government for science and technology 
in Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) during the 1970s was that economic and social 
development should be supported from a research basis (Jezequel, 2007). In addition, 
the concept of ‘Africanisation’ became part of the policy in Upper Volta and was 
strongly supported by Ki-Zerbo (1973) and many others scholars. For them, higher 
education ‘Africanisation’ would enhance African scientific and technological 
development and reinforce the availability of African publishing facilities in order to 
make their scientific discoveries known worldwide (Ki Zerbo, 1973).  Moreover, there 
was an awareness of the need for a solid intellectual base for the consolidation of 
independence, as well as a means to meet the overwhelming requirements for high-
level manpower (Yesufu, 1973). This awareness led different African countries to 
create their own national universities to promote higher learning in the 1970s. Among 
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them was the University of Ouagadougou, the first and the biggest University of 
Burkina Faso created in 1974.  
 
In addition, Research and Development (R&D) was introduced by the different 
governments’ agendas.  The sectors of research concerned Ethno-sociology, 
Geography, History, Linguistics, Zoology, and Botany. In addition to the quality and 
quantity of research programmes, there was an increased number of researchers. It can 
be understood therefore that science in French Africa was fragile compared to English 
parts where the number of scientists was far higher. However, in both French and 
English Africa the focus of research was on the agricultural sector. During the 
implementation of the post-colonial development policy, the aim was to encourage 
scientific research related to immediate needs such as food and water, to help counter 
poverty.  
 
At the end of the 1970s a general movement of democratisation influenced 
development policy strategies so as to shape innovation diffusion tools with more 
emphasis on the participation of those for whom the innovation was intended to 
benefit. This resulted in a shift from the Top-Down innovation diffusion approach to a 
Top-Down Bottom-Up approach.  
 
4.3.2. Participatory Innovation Approach: Training and Visits Innovation Diffusion Tool  
The participative approach to innovation diffusion, what is called Top-Down Bottom-
Up, was developed by Daniel Benor on behalf of the World Bank in the 1970s 
(Russell, 1987). It consists of organising farm visits by technical agents at a time that 
is mutually agreeable to both the agent and farmer. An interviewee describes this 
approach: 
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At the end of the 1980s, there was a consultant from the World Bank named 
Benor who developed a system call TV (Training and Visits). But it was still 
the same linear process where between researcher and farmer, there is no 
communication. The relationship is between researchers and technical agents 
who always meet. The farmer is kept aside, only the technical agent could meet 
with the researchers. So the linear thinking still exists but there was dialogue 
between technical agents and researchers during meetings and dialogue 
between these technical agents and farmers […] (interview #16). 
 
Conceptually the approach is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Processed by author 
 
 
 
Researchers 
Technical agents 
agentsagents 
Farmers 
Figure 5: Training and Visits innovation diffusion tool (Top-down Bottom-up approach) 
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 An example of a Training and Visits innovation diffusion tool in Burkina  
In the early 1980s the government of Burkina Faso decided to include in their 
agricultural development project a new tool to technology transfer based on “Training 
and Visits” and in 1982 a national service for technological diffusion was created 
within the Ministry of Agriculture. In this regard, Burkina Faso was the first country 
to trial the “Training and Visits” innovation diffusion tool (Levi and Kam, 1987). The 
aim was for the ministry to lead the diffusion, while technical agents provided training 
but also provided farmers with credits. What was essential in this new diffusion tool 
was that it institutionalised the dialogue with researchers. In doing this, a programme 
was set up to make sure different actors at different levels could express themselves 
and that continuous training was provided. This tool was introduced in six regions 
across the country, one of which has been detailed in an article by Levi and Kam 
(1987) concerning the Hauts Bassins, comprising 365 villages within the ORD 
(Regional Development Organisation). The concerned ORD involved four research 
institutes, six offices and 102 diffusion centres with schedules of farms and farms 
meetings.  
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Table 9: Increase in the number of actors involved in the Training and Visits 
innovation diffusion tool 
Years 1979/80 1983/84 
Technical agents 50  105 
Number of farmers 108 288 
Number of groups 
of farmers 
18 36 
 
Source: processed by author from: Belloncle G (ed) Recherche, vulgarisation et 
Developpement rural en Afrique Noire, 1987, Ministere de la Cooperation 
 
It appears that farmers have appreciated the continuous and ongoing visits from the 
technical agents. At the same time the ongoing exchanges between technical agents 
and researchers makes them feel they know their job better and what to do at every 
stage. There is mutual respect between technical agents and farmers. The ORD are 
also satisfied because of the independence they gain in the distribution of insecticides 
etc. In addition, researchers’ findings can be diffused to farmers and thereby give them 
more choices. A summary of the approach is presented below. 
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Source: Processed by author  
 
However, there could be problems as discussed by one interviewee: “the technical 
agents were supposed to transmit farmers’ enquiries to researchers but this never 
happens or if it does happen, the message is transformed at the end” (Interview#16). In 
this approach, the problem of participation remains crucial because the level of 
participation was low or even non-existent. Indeed, in general, by definition, “First, 
Figure 6: Training and Visits innovation diffusion tool to the implementation of 
commercial crops in Burkina Faso 
ORD provide the technical agents 
to give advice, deal with input, 
insecticides and techniques of 
cotton growth at the expense of 
SOFITEX 
 
IRCT, IRAT, CERCI and IRHO 
research on cotton. 
Receive feedback from farmers 
Practice 
Cotton farmers receive technical 
training from agents. They receive 
cotton crops, insecticides and 
inputs from cotton industries. No 
feedback is made 
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participation has to be active. Secondly, participation implies that people have the 
right and the responsibility to make choices and therefore have power over decisions 
which affect their lives. Thirdly, mechanisms have to be in place to allow the choices 
to be implemented.” (Bjaras, Haglund and Rifkin, 1991:200). These conditions are not 
met in this Training and Visits innovation diffusion tool where wrong messages are 
sometimes transmitted by technical agents who are situated between researchers and 
farmers. As a result, in practice, farmers and researchers never meet even though 
technical agents were working as intermediaries.  
 
As can be seen, the two diffusion tools, “integrated approach around a cash crop” and 
“Training and Visits, in theory as in practice, remain linear. The main difference being 
that in the latter communication is improved with feedback from the technical agent 
who plays the role of intermediary between researchers and end users. Consequently, 
there was little improvement in the broader science policy regime during this period 
either. 
 
 Science and Technology Policy for the People: The Faraco-ba Symposium  
From 1980, important events emerged aimed at boosting economic and social 
development through a well organised scientific research strategy in Upper Volta. 
There was a “boom” in the strategy to improve science and technology in Upper Volta 
and in all African countries. Inter-institutional and scientists’ relationships were 
promoted to facilitate knowledge flows at national and international level (Gaillard, 
1999). In this respect, higher education tended to be the centre of those fruitful 
exchanges. Scientific implementation facilitated research and knowledge 
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dissemination with the aim of emancipating the African continent including Burkina 
Faso. 
 
The Faraco-ba symposium of 1987 was a significant policy event in Burkina Faso. 
Indeed, this was the first time Burkina Faso’s government defined strategic lines of 
scientific research which specified the development sectors. This symposium ended in 
a revolutionary period. The symposium established some directions in scientific 
research processes and engaged practical thinking in defining research activities in 
Burkina Faso. Researchers and policy makers therefore achieved: 1) more 
independence in doing and organising research; 2) linking all research programmes to 
social and contextual realities and needs; and 3) linking research activities to 
productivity. These three components constituted the key issues of research at that 
time and the symposium strategy was to make scientific research serve the real 
interests of the local society. The major consequence of the Faraco-ba Symposium was 
the creation of a national scientific research committee in order to help fulfil the above 
aims. In addition, scientists and policy makers established a strategic plan of action. 
But this engagement was not to last, as the revolutionary regime who led it was 
evicted the same year.  
 
Nonetheless, the idea of creating a national science policy to promote development 
had a deeper influence on the approach to innovation, with thinking on more 
interactive models beginning to develop.   
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4.3.3. In Search of an Interactive Innovation Diffusion Approach 
It was in the 1990s that the terms “innovation network”, “research optimisation26” and 
“local use” were introduced in Burkina Faso’s development strategies (MESSRS, 
1994; MESSRS, 2008; Dakouo, 2008). This led to calls for another tool for innovation 
diffusion, a system approach known as a ‘Farming System’ (Belloncle, 1987).  This 
innovation diffusion tool relies mainly on farmers’ experiences and beliefs (Bjaras, 
Haglund and Rifkin, 1991) and therefore encourages their participation in the 
innovation diffusion process. Farmers are seen as key actors who have their own logic 
and reasons for doing things, can explain them and should do so.  It makes an 
inventory of the different kinds of existing technologies and employs a systematic 
programme of trials in stations and on fields in order to test the validity of the findings 
in the real world at different places. This step involves farmers in the processes. It 
allows a joint analysis of the results of stations and real farms etc. to be compared 
before dissemination. This helped to validate new ways of research in order to refine 
the invention.  This is a continuous process where the different actors work together as 
a system in which researchers are in direct contact with the intermediary technical 
agents and farmers, as described by a researcher; 
 
Yes, the research system appeared in 1985-1990s. It was an integrated research 
with many disciplines. It was multi-disciplinary. The objective was to assess 
the technology’s agro-ecologic basis and socio-economic impact. It is to see if 
the variety of ‘sorghum’ trialed by the research station for example, has the 
same behaviour at Sissili as well as Koudougou, Yako and Kaya for example. 
It is to see if the different farmers wherever they are can gain benefits with the 
                                                 
26 Here optimisation means putting value on an innovation is the same meaning as valuing (valorisation) in 
French.  
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technology.   There was some kind of small station, called PAPEM. I began 
my career in research at that time in 1985. The research results were tested in 
order to validate their agro-ecologic dimension before dissemination stage 
(Interview#19). 
 
Conceptually, the approach is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: processed by author  
 
In this interactive approach the aim is that “specific groups with shared needs living in 
a defined geographical area actively pursue identification of their needs, take decisions 
and establish mechanisms to meet their needs” (Rifkin et al., 1988) cited by (Bjaras, 
Haglund and Rifkin, 1991: 200). 
 
Figure 7: The interactive approach to innovation diffusion 
Researchers become 
facilitators 
-in direct contact with farmers 
and technical agents 
-learn from both of them 
Farmers who receive training 
follow what they have been 
trained for and take credits. 
Occasionally, they 
commercialised their products 
Technical agents train 
farmers and follow up 
-transmit messages to 
farmers in presence of 
researchers 
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It is not until 2005 that experiments involving interactive approaches emerge. One is 
the NIS policy tool, which constitutes the object of this research, and another the 
Multi-Actor Platform (MAP). The MAP, according to the MRSI (2012a:11), is “a 
grouping of means (essentially equipment and human resources) for a specific open 
community where users, mainly enterprises, are in interaction with (location of 
equipment, experimentations of services…) allowing them to conduct their Research 
and Development (R&D) innovation projects.” 
 
The MAP innovation diffusion tool is derived from a farming system which has not 
been implemented in Burkina Faso. MAP attracted a lot of funding bodies who 
invested in this domain for its experimentation and adoption (CIRAD-GRET, 2002). 
This perspective of the Dissemination of New Agricultural Technologies in Africa 
(DONATA) project attracted the Ministry of Agriculture to adopt such a tool. This 
innovation diffusion tool, which brings together researchers and actors from the rural 
world involved in a value chain, was implemented in Sissili (a region in Burkina 
Faso). The objective of the Innovation Platform in the case of maize was to optimise 
the adoption of agricultural technology including farmers’ innovations and good 
practices (Millogo, 2013). In other words, the MAP 
 
constitutes a tool for multiple stakeholders (producers, users, traders, technical 
partners, etc.). These actors with common and / or divergent interests, are 
called to learn, innovate and act together in a systemic way. Indeed, this 
framework will be a space for dialogue and the search for actions to 
development. It aims to strengthen producers' decision-making capacity, and 
ensure the sustainability of their farms (Millogo, 2013:5). 
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As can be seen in contrast to the NIS diffusion tool, which is the case study of this 
research and which is going to be developed in the following chapter, the Multi-Actor 
Platform tool is embedded in the logic of the ‘farming systems’ (Glin, 2010). The 
main innovation in this approach compared to the ‘integrated approach around cash 
crops’, ‘Training and Visits’ tools, is its heavy use of utilitarian economic principles in 
its framing. For example, all involved actors are supposed to have interests beyond 
humanitarian interests for getting involved, and farmers in particular can negotiate 
with the other actors what they think is relevant for their business (Glin, 2010). 
Communication is also improved as all actors can communicate with each other either 
in groups or individually. As with the two previous approaches, it is in the agriculture 
sector that this interactive approach has been trialled. It partially replaced the old 
participative diffusion approach, but still operates within the same sector with almost 
the same actors, as the researcher who brought it to the Institute for Environment and 
Agriculture Research (INERA) practiced both previous approaches. The story of the 
experimentation of the approach in Burkina Faso is best told by a researcher involved: 
 
From 2006, there was funding coming from different levels and in 2007, the 
CORAF which is the main institution for innovation in the sub-region of 
Africa, and which depends on FARA, the African Forum. CORAF, which is 
affiliated to all the different research institutes in Africa, made a proposition 
concerning a new method of linking research and human [interaction] What is 
sure is that it was in December 2007 that we were called to Dakar to be told 
that in fact there is a new approach for technology transfer and that it is in line 
with the Integrated Research for Development, in English IAR4D. So they 
have given us an introduction to the concept IAR4D […] its mechanism for 
technology transfer is the Multi-Actor Platform which is the context for 
research and development. We implemented it with Sissili’s project with a 
certain   number of actors, well it is probably because of this that you were 
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advised to see me. The project was called DONATA: Dissemination of New 
Agricultural Technology in Africa. It was this DONATA project, which was 
initiated by the CORAF, and which was implemented in 12 countries, 10 
countries in West Africa. […] So the DONATA’s project is the key. It was 
really the development of IAR4D. It was to show that innovation was central 
in development. We need to innovate; we need to do research in another way 
and for this we need to link actors, all the actors from the value chain of a 
product. We needed to link them, put them together, make them enjoy the 
dynamism, do it in a way that they get involved based on mutual interest. So, 
we take a product. For example, when I was asked which product we shall use 
for the project in Burkina Faso, there were three competing products which 
were candidates: there was rice, maize and cotton […] (Interview#22).  
 
 Neo-Liberal Science and Technology Policy: The strategic plan 
At policy level, advances were made with the development of the Strategic Plan of 
Scientific Research in 1995. This strategy is the second important event with the aim 
of coordinating research in all sectors in order to make it more efficient and fruitful for 
the sake of Burkina Faso’s economic and social development. In addition, this strategy 
aimed to reinforce and create research structures based on the country’s needs. Indeed, 
following the Faraco-ba’ symposium, the elaboration of a development plan based on 
scientific research became a necessity for the country’s development. It can be noted 
already that the institutional focus of the Strategic Plan was not the Universities but 
the CNRST (CNRST, 1995; 2007). Such a focus was as much about the dynamics of 
the local scientific community as the influences of international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank (Kobiane et al., 2012). This Strategic Plan gave a detailed 
progress of scientific research from the Faraco-ba Symposium up to 1995 and 
specified all the development sectors and gaps in research that needed to be filled. It 
consisted of a five-year programme. After the definition of the development problems, 
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the participants in the scientific research plan elaborated the solutions and the 
strategies needed to solve these problems. However, this period was also one which 
had seen Burkina Faso involved in the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, resulting in the freezing of research and higher education funding, 
although the programme proved insufficient in the face of development challenges 
(Zagre, 1994). In effect, the financial issue remains to the present day. Funding of 
higher education and research, as for other sectors, is heavily reliant on international 
donors, which has an impact on science, technology and development. The Strategic 
Plan remained partially implemented until 2011, which saw important changes in the 
organisation of science and innovation for development in Burkina Faso. How then 
will this socio-technical regime shape the adoption of the NIS as an innovation 
diffusion tool in Burkina Faso?  
 
4. 4. The Organisation of Research and Innovation 
Up to 2011 the Ministry of Higher Education and Research (MESSRS) led research 
and innovation activities, which was in fact a marginal mission compared to the 
training mission. Like the different science policies of the time, the existing 
institutions were considered inadequate to promote a knowledge-centred development 
policy.   
 
4.4.1. The National Centre for Scientific and Technological Research (CNRST) 
The National Centre for Scientific and Technological Research (CNRST) is the main 
organization for research and innovation in Burkina Faso (MRSI, 2012). At its 
creation in 1978, the CNRST had five main missions (MESSRS, 2010). First, it 
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proposed to contribute to the definition and implementation of a national policy of 
scientific, research and technology. Second, it was expected to promote applied 
research instead of fundamental research. Third, it aimed to coordinate and control 
scientific and technological research activities undertaken at the national level and 
abroad. Fourth it set out to elaborate and execute research programs. Finally, it 
planned to facilitate the diffusion and optimisation of research results. The CNRST is 
a result of the reform of the Voltaic Centre of Scientific Research (CVRS), itself a 
product of inherited colonial research institutions (Poussi, 1969). The CVRS is the 
nationalised name of the French Institute of Black Africa (IFAN) which was created in 
1937. IFAN had its headquarters in Dakar and a branch located in Burkina Faso since 
1949. It changed its name to CVRS in 1965 (Lill and Gaillard, 2013). Long before 
IFAN, the French set up the first experimental agricultural research station of Saria in 
1923 at Niangologo in the western part of Burkina Faso (Notes Africaines, 1961).  
 
To date, the CNRST is made up of four Institutes namely the Institute of 
Environmental and Agricultural Research (INERA), the Institute of Research in 
Applied Sciences and Technology (IRSAT), the National Institute of Social Sciences 
(INSS), and the Institute for Research in Health Sciences (IRSS).  In addition, the 
Strategic Plan of Scientific Research of Burkina Faso, was developed in 1995 by 
policy makers, national and international scientists and specialists, aimed through the 
FRSIT and ANVAR to adopt innovations able to support the country’s development 
(Université de Ouagadougou, 2004). Therefore, it acknowledged research as important 
for development and charted the course that future research needed to take. It was on 
the basis of this last objective that the national Forum of Scientific Research and 
Technological Innovation (FRSIT) was created and institutionalised in September 
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1995 (FRSIT/CDRI, 2008) to promote the use of research results and innovations at 
national and international levels, and to encourage research collaboration through 
biennial events.  
 
To fulfil these aims, The National Agency for the Use of Research Results (ANVAR) 
is the sub-structure created in 1997 whose task was to promote the use of research 
results generated in Burkina Faso, neighbouring countries and worldwide (FRSIT, 
2009). This national agency’s mission is to make sure that the research results 
promoted by FRSIT gain better recognition, thus allowing research and innovation 
results to have a positive impact on the economic development of the country. Under 
ANVAR’s mandate, any innovation can be adopted if the technology is considered 
useful for solving problems faced by the country (CNRST, 1995; FRSIT/CRDI, 2008; 
FRSIT, 2009). 
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CST: scientific and technologic committee  
CA: administrative committee  
CD: direction committee  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Processed by author  
 
4.4.2. Technical Agencies and NGOs 
Apart from the formal system of scientific and technological research (CNRST), other 
ministerial departments carry out research in various areas (MRSI, 2012). For 
example, the Centre for Health Research of Nouna and the MURAZ Centre, under the 
Institutes  
General delegate 
CST CA 
CD 
INERA IRSAT IRSS INSS FRSIT 
General 
Secretary   
Figure 8: National Centre for Scientific Research organisational framework organisational 
framework 
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Ministry of Health; the National Research Centre for Forest Seeds (CNSF), under the 
Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development; and the Office of Mines and 
Geology of Burkina (BUMUGEB), under the Ministry of Mines, Career and Energy. 
In addition, other regional, international funding bodies and NGOs support higher 
education and research activities in Burkina Faso.  
 
4.4.3. Organisation of Higher Education 
Higher education in Burkina Faso is led by Universities. The main public University is 
the University of Ouagadougou with other public and private universities. Together 
they contribute to the training of higher education students. In total, around 1,686 
publications from Universities were recorded by university researchers in 2008 
(Dakouo, 2008). Since then the number has increased. For the academic year 2010-
2011, the Universities counted 60,998 students in total for higher education with 6000 
teaching staff (Kobiane et al., 2012). Among the 60,998 students, 83% are from public 
universities and only 17% are from the private universities (Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères et Européenne, 2011). M.A. and doctorate training only started in 1994, 20 
years after the first University was created, with only MAs in economics. In 2009, 
there were 30 doctoral programmes (Some, 2009). Research conducted in universities 
is primarily focused on advancing researchers in their respective teaching/research 
career. Therefore, R&D is not a priority in these institutions (MRSI, 2012).  
 
Moreover, there is limited financial support for research. As stated by one official: 
 
you know that the State does not support research, in spite of the fact that the 
State pays the salary of researchers, the buildings and water as a well as 
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electricity bills, the State does not do anything at all. You can imagine how 
dependent we are towards external support […] these funding bodies come 
with everything set, we just have to follow. Since when have you ever seen a 
country which develops based on this? […] (Interview#16).   
 
Indeed, many financial partners have been involved in scientific research, 
development and research results validation and use in Burkina Faso, but, pure 
research is still predominant (87,6%) compared to applied research (11%). Only 1.4% 
deals with both (MESSRS, 2010). The research budget from the government in 2008 
was 33% compared to 25% for training and 67% from partners. Since the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes adoption in Burkina Faso, the grant allocated to students has 
decreased considerably leading to the creation of the funding body (FONER) in 
February 1994 to help students with financial support and loans (Lill and Gaillard, 
2013). As of 2012, 60,000 loans have been distributed to students. In the research area, 
government financial support remains very low. The predominant research area is 
agriculture, which appears to be the main development sector in developing countries 
in general.  
 
Before 2011, the CNRST and the Universities were coordinated by the same ministry, 
namely the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESSRS). In early 
2011, the scientific research branch of MESSRS was detached to constitute a new 
ministry, the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation (MRSI). Then it became 
the Ministry of Secondary and Higher Education (MESS).  
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4.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the crisis of successive socio-technical 
regimes in Burkina Faso through policy shifts with respect to innovation diffusion 
tools (integrated approach around cash crop, Training and Visits, Farming System). 
These changes in relation to innovation diffusion were partly a result of increasing 
pressure from the socio-technical landscape with the rise of the knowledge centred 
development policy (knowledge economy). These systemic changes paved the way for 
the adoption of the NIS as a tool to diffuse innovation.  
 
The analysis has shown that successive innovation diffusion tools have each revealed 
some insufficiencies on the level of participation of the involved actors. In the 
“integrated approach around cash crop” there was a complete lack of participation by 
the end users, the farmers, due to a linear process in the innovation diffusion as shown 
with the mechanisation of the agriculture sector. The end users merely received 
information and acted upon it. While the “Training and Visits” tool was more 
participative, it focussed on the role of the technical support agent as an intermediary 
between end users and researchers. As seen above, the level of participation of the 
farmers was limited to receiving information instead of an open dialogue between all 
innovation actors. Lastly, the “Farming System” innovation diffusion tool has 
prioritised whole-system participation as essential for successful innovation diffusion.  
 
Burkina Faso, which has experimented with and successively adopted different 
innovation diffusion tools, has found in the latest interactive systemic approach 
embodied by the MAP tool a means to interest financial bodies. Indeed, the 
cooperation of international financial institutions has played an important role in 
 173 
innovation diffusion because the adoption of different approaches was dependent on 
whether or not it was of interest to these institutions. Consequently, due to a lack of 
funding, it took a long time to diffuse the systemic approach to innovation in Burkina 
Faso. The role of the state is however becoming central in the implementation of 
interactive approach to innovation, particularly the NIS diffusion tool, as demonstrated 
in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.1.3). 
 
The relationship between the strategic policy level and operational level is a 
methodological one. Since the 1960s the government of Burkina Faso has consistently 
sought to implement different development policies to improve the economic and 
social conditions of its people, often in line with state of the art thinking and with 
external approval, for example from a funding agency.  Nevertheless, the results of 
every new development policy have proved disappointing leading the government to 
consider adopting the NIS as a policy tool to implement knowledge centred 
development. Geels’ MLP helps explain the diffusion of the NIS policy tool at both 
strategic and operational levels. Indeed, with regard to the present study, there are 
three observations to make with regard to the interplay between landscape, regime and 
niche. The new landscape (knowledge centred development policy) which took over 
the old one (market policy) put pressure on the existing diffusion approaches (Training 
and visit) which has become inadequate. This crisis opened up windows of 
opportunities for the NIS as a new policy tool for innovation diffusion.  Under this 
pressure, the Forum of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation (FRSIT), has 
been identified as a niche, where, the NIS policy tool is being tested, through a process 
of learning, with the aim to replace the existing diffusion approach niches are 
characterised by Geels as the spaces where innovations are developed. The concept of 
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niche will help identify the ‘protected spaces’ where they emerged. The interplay of 
landscape, socio-technical regimes, and niches provides therefore a coherent 
conceptual framework with which to investigate the adoption of the framework as a 
development policy tool in Burkina Faso, and to appreciate how it is shaped through 
this process. Methodologically, the study of the transition to the NIS as a policy tool 
cannot be limited at strategic level to how it shapes policy options. It also needs to 
take into account the appropriation of such a policy tool at operational level. It is this 
methodological requirement that justified the study of the NIS at both strategic to 
operational levels.   
 
However, this process need not to follow the linear continuum strategic-operational 
level. Because, as shown in Chapter 1, from the 1980s, development interventions 
were thought to be more efficient when done directly at operational level in order to 
reach the poor, meaning that it is unnecessary for intervention to pass through policy 
down to operational level. Consequently, the diffusion of the NIS as a policy tool 
could be adopted directly at this operational level. It was therefore relevant, regardless 
of the state of the diffusion of the NIS policy tool at strategic policy level, to study its 
diffusion at operational level in the agricultural sector. 
 
The following chapter will investigate the process of adoption of the NIS policy tool 
for catalysing innovation for development in Burkina Faso. The analysis will address 
the relationship between the pressures at the socio-technical landscape level due to the 
rise of the knowledge-centred development regime in the early 2000s, which opened 
up the opportunity at the socio-technical regime level for the adoption of the NIS as a 
new tool for innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso. 
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Chapter 5: The Shift to the NIS Policy Tool 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed three different conceptions of innovation diffusion 
tools, and noted how there was a change in the definition and choice of a NIS 
diffusion tool in the socio-technical regime in Burkina Faso. As we have seen in 
Chapter 1, Socio-Technical Landscapes were identified (Geels, 2004), which had 
implications for the transformation of Burkina Faso’s own development policy 
(Section 1.4.2).  As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the socio-technical regimes in relation 
to innovation diffusion did undergo changes, partly in response to pressures at the 
landscape level. By investigating the policy shifts with respect to innovation diffusion 
tools in response to the changes in the country’s development policy regimes, Chapter 
4 has described the foundation for the adoption of the NIS policy tool for innovation 
diffusion. The present Chapter will examine the adoption of such a tool for the 
implementation of knowledge-centred development, as the latest development policy 
in Burkina Faso. It will make explicit the interplay between the landscape, the regime 
and niche. 
 
Such a process is outlined by Geels as follows: 
 
…radical innovations usually emerge outside the regime, in particular market 
or technological niches. Such radical innovations may diffuse more widely, 
when several processes link up: (a) external environmental changes, which 
create pressure on the regime, (b) weakening of the regime, e.g. increasing 
problems, loss of faith by main actors, (c) stabilisation of the niche-innovation 
in a dominant design, increasing support from powerful actors, and improving 
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price/performance characteristics. If the radical innovation replaces the 
existing technology, this is accompanied by broader social, cultural, political 
and infrastructural changes. (Geels, 2007:1412). 
 
The aim of the chapter is first to describe the innovation niche, defined by Geels 
(2004) as the level or 'area' where the space is provided for radical innovation and 
experimentation, that enabled the emergence of the NIS as an innovation diffusion tool 
in Burkina Faso. Second, the chapter also analyses the processes of learning and 
stabilisation that led to the diffusion of the NIS as a policy narrative, and a tool for 
innovation diffusion. Finally, this process of diffusion has its own dynamic and needs 
to be understood in order to appreciate the transition between innovation diffusion 
approaches. As Akrich et. al highlighted, 
 
The bringing together of market and technology, through which both 
inventions and the outlets which transform them into innovations are patiently 
constructed, is more and more a result of a collective activity and no longer the 
monopoly of an inspired and dedicated individual. The individual qualities of 
insight, intuition, sense of anticipation, quick reactions, skilfulness, must all be 
reinvented and reformulated in the language of the organisation. They are no 
longer the property of an individual, but become collective virtues, during the 
emergence of which the art of governing and managing play a key role. 
(Akrich, Callon and Latour, 2002:189) 
 
To follow this collective activity, the chapter will be organised into three main 
sections. The first section describes the Forum of Scientific Research and 
Technological Innovation (FRSIT), as a niche within which the NIS as a diffusion tool 
was nurtured, and outline the context of its creation, mission and organisational set up 
for innovation management. The second section is about the process of stabilisation of 
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the NIS diffusion tool at niche level, by highlighting the learning processes, the 
experimentation and the network building involved to stabilise the NIS diffusion tool. 
The last section explores the outcomes of the innovation process, through an analysis 
of the institutionalisation of the NIS framework as manifested and applied in policy 
design.   
 
5.2. FRSIT: An innovation Niche for the NIS as a Policy Tool for Innovation 
Diffusion  
This section is a description of the FRSIT, as a protective niche within which the NIS 
policy tool was nurtured and tested with the intention of eventually using it to improve 
existing innovation systems at the regime level such as agriculture in the case of 
cotton. It describes the FRSIT’s context of creation, its missions and its organisational 
set up for innovation management in Burkina Faso.  
 
5.2.1. Historical Context of Creation 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Burkina Faso still faced great development challenges. 
The successes of the revolutionary policies of the previous decade started to wane 
while international economic agencies were pressing the country to adopt Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) (Zagre 1994). The adoption of the SAP in 1991 had 
resulted in little improvement five years later (Zagre 1994). In the face of these 
challenges, the government of Burkina Faso sought new leverage, and turned to the 
potentially promising area of technological and scientific development. Modest but 
varied research had been done, however the government and researchers found that 
“this activity of researchers has long remained unknown to the general public and 
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decision-makers, because of a lack of appropriate policy and communication 
strategy.” (Nacoulma et al., 2005:7).  
 
To rectify this lack of policy and communication between researchers and users of 
their results, an official meeting was held on 3rd August 1993 between researchers of 
the University of Ouagadougou, the CNRST (the National Research Centre) and the 
President of Burkina Faso (CNRST, 1995; Nacoulma et al., 2005). This meeting 
resulted in the first Forum of Scientific Research and Technological Innovations held 
between 28th March and 2nd April 1994, under the patronage of the President of 
Burkina Faso. The success of the forum led to its institutionalisation the following 
year by a presidential decree (n° 95-347/PRES/MESSRS) on the 19th September 1995. 
“[The Forum] also marks the engagement of Burkina authorities in facilitating 
collaboration between users and producers of research for the best utilisation of 
innovations and inventions” (Nacoulma et al., 2005:2). The Forum would play a focal 
point in research, invention and innovation promotion for sustainable development in 
Burkina Faso. In fact, well before the creation of the FRSIT by the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Craft created 
the National Fair for Inventors and Innovators (SNII) with the aim of establishing a 
platform for inventors and innovators from all industries (formal and informal) to 
make their results available to economic and social organisations. For purposes of 
efficiency, this fair was integrated with the FRSIT in 2000. With this fusion backed by 
the two ministries, the FRSIT enlarged and strengthened its framework as a national-
level innovation niche and catalyst for innovation in public policy.       
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5.2.2. The FRSIT’s Missions 
The FRSIT set out to serve as a platform for actors of research, innovations and 
inventions, to disseminate and communicate their results and expertise, and record the 
application of these results by users. In order to achieve this mission, the Forum set 
out several objectives for the wider communication and dissemination of research 
results. The FRSIT sought to: 
 
 diffuse the value of the research undertaken in Burkina Faso, or by Burkinabe 
researchers working for the country and living abroad. 
 Disseminate technological innovations; 
 Regularly and consistently communicate information on technological 
innovations to the public 
 
It should be observed that, the idea of adopting a more effective strategy of diffusion 
was established around the period (1995) in Burkina Faso. The innovation model for 
science and technology development, which was dominant in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
even 1970s, was linear. This model explained innovation as depending on scientific 
discoveries. If every innovation begins with these discoveries, Science is seen as the 
main actor in the development process (Manley, 2003). The first linear model assumed 
that the high investment in R&D would lead to productivity growth (Godin, 2009). 
This model includes basic science, R&D, production construction and marketing. All 
of these elements are thought to be acting in a linear way (Manley, 2003). It is for this 
reason that the linear model is called the “Science-Push Model” and then “Demand-
Pull” when focused on the demand side of the process (Manley, 2003). In a way, it 
was a period characterised by scientism and technological progressivism, consisting in 
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attributing an intrinsic instrumental role to science and technology (Kleinman, 2005), 
thus making any idea of purposive communication around research results is not 
relevant The trend in FRSIT strategy in terms of diffusion reflects then a broader shift 
in innovation theory, although not purposively articulated by actors in Burkina Faso. 
As Rogers (2003:5) explains, “diffusion is a process in which an innovation is diffused 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”. In 
Burkina Faso, in the 1990s, the development agencies were striving to develop more 
interactive approaches for innovation diffusion. As one official stated, “Promoting 
communication is essential to deal with the development issues of the time” (Interview 
#01). 
 
Secondly the FRSIT sought to strengthen scientific communities through education 
and professional development by: 
 
 Guaranteeing the quality of research products given to the consumer,  
 Establishing strong links between researchers and the other actors of 
technological innovation, 
 Evaluating what is gained and the state of research,  
 Creating a synergy and reinforcing the relationship between research 
structures, 
 Promoting research and endogenous technological inventions,  
 Developing in young people the desire to do research, invent and innovate.  
 
The tendency to think in interactive ways led also to the recognition that each actor in 
the system needed to be promoted. Research is no longer seen as exclusively within 
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the framework of R&D firms (Some, 2009). In a developing country such as Burkina 
Faso, the other key challenge regarding the development of a strong research 
community is the existence of a dynamic but informal research sector, which needs to 
be integrated within the innovation network and which needs a favourable context in 
which to promote researchers’ discoveries and inventions. The challenge is well 
expressed by the following statement of a state official who is giving specific 
examples of behaviour that hinder the diffusion process in Burkina Faso. For him 
researchers always try to curb the informal discoveries from inventors. Sometimes, 
they will claim the property right over products belonging to informal inventors and 
the benefits associated to it. This lack of trust has aggravated due to State weakness in 
terms of law enforcement.  
  
There is ‘KATO’ [a private industry]. It makes food for animals… its director 
is rich. He got loads of work offers from everywhere; for example, the World 
Bank. There are other funders too. One time one [informal inventor] told me 
that he has received a financial offer with the help of the ministry, but someone 
from there has curbed this for his own interest. This guy at the ministry found 
someone else to copy the same thing. It is really hard for the private informal 
inventors. […] These kinds of examples are many. Another example is the lady 
who invented a dish and she wanted IRSAT’s [research institute] help in order 
to get her dish improved, but, IRSAT took her invention and published under 
the institute name leaving the owner very disappointed […] Few years ago, one 
of our ministers went abroad and saw the ‘bitatore’ [invented in Burkina Faso] 
and he did not know that it was from Burkina. When he was told that it is from 
his country, he couldn’t believe it […] To tell you that our inventions and 
discoveries remain ‘under the roof’. It is shameful but that is the reality, it is a 
matter of mentality. There is definitely a need for a real change. As for now, 
we are in this situation because, the owners of the technologies are very scared, 
as they are at risk to see their inventions and innovations being stolen by other 
strong actors (Interview #9).    
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 A further set of objectives focuses on the need to involve policy-makers in a more 
systematic way in innovation promotion. To this end, FRSIT sets out to: 
 
 Raise the interest and commitment of the national and international 
communities in the current research programmes in Burkina Faso,   
 Involve the development partners in research in a dynamic way,    
 Attract research partners and encourage the promotion of technologies, 
diffusion of research results and research funding 
 Encourage policy makers to appreciate research on a concrete level in order to 
shed light on their strategic choices.  
 
According to another official, this is to say that: 
 
The FRSIT in its conception is a tool of dialogue [that is to say a tool which 
create incentives for collaboration and networking] between the different 
actors such as researchers, inventors-innovators, decision makers, 
industrialists, producers of research results and other research partners. In this 
dialogue, researchers and the inventors-innovators are expecting a better 
promotion of their findings and opportunities of scientific cooperation and 
business networking. Policy makers need trustworthy scientific data to make 
sure that their decisions are pertinent to efficient resources for research 
concerning the funding agencies and the producers. The FRSIT is conceived to 
assess the possibility of using research results, inventions and any innovation 
undertaken (Interview#3). 
 
Until the creation of FRSIT, the policy aspect of innovation systems had been 
neglected. Indeed, as described in Chapter 4, not only were the innovation diffusion 
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tools limited to the micro-scale but also, they consisted in the diffusion of technology 
developed for farmers, either locally or internationally by low level technicians. At 
best, these innovation diffusion tools tried to increase the degree of participation of the 
users and involve local craftsmen in the maintenance of the diffused technology. The 
broader social context which would have brought forward the policy aspect was 
neither explicitly present nor considered relevant to the innovation process. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, such considerations appeared inadequate for solving the 
complexity of innovation processes. A broader approach was urgently needed, which 
would also allow politicians to be aware of the important role of science in 
international relations.    
 
5.2.3. FRSIT’s Management 
The FRSIT as a technological niche is an organised space (Geels, 2004; Geels and 
Kemp, 2007). The performance of technological niches in terms of nurturing 
innovations depends on their human resources, organisational set up, organisational 
positioning, and networking capacities (Geels and Schot, 2008). At its creation the 
FRSIT consisted of administrative and scientific functions. The former is led by the 
Permanent Secretary, nominated by the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research (MESSRS). His role is in line with the objectives of FRSIT. As an institute, 
the FRSIT possesses three services: the administrative and financial service, the 
service for creativity and invention and the promotion and marketing service. The role 
of these services is: 
 To inform the public and the researchers on the FRSIT and its 
activities, 
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 To raise the profile of FRSIT through media and other useful means of 
communication both regionally and internationally 
 To participate in resource mobilisation in order to organise the forum 
and mobilise actors. 
 
On the other hand, there is the scientific committee headed by a general delegate of 
CNRST with scientific members from universities and research centres, ministerial 
departments, NGOs and regional research institutes.  
The role of the committee is: 
 
 To define the themes of the different editions, 
 To propose the themes of these editions, 
 To follow recommendations derived from the discussions during the 
forum. 
 
One of the main duties of the FRSIT is to organise a forum every two years whose 
theme is chosen by the scientific committee. Its aim is to give an opportunity to every 
actor, from around the world whose work is of relevance to Burkina Faso, who is 
interested in research or technological innovation to participate in order to share 
his/her research results with a wider public at national, regional and international 
level. As stated by a former Permanent Secretary of the Forum during an interview, “it 
is like that, every two years the scientific committee together choose a theme and the 
date is fixed for the forum. You see, at this event everyone is present: those who 
[have] got something to show and those who come to look at the inventions.” 
(Interview# 19). However, it’s paradoxical that with the political interest in the forum, 
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as evident from its mission and objectives, the Forum is financed by non-
governmental organisations.  Key financial partners are the Ford Foundation, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, CRDI, CTA, the European Union, US/AID), Union 
Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine l’UEMOA etc (MRSI, 2012). Another 
perspective on this funding support is that FRSIT has established itself as a key player 
in the network, and is valued both internally and internationally. 
 
5.3. The Adoption of the NIS Policy tool 
5.3.1. The Need for a New tool to Innovation Diffusion 
The need for a new tool for encouraging innovation diffusion was recognised in the 
early 2000s. At the end of the 1990s, after different development policy shifts, the 
development indicators still showed unsatisfactory results (World bank, 1999). 
Chapter 1 gave a very detailed description of the different development policies 
developed for the socio-economic development of the country which for a long time 
has experienced persistent underdevelopment. Such a situation has not improved 
despite different efforts, among them, the Strategic Plan for Scientific Research in 
1994 and the National Forum for Scientific and technological Innovation in 1995, 
which were put in place to foster the country’s socio-economic development. As 
shown in the evaluation of the FRSIT in 2005, development actors were still 
struggling to meet their goals (Nakoulma et al., 2005).  
 
It appears from this evaluation that the Forum’s ability to promote innovation 
development remained low. Other difficulties were identified by the organisers of the 
Forum including 1) the different actors (researchers, inventors, innovators, policy 
makers and users of research results) work in isolation from one another so that results 
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are neither shared nor widely disseminated; 2) The same actors are ignorant of the 
needs of the users of their research; 3) there is no framework for actors; 4) there is no 
dynamism in scientific and technological research; 5) the good work done by isolated 
innovators in mechanics such as, food, energy, GMO, small private enterprises are not 
well known. Finally; 6) women do not occupy their place in innovation promotion 
despite their important role in food and cosmetics (Nakoulma et al. 2005).  
 
As can be seen, the main gap is the lack of synergy between actors who are meant to 
work in a system. Indeed, there is no perceived link even between actors of the same 
group. For example, though they both belong to the same research centre (CNRST), 
results are not shared between the agricultural research institute (INERA) and the food 
research institute (IRSAT) (FRSIT/CRDI, 2008).  However, the information flow 
between faculties and research units is essential because, this will help actors in the 
same sectors to know each other’s needs through efficient communication. Not only 
was there a need to implement new development policies, but also to develop new 
methods to boost technological innovation. It is in this context that the knowledge 
centred development policy emerged in Burkina Faso. There was a need to identify the 
existing actors in the innovation systems of Burkina Faso, get to know their needs, 
constraints, motivations, strengths and weaknesses. In addition, there was a need to 
create synergy between researchers, inventors, innovators, policy makers, businesses 
and civil society to promote the value of research results in order to reinforce the 
capacity of the general secretary of FRSIT to coordinate activities which facilitate 
dialogue between all the actors. In fact, as the following statement indicates,  
 
the observation that one can make is that there are in Burkina Faso results and 
research products and innovations, as well as elements of an innovation system 
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capable of significantly increasing the productivity of agricultural systems and 
bring added value to the direct beneficiaries. However, there is a deep gap 
between existing innovations and changes implied that this should lead in 
improving the living conditions of populations. Also creating a synergy of 
action between the various actors would firstly: identify and understand the 
needs of users of the results; organize inventors and innovators by area of 
competence; and secondly: easier access to bank loans; establish partnerships 
and negotiate contracts; to make political decisions. (FRSIT/CRDI, 2007 :1). 
 
Accordingly, a three years’ agreement between IDRC and CNRST was created, 
entitled the "Analysis of innovation systems and strengthening ties between the actors 
for socio-economic development of Burkina Faso". Its purpose is to strengthen or 
create tangible links between the various stakeholders (researchers, policy makers, 
inventors and media users, private and public) in order to provide relevant material to 
establish a framework for promoting more ambitious innovations.  
 
However, at this this point there was no clear answer to what needed to be done 
practically to solve the difficulties acknowledged by FRSIT. This context opened 
windows of opportunity for the adoption of new systemic approaches resulting in the 
choice and promotion of the NIS innovation diffusion tool intended for use by both, 
the government of Burkina Faso at policy level to develop new policy strategies and 
actors from all sectors at operational level to change the behaviour learnt from old 
diffusion tools to new ways of interacting which would be informed from the NIS 
policy tool. 
 
The adoption of innovation is a complex process. Before the technology leaves the 
niche level to be incorporated within the ST-Regime, it needs to be stabilised at niche 
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level first. In this respect, the NIS policy tool adoption and experimentation at niche 
level went through a complex process. The actors’ learning processes led to the 
stabilisation of the NIS policy tool framework which transition at the development 
policy regime offers an opportunity for its adoption. The next section will address the 
learning and stabilisation processes of the NIS policy tool in the context of Burkina 
Faso. 
 
5.3.2. Building Social Networks 
As indicated in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.1) of this thesis, the NIS framework did not 
originate in Burkina Faso. it was developed in the 1980s for the OECD countries by 
Freeman (1982) and Lundvall (1985), as a tool for technological innovation as 
intrinsically linked to the complex interactions between institutions (Lundvall, 2007). 
In the case of Burkina Faso, where it was introduced in 2000s, it is a matter of 
technological transfer; that is to say the “acquisition, development, and utilisation of 
technological knowledge by a country other than that in which this knowledge 
originated” (Jafarieh, 2001: 13 citing Derakhshani, 1983). However, technological 
transfer supposes a definition of a clear problem which will be solved by what is to be 
transferred (Akrich et al., 2002). At the FRSIT the actors had a clear definition of the 
problem which needed a solution. Their objective was: 
 
to facilitate the linkages between the different innovators […] the aim was to 
find a strategy in a way that innovations, inventions and the research results 
which had value during FRSIT’s forums being valued at national level. This 
consisted in making sure that many people get to know the technology and 
then adopt it (Interview#10).  
 
In other words, as clearly stated in the workshop report,  
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there are links between the different actors that need reinforcement. Facilitating 
access to inputs, equipment is the result of personal relationships. The 
technical and financial partners and the state support very little research / 
development. Appreciation of support enjoyed by actors to promote 
innovations in the pipeline. The state is the main supporting actor. Supports 
transformation are more important than the production level» (CNRST, 2009: 
3).  
 
In order to find a solution to this problem, having long worked with FRSIT as a 
financial partner, the IDRC offered to provide a substantial financial support, because 
the type of problem exposed by the FRSIT actors was part of its area of interest27.  But 
this financial support was subject to the submission of a proposal which followed the 
IDRC’s funding policy. In this chapter, the word project refers to three meaning 
according to the context.  
 Project as a grant application 
 Project as development project or intervention 
 Project as the specific case of NIS 
In Burkina Faso, as in many developing countries, the wide spread of development 
projects has led many local people to consider them more as opportunities for 
                                                 
27The experience of such an agency of the NIS framework goes back to the 1980s through Mullin James who 
before he worked for IDRC, was a former Chair of the Committee on Science and Technology Policy at the 
OECD. It was within such committee members that the NIS framework was developed in the 1980s. However, 
IDRC has recognised the possibility of the transfer of such technology to an Africa context since 2003 when, 
after it created the regional advisers commission in 2001, the regional office met with its 10 members and 
discussed on the possibilities of stimulating the use and importance of research results for fruitful decision 
making in an African context. Since then, 2004-2007 was mainly the time to look at specific cases. The series of 
meetings of regional advisors with researchers and policy makers from different countries was a way to 
acknowledge different points of view and look at obstacles which hinder the dialogue between development 
actors with reference to every country’s specific realities. As can be seen, it was within this period that the 
project on the NIS between FRSIT/IDRC was built. Its representative Dr Innocent Butare advice local actors on 
the effectiveness of a new approach which could help solve the underline problems  
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individual gain and self-promotion through money making from funding bodies than 
as means for solving development problems. In addition to being in line with their area 
of interest, the project (grant application) should be developed through a participative 
process involving IDRC’s experts in order to come up with a mutually agreed project. 
As the leader of the national project team member stated: 
 
[Ever] since its creation after the first forum in 1994, I led the FRSIT and 
every two years at each different forum, CRDI has always been a financial 
partner. It has given us a number of donations, 10 to 15 billion at each forum. 
Because of this constant financial support, I discussed with the minister what 
could be done to acknowledge it. I proposed an award to the director because it 
is in fact the director who was responsible, and the outcome could have been 
different if there had been a different person in charge. At that time the director 
was unable to come and was represented by one of his employees who 
received the award on his behalf. He took it back to Canada and presented it 
during their general assembly. People at IDRC were really happy about the 
recognition that we showed through the medal which will never disappear. 
Then he [the director] came and said, we were making innovations, and that we 
needed to elaborate the project [grant application] so that they can give us a 1 
billion in CFA for such a project on the innovation systems. This is how the 
idea was born […]. You see, it is a story, it is a philosophy, it is a system, it is 
a whole vision (Interview#28). 
 
In response to this offer, according to his understanding of the problem to be solved, 
the head of the national team at FRSIT set out to build an appropriate team for the 
project’s development. He gathered five other researchers from various academic 
backgrounds and institutional affiliations to work with him, a total of six members 
with life and earth science backgrounds including two social scientists. Only two 
members, both from life and earth science, were affiliated with FRSIT. They drafted a 
project about the “Promotion [advancement] and use of technological inventions and 
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innovations in Burkina Faso by the FRSIT”28. An analysis of the underlying 
assumption in the framing of the project shows a definite break with old innovation 
diffusion tools as described in Chapter 4. However, there is no indication that they 
were aware of the NIS tool for innovation diffusion. At best, the assumption and the 
framing are closer to an approach developed by the IDRC in the early 2000s published 
under the title, African Researchers and Decision-makers: Building Synergy for 
Development. The idea of heterogeneous actors (policy makers, researchers and users) 
is present, the idea of a network and or a system is present and the idea of 
communication between these actors is also present from what follows. In sum, this 
appears as a network. Even if these aspects are present in the NIS policy tool, there is 
no evidence from the draft that their inspiration came from it.    
 
This proposal was submitted to the IDRC during the year 2006. I understand that “Dr 
Butare was the leading actor in the project at IDRC” (Interview #9), who received the 
project from FRSIT and submitted it for analysis. Analysis of the internal process at 
the IDRC shows that there was a different interpretation of the proposed solution to an 
interactive tool from the national team at FRSIT. From the IDRC’s analysis of the 
underlying assumption of the project, they decided that the NIS policy tool would be 
the best solution to the problem regarding the fact that there were no linkages between 
users and producers of knowledge. A representative at IDRC stated that “it is 
obviously from us, let’s say […] I had to make the proposition because locally the 
concept was not known at all by national actors” (Interview#47).  
 
                                                 
28 Draft proposal access from an interviewee, member of the national team 
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Feedback was sent to the national project team advising it to revise its proposal by 
framing it according to the NIS framework. However, as shown above, the national 
team lacked expertise on understanding this framework, then use it as a policy tool. 
IDRC offered technical support, in the form of an expert in development who is also 
from Burkina Faso. As one of the team member observes: 
 
Yes, yes, I will explain to you how the IDRC works. If for example they have 
an activity, they have their experts who work with them. This person is in the 
company workers’ list in different domains. There are some people in the list 
who are marked in red because they have failed to do previous tasks. So IDRC 
always has to give its point of view even if you propose an expert. In our case, 
we did not propose anybody. But [name], has been working with IDRC for a 
long [time] and so he was proposed by the IDRC to assist us (Interview#11).  
 
This expert was expected to advise the national team in order to meet the IDRC’s 
guidelines. After several rounds of submissions and feedbacks, the project was revised 
accordingly and then funded.  One of the national team members describes the process 
as follows:  
 
Each of us has contributed to the writing of the project [grant proposal]. I think 
it took almost a year before it was accepted, because, when we write we send 
and the IDRC say, you need to do this, we correct and then send back again. At 
some point, the boss said we should leave it and I said we are going to do it 
until the end, because, if we don’t, they will say, ‘look we wanted to help them 
with a project and funding but they did not want help’. Then we continue 
working and then one day, I think it was just before Christmas the boss 
[referring to NIS project manager] said he has received a message which says 
that the project was accepted. That is it! we’ve written and their experts have 
accepted after many drafts (Interview#39).  
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The final version of the project was entitled ‘Analysis of the Innovation Systems and 
Strengthening of Linkages Between Actors for Socio-Economic Development in 
Burkina Faso’. Based on preliminary analysis of the existing systems The focus was 
to draw a policy tool in light with the NIS framework The IDRC consultant explains 
their involvement in framing the project: 
 
Here it is, it is FRSIT which submitted the project but in fact, it is the CRDI 
[IDRC] which has done a lot of work on the subject [NIS], because, as I said, 
there was [too great] a lack of competence in the matter locally to allow local 
actors to make such a formulation of this kind of project. Therefore, the CRDI 
through its experiences said look, there are some existing approaches which 
fortunately can be used here if you take the opportunity and the necessity of 
coordination between the different actors who are involved in the system to 
create value chains... (Interview#7). 
 
The IDRC representative recalls "As I said earlier, I proposed this idea of the NIS, 
they [national team] did not have knowledge on the matter" (Interview#47). 
 
The framing of the project by the IDRC using an innovation perspective leaves two 
options. One is that the IDRC takes over the lead of the project at the expense of the 
national team. Because, in practice, by reframing the solution to the problem, IRDC 
makes itself in Callon’s words “an obligatory passage point” (Callon, 1986). Its power 
in the network increases as its role changes from that of an external funder to that of 
an internal technical advisor. The other option is that the national team be trained on 
the NIS framework allowing them to lead the implementation of the project [the NIS 
as a project]. This latter option will enable both parties to advance their interest though 
with a shift in power relations. Although the IDRC has expertise in implementing the 
innovation systems diffusion tool, it was not equipped to conduct a training course on 
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the NIS concept, thus, an expert from the United Kingdom29 was recruited by the 
IDRC for this purpose. The course was designed in two parts. A theoretical part 
consisted of learning about the NIS as a concept, and its application as a tool in four 
case studies.  
 
The training in the use of the framework as a tool for innovation systems 
building […] aims to give specific knowledge to the project team and other 
partners. This is the theoretical part of the concept. The training therefore aims 
to give to the team some tools to collect and analyse data for the analysis of the 
existing innovation systems of maize, millet, mango and shea which are chosen 
in the framework of the project in order to reinforce it, in light with the NIS 
model (Interview#14). 
 
The objective was that the findings from these analyses can be used to make policy in 
some ways.  
 
Table 10: Training content 
Introduction to the Innovation 
Systems 
Analysis of Innovation Systems Method and case selection 
-Concept Origin  
- Definition of NIS terminology  
-Main components 
Central elements 
- Evolution of the concept 
- Analysis of the agricultural 
sector 
 
-Lessons from other case studies 
on cocoa from Ghana  
-Case studies on maize, millet, 
mango, shea,  
-Clear plans on how work will 
be conducted  
 
Source: Processed by author  
                                                 
29Dr Watu Wamae a Kenyan national, holds a PhD in economics of innovation and development and is a visiting 
research fellow in the Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University, UK 
 195 
 
In addition, the training included participation in conferences and continued 
international training to strengthen what had been already learnt. For instance, 
attendance at the III International Conference on KMA “Knowledge Management 
Africa” under the theme Knowledge to Reposition Africa in the World Economy. 
Moreover, the team leader spent over two weeks at UNI-MERIT30 in Maastricht with 
the objective of exchanging information with the UNI-MERIT team on the innovation 
systems, discussing draft papers from the case studies, looking for possible doctoral, 
masters or short-term training opportunities for his colleagues and students, and 
finding a possible expert for the mid-term evaluation of the project. The team leader 
said in this regard, “I even had training abroad to deepen these ideas. It was in 
Maastricht. In fact, we wanted to meet and learn from experts due to the fact that we 
needed these experts’ advice and impressions on the experience of Burkina Faso. I did 
meet with them […] there are many other types of training for all the different actors 
or some specific ones undertaken locally” (Interview#28).  
 
Through this learning process, one can conclude from the above analysis that the NIS 
policy tool reached relative stabilization. Through the setting up of appropriate 
networks and undertaking training on the NIS framework, the local team managed to 
meet the standard of IDRC. However, this does not mean though that the NIS policy 
tool has stabilized at the niche level, such that it will automatically be adopted by the 
                                                 
30United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Ssocial Research and Training Centre on Innovation and 
Technology with key reference people such as Luc Soete, a professor of economics and director of UNU-
MERIT, Maastricht University and his collaborators. The UNU-MERIT course on the Design and Evaluation of 
Innovation Policies (DEIP) is an intensive one-week programme for policymakers in science, technology and 
innovation in developing countries and for participants from the private sector involved in strategic decision-
making about technology and innovation. UNIT-MERIT director, Soete L has published number of books and 
article with NIS funders such as Freeman on the national innovation systems. This university is well known for 
its expertise on the matter. IDRC’s director was aware of this and proposed the national team director should 
spend some time with them.    
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relevant actors. In order for the NIS policy tool to spread and become a common tool 
for relevant actors at the socio-technical regime level, it needs “windows of 
opportunity” (Geels, 2004: 915). Such “windows of opportunity” are created by the 
need for new ways of doing things as a result of pressure from the landscape level 
(Geels, 2004; Geels and Kemp, 2007).   The analysis of the dynamics between the 
socio-technical landscape and the socio-technical regime in Chapters1 and 4 
respectively show the existence of potential windows of opportunity for the adoption 
of the NIS concept. At the landscape level, after more than four decades of 
unsuccessful development policies implementation, the knowledge-centred 
development as the latest policy had been established and needed a tool for its 
implementation. Therefore, policy makers and entrepreneurs have been looking for 
new approaches to promote economic performance and social welfare. At the level of 
the socio-technical regime, the adoption of a new technology supposes there is a 
problem which needs a solution. In the case of Burkina Faso, policy makers, 
researchers and users of research results need to know about the NIS concept and that 
it can be used as a tool to promote their interests. Being aware of this, the actors at 
FRSIT included in their experimentation strategies, the involvement of all these actors.  
 
5.3.2. Enrolling Researchers, Policy-Makers, Business Actors and the Other Interested 
Parties 
The project described in the previous section was meant to establish the theoretical 
and methodological foundation for a broader project which aimed at valuing research 
results. These are niche level actors talk at FRSIT relating to the NIS project. It was a 
necessary starting point of the project itself because in the context of technology 
transfer, it was essential to inform the relevant national actors about the framework to 
 197 
be implemented so these niche level actors could convince policy makers, researchers, 
innovators, inventors and the users of research results who do not have any knowledge 
on the matter. According to one of the national team members this part of the project 
was named: 
 
The little project [a development project], because it was a type of formal 
framework, where people regularly meet: this is what we want, this is what we 
got, this is what we want to do, who will do this and that what is the role of 
everyone […] it was supposed to create in fact a national expertise […] 
reinforcing communication, knowledge etc. Then, the big project, the project 
for diffusing it, is the one which should make sure the project has continuity 
through its institutionalization […]  (Interview#13). 
 
Among the range of actors who took part in the process and the adoption of the NIS, 
two other categories can be identified: the policy makers and the business actors. As 
explained by one interviewee: "We have invited people from the private sector, people 
from the transformation side of products. As I said, at political level, there were 
political representatives. We have invited all of them at all levels and stages” 
(Interview#23)  
 
5.3.3. Involving researchers, inventors, innovators, users and policy makers 
 Involving researchers  
At niche level, the national team has actively participated in the process of the NIS 
transfer to Burkina Faso. The team knew at this stage that introducing a new 
technology required consideration of the social and political context in which it was 
being introduced if it was to be accepted and successfully implemented. The team also 
believed that, as with any technology, the social context within which the NIS policy 
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tool was intended to be implemented, was not neutral. That is to say, the new ST-
Systems need to displace the old ST-Systems (Geels, 2004). Indeed, for a long time, 
researchers have collaborated with those who use their research results and therefore 
already had their avenues for the diffusion of their research results. These former 
unsuccessful approaches are discussed in Chapter 4. Being aware of these avenues, the 
national team at niche level adopted a participative approach for information and 
diffusion, and to show relevant actors the necessity for them to forego their old 
practices and adopt new ones from the NIS concept to enable them to achieve a more 
positive outcome from their collaboration which reflect the foundation of the NIS 
concept. The national team chose four strategic case studies to draw researchers into 
the process and show how they could improve their networking through the NIS as a 
new innovation diffusion tool. Researchers participated in conferences, workshops, 
meetings etc. to strengthen the links between them and the users of their results. This 
approach also aimed to clarify for the researchers the benefits other actors, (users of 
research results and policy makers), can bring to them. As explained in the following 
statement “Researchers would of course get to know the taste of the users of their 
results, [because] their interests will need to meet those of the users. Then, [working] 
together in a system any innovation and invention can be successful” (Interview#2). It 
was a strategy which aimed to establish a dialogue or improve existing dialogues to 
move from informal to more formal linkages and clarify the advantages for each party 
for a ‘win win’ result.  
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 Involving policy makers  
The strategy adopted by the national team also involved the participation of policy 
makers.  
 
This was in acknowledgement that they were crucial to the successful adoption of 
innovation at the national level and that the previous practices of policy makers 
needed to be considered in their strategies. With regard to the NIS as a policy tool, 
thus an innovation diffusion tool, policy makers were invited to take part in a range of 
different activities31. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, development policies implemented prior to the 2000s at 
the socio-technical regime level were in harmony with the development models at the 
landscape level. It was from the early 2000s that the rise of the knowledge-centred 
development model at the landscape level started to put pressure on the policies at the 
regime level leaving room for new policies. As a result, policy makers who had 
previously played a passive role in innovation diffusion policy processes became key 
components in relation to the NIS concept. IDRC representative Dr Butare explained 
the thinking behind directly involving policy makers in the NIS concept: “[This] gives 
scientific tools which will help decision makers to take appropriate decisions aiming 
to facilitate knowledge flow between the different actors of innovation systems and 
[encouraging] their optimal use to reach goods and services useful for the population” 
(FRSIT/CRDI, 2008: 7). That is to say that they want their innovation policies to be 
evidence based.  Within this framework, policy makers are considered as the creators 
                                                 
31These activities included: 1) training on the use of the NIS analytical tool, 2) participating in a workshop on 
project launching, 3) attending a symposium on case studies, 4) attending an international conference in Dakar, 
5) participating in a workshop for networking with innovation actors; 6) participating in learning exchanges and 
training at UNI-MERIT 
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of a favourable social and political context for actors to network appropriately in a 
formal way (Geels and Kemp, 2007). Therefore, the national team strategy to involve 
policy makers consisted of both groups examining in collaboration with other relevant 
actors’ ways to create favourable social and political contexts for the diffusion of 
innovation. This is highlighted by the national team member:  
 
In fact, it is the policy, which creates these frames for the institutionalisation. 
So, policy makers create the frame and give a role to such a frame, the way it 
functions and then define all its mechanisms. That was why in this project we 
included policy makers. The First Ministry was always invited to all the 
meetings, all the workshops etc., we made sure that they were invited, and we 
always ask them to send a representative because, the role of the policy maker 
matters here. It was very important in the implementation of such processes, 
so, you can see, the government took part through its representative at every 
level […]. (Interview#12) 
 
The NIS policy tool as a project was not only desk research but involved meetings, 
workshops conferences with relevant stakeholders who were invited to contribute 
throughout. The social context takes into account the power of the institutional and 
jurisdictional levels to facilitate and accelerate knowledge exchanges and information 
between innovation system actors. In so doing the team’s intention was to create 
coherence with other development policies such as IPR at the national level to 
contribute to the protection of inventors and innovators rights.    
 
 Involving users of the research results including business actors   
One of the NIS policy tool components concerns users who are an integrative part of 
the system (Geels, 2004). The national team deployed the same method to involve 
research results users including consumers, traders, industrialists, transformers, 
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business actors, small enterprises, and NGOs, for example, who were enrolled in the 
process of experimenting with the NIS framework as a policy tool with the intention 
of them adopting it. The strategy for the national team consisted of examining existing 
ways in which users accessed research results. In doing so, the national team intended 
to demonstrate the contribution of the NIS policy tool in strengthening the link 
between research, innovation and potential. The involvement of these actors is 
consistent with the NIS policy tool design (OECD, 1999) where they occupy a key 
role for a functional NIS tool for innovation diffusion. Recognising their importance, 
the national team set out to explore how they could improve the existing behaviour of 
users to create a ‘win-win’ situation for all parties. 
 
The above demonstrates that the NIS policy was transferred to Burkina Faso and 
experimented at the niche level by the FRSIT. The actors who participated in the 
technological transfer have undertaken a process of diffusion of the NIS policy tool 
involving different actors who form the different components of the NIS framework. 
At the niche level, the national team demonstrated through specific case studies 
(maize, millet, mango and shea), how the NIS policy tool would strengthen existing 
forms of networking between innovation systems actors for a more positive outcome. 
The section below focuses on the outcomes of the diffusion of the NIS policy tool for 
innovation diffusion, at policy level as a policy design. The final part of this thesis sets 
out to investigate the diffusion of the diffusion tool at the operational level through 
actors’ behaviour using the case of Bt cotton innovation diffusion and how actors’ 
behaviour in the Bt cotton case conforms or not to what the NIS policy tool has been 
designed for. 
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5.3-4 NIS Institutionalized: The Use of NIS as Innovation Diffusion Tool 
Created on the 16th of January 2011, the Ministry of Scientific Research and 
Innovation (MRSI) aims to support research for socio-economic development in 
Burkina Faso. As a result, scientific research previously associated with the Higher 
Education Ministry was detached and named MRSI. MRSI then, hosting research and 
innovation activities “places particular emphasis on scientific research, technology and 
innovation as essential drivers for development. MRSI’s main mission is to design, 
implement and monitor government policy towards research and innovation for 
economic and social development in Burkina Faso.” (Lill and Gaillard, 2013: 9). 
Based on this, its specific objectives target 1) innovation, 2) scientific and 
technological research, 3) optimising research, inventions and innovation results,  
 
4) facilitating science and technology information and communication, 5) 
strengthening cooperation between the scientific and the technical sectors 6) 
supporting the institutional framework of scientific research and innovation, 7) 
looking for ways for funding scientific research and innovation, 8) putting in place 
standards and ethics of scientific research and innovation and 9) creating a system for 
monitoring and evaluating scientific research and innovation (MRSI, 2012). These are 
the nine key fields for which the MSRI was created. Its creation is intrinsically linked 
to the CNRST because it was created to give more visibility to research and 
innovation activities in Burkina Faso and to promote results of scientific research, 
inventions and innovations.  
 
This statement is confirmed when we compare the objectives of the FRSIT (as 
described above in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3) and the objectives of the MRSI here. 
There is an underlying similarity between the two sets of objectives with the exception 
 203 
of some details in the wording. As a result, we can agree that the FRSIT as a niche 
which transferred and experimented with the NIS concept for policy as an innovation 
diffusion tool has been strongly institutionalised following its institutionalisation 
through the MRSI. Thus, FRSIT’s function has been generalised to make a national 
framework for innovation and research with the creation of the MRSI. This can be 
seen as a move from the niche level up toward the regime level. 
 
However, this is not a clear cut conclusion. What is surprising for an analyst is how to 
understand the implication of having a new institution with the same objectives 
without undergoing deep changes following the NIS innovation diffusion tool 
adoption, experimentation and diffusion.  
 
One explanation of the creation of the MRSI is the exclusion of the national team at 
FRSIT which was involved in the learning processes for the transfer of the NIS policy 
tool in Burkina Faso. Having substantial knowledge of the NIS concept, the members 
of this national team were mainly those who would have had policy proposals based 
on the NIS policy tool.  As attested by a key official: “The ministry was created under 
the FRSIT activities. It is the different activities of FRSIT which have led to the 
creation of the ministry to do things because I have worked for that and I have been 
completely excluded. Now they’ve put their people there who do not have any 
knowledge on the matter” (Interview#28).  
 
During the process of transfer, experimentation and diffusion, and considering the 
other actors they brought into the diffusion process of the NIS policy tool, the national 
team did not at any time discuss the suitability of the NIS policy tool for pursuing 
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development goals in Burkina Faso as laid down as a justification for the 
FRSIT/IDRC’s project. This recalls the observation of one interviewee regarding the 
attitudes of people engaged in projects in general in Burkina Faso: 
 
We avoid criticising projects [development projects in general], I have seen 
this with the World Bank, at the beginning I was making some contribution by 
criticising some aspects of the project, I have been Excluded, I was not invited 
for the meetings anymore, and the representative of the World Bank himself 
said to me that they are not here for criticism, they are here to build. I said we 
can criticize while building […] so the director [name] of our research institute 
was worried that I can compromise the project so I was removed. Well for your 
information, I think I got a bad behaviour [Laugh]. I don’t like people who 
exclusively look for their own interest (Interview #25). 
 
The replacement of the national team at FRSIT level with new people, (who did not 
take part in the NIS policy adoption processes) to lead the new MRSI is perceptible 
from the policy documents design which set the frame for its action. When one reads 
these policy documents32 which are33 it is hard to reconstruct a complete framework 
which reflects the underlying assumptions of the NIS framework. One can identify key 
words such as ‘innovation’, ‘national research and innovation systems’, ‘science and 
innovation policy’, ‘intellectual property rights’, etc. What is clear from the NIS 
diffusion tool in these policy documents is the idea of a system. This is consistent with 
what is found in other countries such as Hong Kong (Sharif, 2009); Canada and 
Quebec, (Cambrosio, Limoges and Pronovost 1990) and Albert and Laberge 2007), 
Uganda, (Ecuru et al., 2012); that is to say that the interpretive flexibility of the NIS 
                                                 
32Documents on the National Policies for Scientific and Technological Research (PNRST) 
33 MRSI. (2012). Politique Nationale pour la Recherche Scientifique et Technique (PNRST) 2013-2025 
MRSI (2011) Ibid. 
MRSI (2013-14) Ibid. 
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allows for different usages according to the content that users give it. In other words, 
by retaining the idea of a system, the shift to other interactive approaches becomes 
easier.  
 
As said earlier in Chapter 4, the key actors who took over the MRSI for the 
implementation of the NIS were already working on the competing Multi-Actor 
Platform approach to innovation. Moreover, the new ministry could count on external 
funding from the World Bank and others organisations that were sympathetic to such a 
framework. While the funding from the IDRC for the transfer and implementation of 
the NIS ended in 2011, in contrast, the INERA, the agricultural institution where the 
Multi-Actor Platform was implemented is regularly well funded although from 
external funders. However, the overall frame reflects the NIS concept because:    
 
The ministry [MRSI] has been created exactly to do [that]. For me, it is really 
an impression that people wanted to give but in reality there were not really 
many things, there weren’t any. It is true that the ministry is a kind of result of 
such a project on the innovation systems, but it did not really create a 
framework to facilitate in ways an innovation system in general in Burkina 
Faso (Interview #4). 
 
As the above analysis shows, the lack of knowledge of the NIS concept by the new 
actors in the ministry was an important factor in shaping the NIS policy tool adoption. 
In other words, the IDRC representative recognises that “the actors did not really 
understand fully the idea behind the NIS that needed to be promoted as a diffusion 
tool, so they were not able to conduct things to a good end […]” (Interview #47). In 
other words, this means that the NIS did not play any further role in policy apart from 
some rhetorical references. In addition, the dependence of the State on external 
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funding for the implementation of its development policy constituted an obstacle, 
particularly when a new policy was adopted not for its relevance in advancing the 
welfare of the majority of the population but for the financial benefit it will give to the 
central institutions of the State. As an interviewee underlined:  
 
Unfortunately, we do not have any policy. It is what I call ‘the policy of the 
projects’. That is to say, we are just waiting for the projects [development 
projects in general] and then we make an idea of [estimate] the money which is 
involved […]. We do not contribute to write the project. This is disappointing. 
If you do not participate to the writing up of the project you cannot interiorise, 
internalise and integrate it. You are just told to do activities and evaluate the 
amount of money you will receive by doing this and that. At the end you make 
a report showing that such activity was a success at 80% or 70% even if it was 
a failure. So, there is no target at all from us local actors, there is very few 
people who got a target for our bloody country! For me, everything starts from 
here [having a target]. If you don’t have ambition for your country everything 
at the starting point is falsified. The consequences are enormous: first, we 
[referring to national local people] accept [agree to take part in implementing] 
all projects [talking about development project general] as far as there is 
money. It is like that. Even if it is the Mafia behind it, we do not care, if it can 
bring money. So we do not look at the project or even participate to its writing 
up to at least write down our vision. We think that if we do that, the funding 
body will refuse to fund. So, this is it. The second thing which is linked to the 
first is that all projects are always seen as positive with good outcomes at the 
end. It never fails, even if it fails. Financial bodies like to hear that it was a 
success, because when you say they have funded a project which had important 
results, they [financial bodies] will show it up everywhere […] (Interview #43) 
 
The interviewee is discussing here about development projects in general and the way 
local people always happily get involve in their implementation for the purpose of 
extra cash than their successful implementation.  
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“It never fails, even if it fails” from above quotation is a key observation, because it 
brings into serious question the connection between the changes at organisation and 
policy levels and the outcomes which those changes were supposed to promote.  
 
There is another example of a mismatch between intention and outcome. I argue that 
the most significant factor which contributed to the shaping of the NIS policy tool 
adopted in Burkina Faso can be found in the conflicting relationship between research 
and higher education professional corporations in the context of a weak state. Indeed, 
actors from both sides acknowledge the long lasting conflict between CNRST and the 
Universities. 
 
It can be seen that the process for integrating higher education and research was 
stopped in 1982, which encouraged rather that mitigated the continuing conflict 
between the parties. What had just been a teaching institute in 1965 became, in 1982, 
the University of Ouagadougou. Such a centre, with the exception of the expatriate 
teachers, was staffed by secondary school teachers. Until 1974, the current University 
of Ouagadougou trained secondary school teachers. After 1982, the University 
teaching staff were from CVRS. From 1982, a plan was made to differentiate 
researchers and teaching researchers under a proposal by a French Ministry official 
who previously worked with the CNRST in France34. Since then teaching researchers 
and researchers were divided into two categories, and the former (teaching 
researchers) have occupied leading positions in an increasing number of universities 
                                                 
34 The full paragraph data are from a debate on the creation of the MRSI just after its creation on SYNADEC "A quel 
ministère appartiennent désormais enseignants-chercheurs?" 28/01/2011 between Magloire, staff from the University of 
Ouagadougou and Guissou Basile from CNRST (the National Research Centre) 
 208 
and also research structures at the expense of the later (researchers) who were low 
both in numbers and expertise. This situation created some tension between University 
and CNRST staff, which was stated clearly here by one of my interviewees:  
 
There is a conflict between the two [University and CNRST] only because for 
[a] long [time], some positions at the CNRST, such as director of institute, was 
a nomination. It then happens that people from the University sometimes 
occupy these positions at CNRST. For example, [name someone] was the 
director of INERA. However, at the University, they wouldn’t allow a 
researcher from CNRST to occupy a leading position. So now, the researchers 
also said no, only researchers within CNRST with a certain position can apply 
for these positions. It will no longer be a nomination. It is like that everyone 
stay in his domain (Interview#52). 
 
In addition to this, many of the researchers at CNRST were not allowed to integrate 
with the University at the end of their studies. It is clear that going to the CNRST was 
not their first choice. They were therefore frustrated from the beginning for being 
refused as teaching researchers. The frustration of these researchers is well 
documented by (Omobowale et al. 2013).  
 
However, before 2000, the conditions were not favourable for complete separation of 
the CNRST and the public Universities. Firstly, because different departments at 
CNRST were still led by teaching researchers; secondly, at the political level, there 
was no particular interest in the higher education with the adoption of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP). Therefore, complete separation was not possible until 
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2000 onwards, with its increase in high level researchers at CNRST and the interest of 
funding bodies in R&D.  
 
The willingness to be autonomous started to grow then because of the favourable 
conditions which were being put in place. The result was the creation of the MRSI in 
early 2011. The first two ministers were both from the CNRST institute which 
remained in control. In addition, all department leaders underwent an internal selection 
process at institutional level prior to their official nomination. 
 
You can see, it is now a competition to become head of department. You have 
to put your application in and then meet a panel to present your working 
programme and defend it. Then based on your academic position and your 
application, the choice is made by the Director of CNRST and the other 
committee members […] (interview#58). 
 
The process clearly excluded University teaching researchers. As a result of that some 
initiatives, such as the NIS as an innovation diffusion tool, initiated by teaching 
researchers 35 from the University who still occupied a leading role in an institute at 
the CNRST, were left ‘hanging’. The diffusion tool, initiated by the FRSIT director, 
who was from University, had not been widely diffused at policy level as he and his 
team had been forced to leave this to others who lacked understanding on the new tool 
to diffusion (NIS concept). From an analytical perspective, it is clear that the end of 
                                                 
35 Refers to scholars working at university, those working at research centers who are doing more research than 
teaching are called researchers. Given that the FRSIT was led by a teaching researcher, they were those who 
initially work with the IDRC for the NIS diffusion tool adoption in Burkina Faso  
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the project on the NIS coincided with the creation of the MRSI in 2011 and the 
eviction of the director36, as the following statement shows:  
 
They then chose to create a new Ministry for themselves. As you can see, they 
have pushed me aside and put [in] their people. FRSIT has fallen down […]. 
Until now they haven’t done anything. [name] and the others at the ministry 
haven’t done anything at all. What they’ve done is that they have dug a big 
ditch between the University and the CNRST (Interview #58). 
 
As with his colleague37, the former Permanent Secretary of FRSIT would not support 
the creation of a new ministry.  
 
The shaping of the NIS adoption at policy level is the result of complex factors. One 
of them is linked to a lack of understanding of the actors who took over the lead 
through the MRSI. Another aspect is financial, which is more or less the case for the 
whole country which was, for a long time, under an authoritarian regime strongly 
dependent on external financial support from international institutions. However, the 
key factor which hindered the full institutionalisation of the NIS as a policy tool for 
innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso is the long standing conflict with researchers 
who nevertheless remained key actors in the elaboration and implementation of 
development policies. These researchers are those the policy makers rely on for policy 
proposals. This is highlighted here by a senior official:  
 
                                                 
36 I am not evaluating the director’s expertise, (who was from university), or evaluating the FRSIT itself, instead I am evaluating the 
institutionalisation of the NIS framework that is mentioned.  
37 The full Paragraph is taken from a debate on the creation of the MRSI just after its creation on SYNADEC "A quel ministère appartiennent 
désormais leenseignants-chercheurs?" 28/01/2011 between Magloire, some from the University and Guissou Basile from CNRST 
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Well, what is the State? Who is the State? The State is the researchers and the 
technical agents who diffuse, it is in fact this. This is the reflection. The 
minister will ask its experts to make him some proposals and it is based on this 
that we focus. In fact, I said, we do not work, we do not think. Even when he 
[minister] asks his agents to write a proposal, they don’t put the required effort 
to do it […] so in fact, the State is these technicians. (Interview #30). 
 
The consequence is that partisan interests undermined public interest objectives, as is 
apparent in this statement:  
 
What I’m saying here is my point of view. But what I have noticed since I was 
a researcher is that whatever it is, a research project or a development project, 
the first idea of the national actors is material aspects, that is to say the 4x4 
cars. That is what I call material, oil vouchers, travels, honoraria; this is the 
first idea that people have. One time I participated to a project on […] and we 
wanted to make people understand that we can contribute, later I heard they 
have given it to other people […] you see. So, the first problem that we have is 
the lack of, I do not know how to qualify it, lack of initiative, the country’s 
development is not the first priority we usually think of. (Interview #32). 
 
This underlies another disjunction between the intentions in relation to the adoption of 
NIS as an innovation diffusion tool and the problems of implementation, associated 
with the failure to make a successful move from the niche level to the regime level. 
This included weaknesses in relation to the exploitation of existing knowledge and 
expertise within both FRSIT, research and university settings, and the lack of 
commitment to the implementation of and evaluation of the implementation of the 
new policy tool. 
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5.4. Conclusion  
The rise of the knowledge centred development policy has put pressure on the existing 
innovation diffusion tool (training and visit), thus creating windows of opportunities 
for a search of a more interactive approach to diffuse innovation. Is was from this 
perspective that the NIS as an innovation diffusion tool was thought to be most 
suitable for knowledge diffusion in Burkina Faso. In this context, after the 
unsuccessful implementation of different innovation diffusion approaches, national 
actors from the National Forum for Scientific and Technological Innovation (FRSIT) 
in Burkina Faso were informed about the existence of the NIS policy tool for 
innovation diffusion for socio-economic development. They were made aware of this 
innovative approach by the IDRC, a Canadian research and development organization 
which has an office in Africa. The national actors saw in this innovative policy tool an 
alternative for the design and implementation of innovation in the context of 
knowledge-cent red development policy. This chapter has therefore investigated the 
process through which the NIS as a diffusion tool was adopted. In so doing, the 
Chapter has in its first section depicted the Forum of Scientific Research and 
Technological Innovation (FRSIT) as a niche within which the NIS as an innovation 
diffusion tool was transferred and experimented on, by describing its context of 
creation, its missions and its organisational set up for innovation management. The 
second section explained the process of stabilisation of the NIS diffusion tool at niche 
level, by highlighting the learning processes, experimentation and network building 
involved in this. Such learning processes consisted of undertaking training sessions, 
meetings, symposiums, workshops and conferences in order to experiment with and 
build up the network of relevant actors who were interested in adopting the 
technology. The last section explored the institutionalisation of the NIS diffusion tool 
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through an analysis of its adoption and diffusion processes as manifested in its policy 
design. The full implementation of the NIS did not happen at policy level. As the 
findings have shown, one key aspect which hindered such institutionalisation was the 
fact that conflicts between researchers from CNRST and Universities that resulted in 
institutional changes and the eviction of the NIS concept promoters. When considering 
the content of the National Science and Innovation policy, there is little evidence to 
support the claim that the NIS tool has been used by policy makers in the design of 
policies. Although the creation of the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation 
on the 16th of January 2011 is a result of significant changes at institutional level 
following the NIS adoption, the text of the ministry policy documents indicate that the 
NIS framework has not informed the policy design. As a result of the exclusion of the 
national team at FRSIT which had been involved in the learning processes for the 
transfer of the NIS policy tool to Burkina Faso, who would have had policy proposals 
based on the NIS framework, the NIS had failed to be adopted as a policy tool. Indeed, 
the new actors who took over the lead of the Ministry wanted to promote another well-
funded approach known as the Innovation Platform that they were implementing even 
before they joined the ministry. This conflict is a continuation of a deeper long conflict 
between university and research centre scholars. It was an important factor in shaping 
the NIS policy tool adoption for innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso. Consequently, 
the NIS policy tool for innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso was not diffused as it 
should have been as individual interests have taken over the country’s socio-economic 
development.  
 
In the last part of the thesis, I’m going to explore the Sectoral Innovation Systems 
(SIS) for cotton from the perspective of the operation of a pre-existing National 
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Innovation Systems, and the impact of the introduction of the Bt cotton innovation. It 
will examine how these two innovation projects, the NIS and Bt cotton, played out, 
given the socio-technical and organisational systems in place in Burkina Faso at the 
time.  
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Chapter 6: Transformation of the Cotton Regime in Burkina Faso: 
from Traditional to Bt cotton ST-Systems 
 
6.1. Introduction 
As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis investigates the NIS inspired policy tool and the Bt 
cotton innovation system. I earlier examined the introduction, development and 
implementation of the NIS as a policy tool for innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso in 
Chapter 5. There I investigated the transfer and implementation of the NIS policy tool 
from the niche (FRSIT) level and its subsequent diffusion at policy level through its 
institutionalisation and changes in innovation policy strategies. Now, in Chapter 6 and 
7, I shall investigate the diffusion of the NIS from the same niche level and its 
diffusion at operational level through the Bt cotton case. Methodologically, the study 
of the transition to the NIS as a policy tool cannot be limited at strategic level to how 
it shapes policy options. It also needs to take into account the appropriation of such a 
policy tool at operational level. From this perspective, it was therefore relevant, 
regardless of the state of the diffusion of the NIS policy tool at strategic policy level, 
to study its diffusion at operational level in the agricultural sector. These two levels 
share the same niche (FRSIT) that is the place within which the NIS policy tool was 
tried out and diffused, given that the policy strategic and operational levels diffusion 
can happen either theoretically successively or simultaneously.  
 
It is this methodological requirement that justified the study of the NIS at both 
strategic (Chapter 5) and operational (Chapter 7) levels along the policy continuum. 
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This consisted in laying down the background of the different innovation systems 
before the arrival of the Bt cotton in the 2000s which will be examined in this Chapter. 
It will chronicle the changes in the production of cotton in Burkina Faso, beginning 
with the pre-colonial period before the 1900s and ending in 2003 with the introduction 
of Bt cotton. In each successive socio-technical system, it will be shown that the type 
of cotton grown, as well as the organisation and the purposes of production have 
changed over time to reflect the political and social context, which together shaped the 
quantity of cotton produced. Each historical period corresponds to a specific 
combination of these factors. Each specific combination can be referred to as a ‘socio-
technical system’ or regime in Geels’ (2004) terms.  Then, in next Chapter 7, the Bt 
cotton innovation system in particular is going to be investigated.   
 
The present chapter is organised into three sections. Each section corresponds to a 
historical socio-technical regime. The first covers the period from pre-colonial to the 
colonial regime (1897-1960); the second is associated with the first three decades of 
post-colonial government in Burkina Faso (1960-1991); the third section covers the 
decade of the liberalisation regime (1991-2003).  
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6.2. The Socio-Technical System of Indigenous Cotton Production in Pre-colonial 
Burkina Faso 
In this section, the historical context in which Bt cotton was rooted is presented, 
focussing on the key actors, their roles and objectives in relation to cotton growth 
during the pre-colonial era. During this period, cotton cultivation was essentially 
subsistence agriculture, and this was reflected in the type of cotton grown, the actors 
involved, its organisation, and the purposes for its production. The pre-colonial 
models of social development were more restricted and involved less marketing than 
later models. Throughout the period, it could be said that because cotton was an 
essential crop for people’s survival, its wider economic assets were disregarded 
(Kaminski, 2009). 
 
6.2.1. The Types of Cotton Grown in Pre-colonial Burkina Faso 
It is crucial to outline the species of cotton grown during the pre-colonial era in 
Burkina Faso, in order to set the background for the genetically modified Bt cotton 
that was introduced in 2003. During that period, three different cotton species were 
cultivated, which had been used for many generations, (Gray, 2005; 2008). The three 
varieties, known as ‘Gossypium arboretum’, ‘Gossypium hirsutum’, and ‘Gossypium 
barbadense’ (Schwartz, 1993), did not originate locally, but had been imported. It 
seems that cotton appeared between the 10th and 13th centuries in Africa and has 
played a key role in the economic development of the continent, and in particular of 
West Africa (Schwartz, 1993; CNRST, 2007). Of the above three varieties grown 
across West Africa, the first variety, ‘Gossypium arboretum’, originated from the 
Eastern part of Africa and India (Schwartz, 1995: 208), and was grown in ancient 
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times. Although we can date when cotton was introduced to Africa, it is very difficult 
to ascertain, from either literature or individual sources, the exact period or date when 
‘Gossypium arboretum’ was first introduced to Burkina Faso.  
 
By contrast, the other two cotton varieties, ‘Gossypium hirsutum’ and ‘Gossypium 
barbadense’, originated from the America and were introduced to Burkina Faso in the 
18th century through trans-Atlantic trade (Schwartz, 1995:208). Until 1897, these 
three varieties of cotton were grown in the country without any alternatives, changes 
or improvements (Schwartz, 1993). The value of the crops in existing markets was of 
no particular consideration for cotton growers since its growth was aimed solely at 
meeting family subsistence. Indigenous people at that time focussed their efforts on 
their immediate needs, rather than seeing cotton as a tradable good (Schwartz, 1997; 
1999). It follows that there was no significant need to improve the above three 
varieties in the pre-colonial era because farmers and consumers cultivated these cotton 
species mainly for their own consumption, with every part of the plant being used for 
a variety of purposes. 
 
6.2.2. Cotton Cultivation Techniques 
The regular cultivation of cotton by farmers, combined with organisational factors, 
reflects the subsistence farming system of the period. Within that context, two 
dimensions are essential to consider: the technical dimension, covering tools and 
methods; and the indigenous knowledge of subsistence farming. During the pre-
colonial period cotton was considered a subsidiary crop behind the other main 
subsistence crops, which were directly used for nutritional consumption (CNRST, 
2007) and its growing status reflected this. It was grown on a very small scale, 
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generally by women, who grew cotton in fields alongside ‘sauce’ condiments, such as 
peppers and okra and other modern-day cash crops such as tobacco often within millet 
or sorghum farms. “Production was low and primarily used at home, spun into strips 
of cotton thread that were then made into clothing and blankets” (Gray, 2008:68). 
Nevertheless, it was an important local crop in pre-colonial Burkina Faso Gray (2008). 
 
In Burkina Faso, as in many African countries, the agricultural sector in general, and 
cotton in particular, relies on the rainy season which lasts between five and seven 
months. The growing techniques were as follows: seeds from some of the crops, 
including cotton, were kept aside after harvesting for planting the next rainy season. 
This cycle of crop saving was repeated every year (Schwartz, 1991; 1993; Gray, 1999; 
2005; 2008; Roberts, 1995). Biological fertilization by the slash-and-burn method was 
used to enrich the soil, usually during the dry season. Cotton growth techniques were 
similar to those of other crops and not given any particular attention (Bassett, 2001; 
2008; Gray, 2008). The techniques were traditional and the tools were exclusively 
simple, handmade and for manual use. (Bohannan, 1959; 1968). For instance, 
machetes, knives, and hoes were made by local black smiths from iron bars or scrap 
metal and used for cultivation in the agricultural sector as a whole in many African 
countries (Bohannan, 1959; 1968). From sowing until the harvest, all the processes 
were manual, involving mainly human strength as the significant labour force. As in 
many parts of Africa, the hoe handle was made from a green forked branch by the man 
who owned it, or it could be bought from his kinsmen or friends (Bohannan, 1959). A 
man also had a duty to make these tools for his wives and mother (Ibid.).  
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These factors had a significant impact on the rate of indigenous cotton production, 
which was between 50 to 150kg/ha (Schwartz, 1995). However, this seemingly low 
productivity was enough to fulfil the family’s needs, because in the domestic 
economy, quantity was not the first objective (Schwartz, 1997). What was imperative 
for farmers in general was that their cotton production would cover the family’s needs 
in terms of clothing and food. The longstanding nature of the above techniques and 
tools used to produce cotton in pre-colonial times reveals a settled ST-System in terms 
of the labour distribution/division, and a lack of pressures for change (Goreux and 
Macrae, 2003; Gergely, 2004; Gray, 2008; Bassett, 2008). 
 
6.2.3. Work Distribution in Cotton Growth 
According to oral tradition, cotton cultivation had a vital place in the household. 
Cotton processing such as spinning and weaving were shared between family 
members according to their sex and age. Women (mainly old but also youngsters 
learning) were assigned to spinning. In the Mossi tribe, for example, all women and 
girls knew how to spin (Schwartz, 1993; CNRST, 2007). Weaving was mainly men’s 
work, particularly those from a griot (storyteller of genealogies and oral traditions), or 
blacksmith culture. In this respect, ethnic and social groups shared the labour involved 
in cotton production and processing. By this division of labour in traditional Burkina 
Faso, all the processing, ginning, spinning and weaving was done locally, usually 
within the same family. Labour was gender divided and shared between men and 
women (Schwartz, 1993). Division of work according to gender is part of African and 
many other cultures. According to Kaminski et al. (2009), cotton was cultivated not 
only by the Mossi but also by other ethnic groups, namely the Senoufo and the Bwa, 
and processing was done by the Marka ethnic group. 
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With respect to work distribution in cotton cultivation during the traditional pre-
colonial era in Burkina Faso, it appears that this early specialisation of the duties of 
different actors involved in the process sometimes occurred within the same family, 
and that the family was the central point of cotton production and processing (Roberts, 
1995; Gray, 2002; Gray and Kevane, 2001). However, it is also the case that, in the 
absence of industries, weaving was often done by specific castes: griots, or 
blacksmiths, according to the patriarchal and ethnic division of labour in a traditional 
economy. The distribution of work involved in cotton growing could therefore be done 
along several lines, including gender, ethnic group, caste and age. It is important to 
note that the knowledge supporting all these processes, from the organisation of work 
to the methods and tools used, was traditional and rooted in Burkina Faso’s social 
context at that time (Gray, 2008). It can therefore be concluded that indigenous cotton 
growth was bound by social, cultural and economic beliefs, which influenced the 
restricted cotton usage of that time. In other words, the pre-colonial ST-System was 
characterised by a combination of indigenous knowledge, locally-produced tools, 
family as well as caste-based labour and cultural traditions. 
 
6.2.4. Objectives and Uses of Cotton Cultivation 
In the pre-colonial era, cotton was grown to meet a range of family needs: domestic, 
cultural and economic. Firstly, in Burkina Faso, domestic needs had two main 
dimensions, namely food supply and clothing. Food was made from cotton grain and 
dishes such as sauce, soup, and couscous were included in the family’s daily diet. In 
addition, cotton fibres were made into clothing for family members (Gray, 2008). 
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Cotton was specifically used in wedding packs for young women who gave their spun 
cotton to the weaver to make their wedding clothes (Schwartz, 1993, 1995, 1997) 
 
Secondly, cotton or its grains were imperative for specific ceremonies and cultural 
events, including those for health, wealth and luck and the ceremony concerned with 
weaving cloth to cover or dress the dead (Schwartz, 1991; Isaacman and Roberts, 
1995; Gray, 2008). A special soup with cotton grain was given to groups of children in 
the village or compound at dinner time to release the sense of innocence and a wealthy 
spirit on the family according to the oral tradition (Gray, 2008; Bassett, 2008). This 
aspect of ritual or magic was very important and involved in ceremonies around the 
cultivation process for crops such as cotton. It is raised in many studies relating to the 
use of magic in social organisation. Malinowski (1965) considers it a key element, and 
notes its specific form in the African context. He asserts that: 
 
No human beings, at whatever stage of culture, completely eliminate spiritual 
preoccupations from their economic concerns whether we pray for our daily 
bread or for adequate rainfall; whether the divine kings of Africa exercise their 
powers for fertility or moisture. (Malinowski, 1965: XX).  
 
Finally, economic needs were met through two types of markets: the local market and 
neighbourhood exchanges, another type of market activity which was more open than 
the local market (Bohannan, 1968). In the local market, buyers and sellers exchanged 
products for cowries. Sellers sold both raw cotton and woven cloth within the local 
market. The exchange was based on the traditional economic principle where society 
was not based on the market and would not perish if the market crashed. Monetisation 
was not well developed in Burkina Faso at that time. In Bohannan’s words: 
 
 224 
In the subsistence economies of Western Africa, the principle of reciprocity or 
of redistribution is likely to be dominant and the principle of market 
peripheral: the market exists and products go into it, but it is like gift-giving in 
the West: it could disappear without chaotic results. (Bohannan, 1968: 203) 
 
The market in this traditional context does not greatly affect people’s lives. In Burkina 
Faso, it was in this type of local market that cotton was traded. Traders (mostly 
women) sold their spun cotton or cotton brute (hard cotton) and men offered woven 
cloth for sale. However, the trade was always done with any surplus cotton, once 
traditional needs had been met. It should be mentioned here that this method of trade 
was significant in the context of the period (Schwartz, 1991; Roberts, 1995; Bassett, 
2001). With respect to exchanges with neighbouring countries, it is also worth noting 
that trade was more open than in the local market and cotton was exchanged for 
products such as kola nut and salt which could not be found locally (Labouret, 1928; 
Schwartz, 1993). The transaction consisted in getting the equivalent value of other 
products for the cotton traded Bohannan (1968). If there was no equivalence, 
bargaining was employed to agree on the products’ value. The way both markets were 
organised in Burkina Faso “works precisely as it does anywhere else, the difference is 
that it affects the way of life of the people very much less” (Bohannan, 1968: 203). 
  
In these pre-colonial times, cotton farmers interacted with neighbouring regions to 
exchange their surplus produce for something equivalent, and sold part of their 
produce (cotton brute or processed derivatives) on the local market (Labouret, 1928).  
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Table 11: Summary of the traditional cotton growth system in pre-colonial Burkina 
Faso 
Actors in 
indigenous cotton 
growth 
Work organisation Variety of cotton 
grown 
Tools and tool 
makers 
Cotton usages 
Cotton farmers 
Blacksmiths, 
Spinners, Weavers 
Men weaving and 
women spinning, 
both farming  
Gossypium 
arboretum, 
Gossypium 
hirsutum and 
Gossypium 
barbadense 
Griots (story 
tellers and also 
tools’ makers) 
blacksmith, (tools 
makers: knives, 
pick axe) 
Family, cultural and 
commercial in the 
local market and 
neighbourhood  
Source: Processed by author 
 
To sum up, the role and place of cotton is constructed in accordance with the way its 
actors interacted during the pre-colonial period. The ST-System of indigenous cotton 
was mainly a familial network of actors. As a result, the interactions between actors 
around indigenous cotton (the artefact) were limited in terms of diversity but stable. 
Both users and producers were within the same family and shared cultural similarities. 
In addition to the traditional way of growing cotton, both organisation and processing 
were distributed within the same family or kinship group. The system tended to be 
closed and less commercialised than later systems with few actors involved. Producers 
and users of the artefact were both in the family where growing, spinning and weaving 
were done. 
 
Furthermore, the use of indigenous cotton centred mainly on family consumption, with 
the result that the type of cotton, the organisation and its use were controlled by family 
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needs. This suggests that the ST-System of indigenous cotton was small-scale. This 
early regime was rooted in the way cotton growth was defined at that time, based on a 
subsistence economy within a small geographical area. The two main bodies here are 
the human actors (family) and the artefact (indigenous cotton). The interaction and 
dynamism of these two bodies form the ST-system of that historical epoch. The 
traditional regime which constituted this ST-System would later shape the interaction 
of farmers with officials during the regime change which followed. This regime forms 
the basis of the following ST-System of cotton, which will transform it to fit its 
requirements.  
 
6.3. The Socio-Technical System of Conventional Cotton in Colonial Burkina Faso 
Colonisation was a complex set of processes and made a deep impact on African 
society’s structures and foundations. This general statement applies directly in the 
specific case of Burkina Faso’s traditional cotton growth structures. It is therefore 
necessary to shed light on the story and in particular the objectives of French colonial 
power in indigenous Burkina Faso. In West Africa, colonisation started in the early 
twentieth century and entered Burkina Faso in the 1900s (Ki-Zerbo, 1978; Crowder, 
1968). Colonisation radically transformed Africans’ political, economic and social 
patterns (Konate, 2011). In the French colonies of West Africa, there was a 
reorganisation of the flow of goods and services in the directions required by the 
externally-oriented nature of the economy-based objective (Amin, 1972). The French 
held most of what would come to be their colonial territory in West Africa (including 
present day Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Niger) 
(Baffes, 2007). West African people at this time became subjects, and not citizens, in 
their own territories. The colonial system was aimed at destabilising and replacing the 
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traditional African social context, cultural values, political aspects and most 
importantly its market design and aims. In this section these objectives of French 
colonial power in West Africa are described, and their impact on the cotton growing 
system are analysed. 
 
6.3.1. Colonial Penetration 
The French colonial encounter in West Africa was driven by commercial interests and, 
perhaps to a lesser degree, some sense of a ‘civilising’ mission (Hargreaves, 1979). 
The political administration and economic interests were fairly uniform throughout the 
colonial period. Little was done to improve the lives of West Africans, although 
attempts were made to provide minimal health and educational services. Socio-
cultural, political and more importantly economic interests were the motives of 
colonisation (Ki-Zerbo, 1978). The first objective was the social and cultural 
assimilation of colonial penetration in Francophone West Africa. These social and 
cultural matters were part of the colonisers’ focus (Ki-Zerbo, 1978; Chafer, 2002; 
Ouedraogo, 2003; Sissao, 2003), and were mainly fulfilled through education and 
religion. These two strategies of colonisation were the means by which France spread 
its culture and civilisation throughout its colonies. The old African civilisation would 
be transformed. When the original federation of the French West African colonies was 
achieved there was no outright statement of the programme for assimilation, 
nevertheless, education and religion were two useful mechanisms for the introduction 
and implementation of colonial cultural values (Ki-Zerbo, 2003). Prevailing western 
approaches to education and religion replaced traditional ones. The colonial 
educational system and its religion significantly involved alienation and domination, 
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and was used to support the full exploitation and fundamental control of its colonies 
by France.  
 
The second objective was political control. France, in colonising West Africa, aimed 
to take control of African territory (Ki-Zerbo, 1978). France was determined to make 
‘French West Africa’ its own territory where it would be in charge of administration 
and decision-making (Ouedraogo, 2003; Sissao, 2003). To achieve this, France 
installed a centralised administration in its new territories, a system of direct rule (Ki-
Zerbo, 1978). Traditional chiefs lost their power to the control of the French (Skinner, 
1989). Local traditional governance systems became incapacitated. In the interior of 
French West Africa, young people were captured and sent as soldiers to fight on 
behalf of their masters and mother country (France) (ibid.), as was the case during the 
Second World War. The control and administration of West Africa by colonials was 
generally harsh, according to Crowder, (1968). By removing traditional chiefs this 
centralised administration aimed to promote the building of a modern State through 
national governance. 
 
6.3.2. Colonisation and Economic Concerns 
The main objective of colonisation centred on economic concerns. France wanted to 
extend its market and gain huge profits from its colonies (Schwartz, 1993). European 
powers were short of natural resources for their industrial progress, so it became 
necessary to find a supplier and cheap labour market (Labouret, 1928, Schwartz, 1993; 
Gray, 2008; Bassett, 2008). The French attempted to increase their economic foothold, 
utilising forced labour and imprisonment in order to maintain and expand their 
interests. The French administration sought to increase productivity in its colonies and 
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extract valuable resources from them (Schwartz, 1993). It fostered the production of 
groundnut and cotton where appropriate conditions were present, and imposed 
taxation as a means of inducing participation in the cash economy. Where crops could 
not be grown, the administration encouraged internal migration to wage-earning areas. 
 
In 1902, the America was producing almost three-quarters of the world’s cotton 
(Schwartz, 1993), which made it powerful and influential in the cotton sector so that it 
dominated the world cotton market. This was to Europe’s detriment since most 
European countries were dependent on America cotton growers for their textiles 
(ibid.). This domination by America was one of the reasons why Great Britain, 
Germany, and France turned to African countries where cotton had been traditionally 
cultivated for many centuries and where the climate seemed to be appropriate for 
cotton growth (Labouret, 1928). In the 1920s cotton became a coercive tool in the 
French Upper Volta colony when its cultivation became compulsory, even though 
farmers often circumvented the “forced corvée” through out-migration, and by selling 
their cotton on the local parallel market or by exporting it to Ghana (the Gold Coast) 
(Schwartz, 1993; Goreux and Macrae, 2003; Gergely, 2004). Schwartz (1997) believes 
that the cotton crisis in Europe was the main pretext and opportunity for cotton to be 
developed in Africa for the world market. Africa was to become the biggest, cheapest 
and most competitive main supplier of cotton to European industries (Labouret, 1928; 
Bassett, 2001). The colonial regime thus focused on the need to expand and enlarge 
land areas for cotton growth to secure France’s supply line and to create profits. 
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6.3.3. Colonisation and Cotton Growth Redefinition 
These cultural, political and economic objectives, resulted in changes regarding the 
aim of cotton production in the case of Burkina Faso. The type of cotton grown, the 
organisation and the purposes of production were all deeply affected by the new 
French colonial aims. The colonial system therefore produced another social, cultural, 
and political structure, in other words, a new S-T System, as a result of which 
indigenous cotton varieties, organisations and use would change significantly. 
 
6.3.4. The Economic Focus in Cotton Cultivation 
The colonial market economy created new conditions for cotton. Cultivation was 
different because of greater economic demand compared with the traditional focus on 
subsistence local consumption. The three varieties grown during the pre-colonial 
period, ‘Gossypium arboretum’, ‘Gossypium hirsutum’, and ‘Gossypium barbadense’ 
had been cultivated for several generations, without any improvement in the quality of 
the seed. French economic ambitions could not be realised through these traditional 
varieties so there was a need for alternatives or improvements to existing varieties in 
order to increase productivity and quality to meet new market needs including the 
development of the French textile industry. Therefore, cotton trials using basic 
research started in the early 1920s (Schwartz, 1991; CNRST, 2007). For instance, 
1923 saw the creation of Saria (a village in Burkina Faso) experimental farm 
(Bantenga, 2003). The three traditional varieties were subjected to trials and improved 
varieties were implemented by technical agents trained at the experimental farm in 
Saria from 1924 and gave a real boost to cotton growth (Schwartz, 1995; Zoungrana, 
2003, Bantengan, 2003). As it appears clearly in graph 1, cotton growth reaches its 
peak between 1925 and 1926. Sold cotton went up to 6,238 tons and did not go below 
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1,500 tons until 1931-32 when it dropped to 142 tons. This fall in the cotton trade is 
explained by the fact that Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) was split and shared 
between its neighbouring French colonies at that time. Because of this, there are 
missing data concerning cotton growth between the period 1931 and 1950 (Schwartz, 
1993).    
  
 
 
Source: Processed by author from: 
Schwartz A (1991) ‘L’exploitation agricole de l’air cotonière Burkinabe : 
Caractéristiques sociologiques, Démographiques, Economiques’, Document de 
Travail, ORSTOM, Ouagadougou. 
Schwartz, A. (1993). Brève histoire de la culture du coton au Burkina 
Faso.ORSTOM: France 
 
6.3.5. Modernisation of the Cotton Sector 
After colonisation the cotton sector was beginning to be modernised and 
commercialised. Frederic-Charles Edouard Alexandre Hesling, an appointed lieutenant 
 232 
governor for Upper Volta, promoted cotton growth from the early 1920s (Schwartz, 
1993) and the exponential growth in the production of cotton provided obvious 
satisfaction for the French colonizers (Schwartz, 1995; Bantenga, 2003). This was also 
the beginning of agricultural research in Burkina Faso, a sector which until then had 
been traditional and archaic in its methods and technology (Bantenga, 2003). New 
actors appeared under the auspices of the colonial authority: the Colonial Cotton 
Association (ACC), born in the early 1900s, and research institutions such as the 
French Institute in West Africa (IFAN), created in 1938 (Kaminski et al, 2009; Vitale 
et al. 2011). With the involvement of these new colonial actors, organisational systems 
in the subsistence economy such as traditional gender labour division and the 
techniques and tools employed in farming underwent significant changes to satisfy 
colonial market needs (Pare, 2001; Schwartz, 2003; Bantenga, 2003; Kutting, 2003). 
The cotton market economy could not operate at the desired high level of development 
if cotton was grown as a secondary crop on a small piece of land with simple tools and 
techniques. There was a need to promote a new organisational system in order to 
increase productivity and market competitiveness.  
 
Consequently, the division of labour in cotton production during the colonial period 
became structured outside the family and involved industrial rather than manual 
processing. The Colonial Cotton Association (ACC) and Cotton Union of France 
Empire (UCEF) created in 1941 were the leading actors in cotton production (Baffes, 
2007; Gray, 2008; AFD, 2008) and later, in 1946, began to focus more on the 
scientific aspects of cotton growth. The textiles industry (CITEC) was another 
structure involved in cotton cultivation. This institution bought the hard cotton in order 
to process and sell it. The French Fibre company (CFDT) specialised in the technical 
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training of cotton growers. All these structures and institutions combined with private 
institutes were involved in cotton growth and the labour was shared between them. 
The cheap, hard labour required for growing was supplied exclusively by indigenous 
people in Burkina Faso who worked under strict supervision on the cotton farms to 
enable France to fulfil its demands. 
  
This brought about a cotton revolution in 1923 in Burkina Faso and a fundamental 
restructuring of the growing process for France’s commercial and industrial purposes 
(Schwartz, 1993). For instance, productivity rose to 3,528 tons between 1924 and 
1925, whereas it was from 50 to 150kg/ha during pre-colonial time (Schwartz, 1993). 
Cotton growth became obligatory farming work between 1924 and 1929. 
Characterised by a huge increase in productivity, cotton growth was no longer the 
concern of a specific ethnic group, and team work was encouraged within and outside 
the villages. The old system of labour division according to gender was removed 
completely. All the local people, whether they were involved voluntarily or not, 
worked in a team at village level (Schwartz, 1993). 
 
Following these early and spectacular results, productivity began to decline from the 
1930s onwards (Schwartz, 1993). This was associated with the intensive and laborious 
nature of cotton farming under this S-T System, coupled with the unintended 
consequence of a sharp reduction in the available labour force as indigenous farmers 
left Burkina Faso, as the next sections explain. 
 
 
 
 234 
 Industrial Process Versus Manual Spinning and Weaving 
France undertook industrial spinning and weaving (Goreux and Macrae, 2003), but 
spinning had been a local activity and now much of this work was taken away from 
local spinners and weavers. All that was wanted from the farmers was the raw cotton. 
In this new organisational system, they were only used as a labour force. This new 
labour distribution was combined with new techniques, tools and methods in order to 
attain the high-level of productivity required (Schwartz, 1997; 1999). 
 
 Shift from Traditional Techniques 
Although the traditional techniques and tools (manual farming, hoes, and machetes) 
continued to be used, the colonial power could not rely on these solely, given the 
pursuit of large-scale production and huge profits (Goreux and Macrae 2003). Farmers 
were given new tools and taught advanced methods by technical agents trained at 
Saria and other structures such as CFDT (Gray, 2005; 2008). They were organised in 
teams to work on large areas of land, used exclusively for cotton production, in 
contrast to the small tracts used in pre-colonial society. The colonial authorities’ 
organised internal migration from the villages where cotton was not grown (Gray and 
Kevane, 2001). The coloniser focused on grouping the rural community into teams. 
The achievement of communal cotton cultivation was believed to be the most 
successful method of optimizing cotton productivity in rural Burkina Faso (Schwartz, 
2003) and cotton production increased during the colonial period when it became 
associated with colonial industrialisation (Isaacman and Roberts, 1995). Communal 
farming started in the 1920s. From the French point of view, the participatory and 
mutual cooperation and association of farmers would enhance cotton growth and the 
rural development of indigenous society (Schwartz, 2003). Although communal 
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farming had been believed to increase productivity, it had, in the end, led to a decline 
in indigenous cotton growth. In addition, this technique of team work meant farms 
needed carts and domesticated animals to provide labour assistance and improve 
growing processes (Gray, 1999; 2002; 2008). Furthermore, chemicals and insecticides 
were introduced to increase productivity both in quantity and quality.  
 
 The Birth of Research on Cotton 
Another difference in the new S-T System emerged in that productivity was 
approached as a technological issue, which prompted a search for knowledge about 
cotton production from the ‘hard’ sciences and neglected the potential contribution of 
the social sciences. Research started slowly in the agricultural sector and was done 
through field trials and basic research. Farmers received training from technical agents 
(see Chapter 4). Research laboratories emerged and developed slowly in the colonial 
context. More research was done in the mother countries by their scientists rather than 
by Africans who were deemed to be insufficiently qualified. In general, this   
contributed to increasing the yield of the crop (Bantenga, 2003; Konate, 2003; 
Kaminski et al., 2009) 
 
 Economic Focus Versus Familial Consumption 
With the advent of colonialism, the market became the foundation of the economy and 
its malfunctioning would adversely affect society. It was what Bohannan called a 
‘monetized economy’ (Bohannan, 1968). Expanding the market was the main policy 
of the colonial government and there was an exclusive focus on the commercial 
aspects of usage. African domestic trade was eliminated or reduced to subordinate 
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primary collectors (Amin, 1972). Familial consumption and the cultural usage of 
cotton slowly disappeared with the extension of the economic usage. 
 
From this point of view, it is fundamental to note that the development of capitalist 
features in the system was not new to African society, though it took on the process of 
transforming Africa’s old and traditional capitalistic system to a modern one. The 
traditional economy based on local markets and neighbourhood exchanges was 
replaced by a more monetized market with its own taxation system, thereby gradually 
transforming the market to become the key element in African society. As Cohen 
argued:  
 
[…]‘Trading areas’ of West Africa and part of East Africa, [was] where the 
pre-colonial mode of production was distorted and made to serve capitalist 
needs through peasant production of cheap raw materials exchanged for more 
expensive consumer goods. (Cohen, 1981: 2). 
 
In this colonial market, buyers and sellers were in a wider network and exchange was 
for more expensive goods. In Burkina Faso, the colonial cotton trade was controlled 
by France, which had political, social and cultural power over the country. Gray 
attested that “French colonial authorities attempted to increase production by forcing 
peasants to cultivate cotton in village fields. The policy was a complete failure” (Gray 
2008: 69). Indeed, the imperialism of the colonial regime resulted in revolts by the 
local population followed by a massive outward-migration of farmers into Ghana in 
the early 1930s (Schwartz, 1997, 2003; Sawadogo, 2003; Zoungrana, 2003). Cotton 
growth declined without strong young farmers, and therefore there was a long period 
from 1932 until 1947 when the colony faced financial difficulties resulting in the loss 
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of the colony’s prestigious position in the cotton industry (Zoungrana, 2003; 
Bantenga, 2003; Sawadogo, 2003). As shown in graph 2, the cotton production was 
unstable in the last decade of the colonisation before independence. After the 
reconstitution of the colony previously split and shared between its neighbourhood 
colonies, it went up to 165 kg/ha between 1951-52, before declining the following two 
years to 58 kg/ha then 45 kg/ha. Until independence, cotton production remained low, 
160 kg/ha in 1960-61 as in the graph 3.  
 
 
 
Source: Processed by author from: 
Schwartz, A. (1993). Brève histoire de la culture du coton au Burkina 
Faso.ORSTOM: France.  
Schwartz A. (1995) Attitudes to cotton growing in Burkina Faso: Different farmers, 
different behaviours. In Cattin B.M, Griffon B. and Guillaumont P. (eds) Economics of 
agricultural policies in developing countries, Paris: Revue Française d’Economie. 
AfDB, OCDE, PNUD, (2014). African Economic Outlook. Burkina Faso. 2014. 
 238 
There was a need to rethink the methods used in growing cotton. Farmers reverted to 
individual farming which replaced the collective model, which led to the 
disintegration of the colony (then Upper Volta), and its merging with neighbouring 
colonies like Cote d’Ivoire (Bassett, 2001; Kaminski et al, 2009; Ki-Zerbo, 1978). 
Thus the story of cotton in West Africa and in Burkina Faso was both an economic 
and a political one. The success of cotton as an economic crop was short-lived. The 
colony could not exist without economic independence. This difficulty in growing 
cotton was one of the reasons that Burkina Faso, (known as Upper Volta at that time) 
was dismantled in 1932. This shows how much the colony’s destiny was linked to 
cotton growth in a regime described by Ouedraogo (2003) as “the authoritarian, 
capitalistic and patriarchal rule of colonialism”. These new conditions inevitably 
affected the basis and aims of cotton growth by the native society which was 
undergoing several radical changes. 
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Table 12: Summary of the conventional cotton growth system in colonial Burkina Faso 
 
Actors involved in 
cotton growth 
Work organisation Variety of cotton 
produced 
Tools and tool 
makers 
Usage of cotton 
Colonial power, 
Cotton farmers, 
Blacksmiths, 
Industries for 
spinning and 
weaving. A few  
Technical agents, 
Research institute 
Men farming, 
Industries doing the 
spinning and 
weaving Research 
began  
Improved 
Gossypium 
arboretum, 
Gossypium 
hirsutum and 
Gossypium 
barbadense 
Griots (Story teller 
and tools maker), 
blacksmith,  
(picks, axes, 
knives, ploughs),  
few insecticides 
and fertilizers 
Only for 
commercial 
purposes (world 
market) 
No domestic 
consumption 
 
Source: processed by author 
To conclude, there was a particular shape given to cotton by the interaction of its 
actors during the colonial period from 1900. The ST-System of improved indigenous 
cotton, (conventional cotton), was primarily characterised by a large network of actors 
with different labels and specialisations whose interactions were diverse. Users as well 
as producers belonged to different specialisations. The family system of ownership 
disappeared and the colonial power took control of conventional cotton cultivation. 
This new political regime came with the aim of growing cotton for the market. In 
addition, the organisation and processing were distributed to industries and researchers 
outside the family. The new regime was more open and mainly commercialised with 
more actors’ involved and interaction related to their expertise. Cotton growth 
specifically meant the establishment of team work, research and industries in its 
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growth and transformation. If growing was done by the farmers, weaving and spinning 
were done by the industries (Goreux and Macrae, 2003; Gergely, 2004).  
 
In terms of producers and users of the artefact (conventional cotton), there was a 
different set of actors whose interaction animated the ST-System of the colonial 
period. Furthermore, the usage of conventional cotton was essentially for the market, 
therefore, the type of cotton, the organisation and the usage of cotton was bounded by 
market needs, showing the ST-System of conventional cotton was both open and 
extensive. This second regime was rooted in the way cotton growth was defined at that 
time based on the market economy. The human actors (farmers, industries, and the 
colonial power) and the artefact (conventional cotton) formed the ST-System of 
colonial conventional cotton. Their interaction and dynamism formed the ST-system 
of that historical, colonial period around cotton growth. This regime which constituted 
this ST-System would shape future interactions between actors in cotton growth. 
 
6.4. Cotton Growth System in Post-colonial Burkina Faso from 1960 to 1991 
The first stage of Burkina Faso’s reform process in the post-colonial era focussed on 
strengthening local institutions and building capacity in preparation for eventual 
market liberalization (Kaminski et al., 2009). One of the first priorities was to build 
and strengthen farmers’ organizations. The conventional cotton growth regime was a 
transformation in terms of the work distribution and number of actors in relation to the 
artefact. The ST-System which developed in the colonial period did not undergo any 
significant change and some aspects were reinforced during the post-colonial era. The 
independence of Burkina Faso led to greater understanding of cotton varieties, and the 
organisation of production developed in new directions.  
 241 
  
The market economy objectives of the colonial system called for cotton growth policy 
changes with regard to the type of cotton grown, the organisation and the purposes of 
the production. To achieve this the colonial system sought to destabilise elements of 
the African social context, cultural values, political control and existing market means 
and ends (Tersiguel, 1992; Konate, 2003). Therefore, before considering the changes 
which occurred in cotton production during the first three decades of independence, it 
is important to note the objectives of the post-colonial state, and the way in which they 
have links to the objectives associated with the colonial period. 
  
6.4.1. Independent Burkina Faso and Cotton Growth 
Burkina Faso proclaimed its independence on 5th of August 1960. Yet, as illustrated 
by Gray (2008), the attention devoted to cotton cultivation remained minimal until the 
1970s, when the French cotton development organisation (CFDT) organised the 
production, processing and export of cotton. “…in 1979 the CFDT partnered with the 
government of Burkina Faso to create the company called (Société des Fibres 
Textiles) SOFITEX38, which then became the main organisation responsible for cotton 
production” (Gray, 2008: 69) The position of the State subsequently changed because 
there were no reliable alternative sectors at that time on which the newly independent 
colony could rely whilst building up its own economy. Consequently, cotton growth, 
and the agricultural sector more generally, was subjected to some structural and  
organisational changes (Tersiguel, 1992). The objectives of the independent State 
were political, economic and social (Ki-Zerbo, 1978; 2003). First and most 
importantly, the political aim was for Burkina Faso to take over its own leadership and 
                                                 
38 Is the first and main cotton industry in Burkina Faso. It was SOFITEX which was the only industry for long 
until cotton sector was liberalized in 2004.  
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reorganise its political agenda (Goreux and Macrae, 2003; Baffes, 2004). Afterwards, 
a few intellectuals from the colonisation era promoted the reactivation of the country’s 
cultural and social values, citing the need for these values to be integrated into the 
educational system (Hazard, 2003; Nacanabo, 2003). Eventually, the post-colonial 
State integrated cotton growing into its plans for achieving economic development and 
economic independence. 
 
6.4.2. Organisation of Cotton Production 
In the post-colonial era, the type of cotton grown, the organisation and purposes of 
cotton production underwent some changes (CNRST, 2007). Cotton varieties were 
improved into conventional cotton to produce more cotton quality of seeds by means 
of targeted, comprehensive research which included the growing system as a whole. 
More productive varieties were found and cultivated (Kaminski et al., 2009). In 
addition, research was done locally. For instance, The French textile company (CFDT) 
was working directly with the research structure and institutions such as the research 
institute (IRCT) in order to improve cotton crops’ efficacy (CNRST, 2007). 
 
Crops were constantly renewed in order to consistently realise the highest quality 
product and productivity (Schwartz, 1995) to meet market needs. For instance, the 
fibre was tested to the requirements of industrial processing and therefore some 
varieties of cotton had an important boost during the first decades of the post-colonial 
era. “Gosypium Arboretum” from East Africa and India was the most suitable variety 
and underwent extensive research to increase its productivity and create new varieties 
(CNRST, 2007; AFD, 2008). The African Institute (IFAN/ Burkina Faso) became the 
Voltaic Research Centre (CVRS) in 1964 and National Centre of Research in Science 
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and Technology (CNRST) in 1978 with more detailed organisation in the different 
development sectors (Zoungrana, 2003). 
 
6.4.3. The Development of the Market Economy 
The post-colonial market, following in the footsteps of the colonial era, became one 
which aimed at increasing productivity for increased profit and competitiveness. The 
organisational system already created by the colonisers was reorganised. While some 
structures disappeared, others’ duties were extended through CFDT, the French 
company which until this time had remained the leading institute in the cotton growing 
system in the whole of Burkina Faso. In practice, CFDT controlled research, loans and 
organised training to improve farmers’ skills in the growing process. Cotton farmers, 
instead of merely constituting a subservient labour force, became actors in the process 
of cotton growth. This led to the abolition of the teamwork structure instituted in the 
colonial epoch and a move towards individual farming (Roberts, 1995; Pare, 2001). 
Furthermore, from 1964, it became important for the independent government to have 
a local industry for fibre transformation (spinning and weaving), which until then had 
been done in the mother country. If spinning had disappeared from villages, weaving 
remained manually done but in a professional way with more efficient tools. The 
voltaic textiles (VOLTEX), a cotton company was already effective in 1968 for 
making clothes (CNRST, 2007) and gradually four other firms were born: one in Bobo 
Dioulasso in 1970, one in Hounde in 1978, one in Dedougou in 1981 and another in 
Bobo Dioulasso in 1981. All were founded to support the spinning process (Schwartz, 
1995). 
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6.4.4. Tools and Techniques 
In addition, techniques, methods and tools were improved. There was more focus on 
cotton care and more land used for cultivation. The Volta extended land (AVV) of 
Nagreogo is an example of land extensions done by the State (Gray and Kevane, 
2001). Free internal migration for cotton cultivation was encouraged. This showed 
how far cotton had become the foundation of the economy of Burkina Faso after 
colonisation. Cotton growth for the first two decades was spectacular in terms of 
productivity as well as quality. Between 1970 and 1980, 77,500 tons of cotton grain 
was sold and $8,604 of the total price returned to farmers (Schwartz, 1995). Finally, 
cotton production, as in the colonial period, remained a primary cash crop in 
agriculture and continued to serve as a vital catalyst in the development of Burkina 
Faso.  Thus, cotton production showed a more or less steady upward trend from 1960 
until 1982 as shown in graph 3.  
 
 
Source: processed by author from Schwartz, A. (1993). Brève histoire de la culture du 
coton au Burkina Faso. Paris : ORSTOM.  
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CNRST (2007). "Production cotoniere au Burkina Faso, La Recherche, un Maillon 
Essentiel’." Revue Eureka.   
AfDB, OCDE, PNUD, (2014). African Economic Outlook. Burkina Faso. 2014 
 
The cotton growth expansion strategy involved substantial government intervention 
such as ‘contract farming’ in which State controlled companies carried out research on 
cotton, farmer’s education, and improved fertilizers. In addition, loans and marketing 
services were created (Kaminski et al., 2009). For example, in 1971-1976 a project on 
cotton made available $5,326.4 million from the World Bank, FAO and the 
government to increase cotton productivity in the western part of the country (Goreux 
and Macrae, 2003; Gray, 2008). This was led by CFDT which was in partnership with 
the State from 1970. This partnership led to the creation of voltaic textile (SOFITEX), 
which replaced CFDT which was a French Textile company (ibid). In this partnership, 
the State had 65% of the capital against 34% for CFDT and 1%for banks (CNRST, 
2007). However, whatever remained of the traditional market was further undermined. 
Farmers were fully involved in cotton cultivation and had access to loans. They were 
organised in teams (GV) within their villages in order to receive loans collectively, but 
the work was done individually. After independence, the government did not allow 
farmers to sell their cotton products on the local market. This policy was seen as a 
means of protecting farmers from free-market perils (Gray, 2008).  
 
Another important aspect of government support concerns the cash payment from 
which farmers benefited with CFDT. This payment was discontinued after 1978 when 
SOFITEX took over leadership (Baffes, 2004). Due to substantial increases in yields 
and to growing interest among farmers, cotton areas increased very rapidly after Upper 
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Volta’s independence in 1960. The CFDT remained a key player, associated through a 
partnership with the new government and with bilateral donors who funded several 
development projects for cotton in the 1970s. This association was then replaced by 
SOFITEX (Société des Fibres Textiles) in 1979, which, importantly, was also left in 
charge of a number of broader rural development projects (Moseley and Gray, 2008). 
Meanwhile, the rural communities were progressively organized in a cooperative 
mode through village groups, called GVs, that enabled farmers to self-manage their 
cotton marketing to SOFITEX and to access input credit through village-level joint-
liability schemes (Schwartz, 1993). The introduction of new production techniques 
(for instance, the ox-plough, mineral fertilization, and pesticides) and high-yielding 
seeds, together with relatively higher cotton prices, contributed to a two-fold increase 
in cotton yields from the late 1970s to the 1980s, as well as to increased cereal 
production and improved food security among cotton smallholders with sufficient 
cotton profits (Bassett, 2001; CNRST, 2007). It is noticeable from graph 4 that despite 
the global economic crises between the mid-1970s and 1980s, the value of cotton (first 
or second choice)39 on the world market was better than the previous years.  
 
                                                 
39 The terms first and second choices are used to qualify the cotton according to its quality. The first choice is the 
highest quality, the cotton which is quite pure with pretty white color. The second choice is the cotton which has 
lost its quality either during harvest or on farm. This cotton is quite darker and is sold less than that of the first 
choice. In addition, the y axis shows the price in CFA as define in Chapter 4 
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Source: Processed by author from: 
 Schwartz, A. (1993). Brève histoire de la culture du coton au Burkina 
Faso.ORSTOM 
 
Table 13 : summary of the conventional cotton growth system in post-colonial Burkina 
Faso (1960-1991) 
Actors involved in 
cotton growth 
Variety of cotton Work organisation Tools and tool 
makers 
Cotton usages 
Independent state, 
Cotton farmers 
Blacksmiths,  
Technical agents, 
More industries for 
spinning weaving, 
Financial backers 
Still improved 
varieties of 
Gossypium 
arboretum”, 
“Gossypium 
hirsutum and 
Gossypium 
barbadense 
Men growing 
Industries weaving 
and spinning. 
Research institutes 
doing research  
Griots, Blacksmith,  
(hoes, knives, 
ploughs,) Tractors, 
Insecticides and 
fertilizers 
Exclusively 
commercial on the 
world market 
Source: Processed by author 
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To summarise, it is important to stress that the most significant change during this 
period was the freedom in cotton growth implementation between and among the set 
of actors involved. Farmers who were not included among the beneficiaries of cotton 
growth under the colonial arrangements became effective actors. The most noticeable 
change from the colonial ST-System to the new, more independent system was mainly 
political. The type of cotton, the artefact and the commercial usage did not change. 
What significantly changed was the organisational dimension with more actors 
involved. 
 
Between these two regimes (colonial to independence) the changes were in terms of 
actors and their involvement with users and producers. It has been shown that during 
the first decade after independence (date range) there was a great increase in cotton 
production, which was initially very successful (Schwartz, 1993; Bassett, 2001; Gray, 
2008). The literature and many reports show that cotton growth progressed until 
around 1987. One thing to mention from the graph 4 is that cotton production has 
significantly taken on greater proportions where more land was used in cotton growth. 
The production reached 169, 227 tons between 1986 and 1987 as graph 5 shows 
below.  Then it went down the following four years due to uncertainty in the 
immediate post-revolutionary period but also because of the fact from this period, 
insect damage was becoming part of the concern facing the cotton sector.  
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Source: Processed by author from:  
Schwartz, A. (1993). Brève histoire de la culture du coton au Burkina Faso., Dakar: 
ORSTOM. 
Burkina Faso, Ministère de l’Environnement et du Cadre de Vie (MECV) (2011), 
Analyse Économique Du Secteur Du Coton Liens Pauvreté Et Environnement Projet 
Initiative Pauvreté Environnement (IPE), report and Agrer (Bruxelles): MECV 
UNPC-B. (2007) Etude sur l’analyse et les stratégies de développement durable de la 
filière coton. Version intermédiaire, Ouagadougou: UNPC-B 
 
In contrast to the previous pre-revolutionary period, the value of cotton on the market 
increased during the following 5 years during the revolution. If this can be linked to 
the global dynamic on the world market, it is important to consider the political 
context of the period has played a key role. 
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Source: Processed by author from: 
 Schwartz, A. (1993). Brève histoire de la culture du coton au Burkina 
Faso.ORSTOM: France 
 
The independent regime did not make fundamental structural changes during those 
first three decades. Burkina Faso built up its cotton growth policies still based on the 
colonisers’ model but cotton had significantly contributed to social and moral welfare 
from the 1960s to the 1980s and onwards. Therefore, the common aim of these two 
regimes remained the pursuit of economic growth. This new production regime 
adopted liberalisation policies in 1991, when cotton growth was left in the hands of 
private institutions, but in terms of users and producer linkages the actors remained the 
same. A new ST-System was born without significant change in the organisational 
level of the existing colonial regime. 
 
 251 
6.5. Cotton Growth Regime: From 1991 to 2003 
Another reform sought to maintain the benefits of contract farming—such as 
potentially higher repayment rates and higher input use—while inducing greater 
efficiency through private-sector participation. The government took a number of 
steps towards liberalising cotton markets, starting with allowing the private sector to 
provide functions for which the State had no comparative advantage (for instance, in 
areas such as input provision, transport services, and cotton refinement, but not 
research and development– (Kaminski et al., 2009: 90-92). In 1991 Burkina Faso 
entered into the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPs)40. The SAP emerged in the 
1980s and stressed a neo-classical view of economic freedom, promoting ideas of a 
free market and competition (Dollar and Svensson, 2001). In contrast to the 
modernisation theory of economics, the State here is considered as an obstacle to 
development, because the SAP undermines the coordinating forces of the market and 
its high spending on productive services and, therefore, was regarded as imposing a 
burden on factors supposed to lead to economic growth (Berg, 1989; O’ Brien, 1991). 
Development policies, which allow less government intervention, would liberate the 
market forces for the benefit of individual and national prosperity (Meier and William, 
1989). 
 
In the 1980s, SAPs were formulated to re-establish the conditions for a free market 
(World Bank, 1981; 1986; 1988; 1990). They centred on the following immediate 
objectives: the redefinition of priorities for development and the mobilisation of 
resources from international organisations based on projects around those priorities 
(UNICEF, 1987; Tarp, 2002). In line with neoclassical economic thinking, this 
                                                 
40 Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) consist of loans provided by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to countries that experienced economic crises 
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approach called for less involvement from the State in enterprises and marketing. 
“This was the essential thrust of the strategy, known as structural adjustment, which 
was soon applied in much of the Third World” (Rapley, 1997: 2). To clarify: 
  
…In the Third World, neoclassical theory has been embodied in structural 
adjustment. Essentially, structural adjustment seeks to make both the state and 
the market more efficient in such a way as to accelerate growth and eliminate 
waste. […] it places the market at centre stage, assigns the state a secondary 
role in development, and puts its faith in the potential of unfettered individual 
initiative, creativity, and ingenuity (Rapley, 1997: 71). 
 
SAP involved privatisation of State owned enterprises, trade liberalisation, currency 
devaluation, and new private foreign investment in industry. It sought to increase the 
power and freedoms of entrepreneurs and investors (Rapley, 1997). IMF and World 
Bank packages played an important role in the process, because they were willing to 
lend money to countries who met these new criteria (Tarp, 2002). Yet, structural 
adjustment contained its own problems. Its shortcomings continue to shed a new and 
damaging light on neoclassical theory (Tarp, 2002). With privatization, economic 
growth was still weak with some profound turbulence related to the donors wanting to 
impose their own desire on how the resources developing countries borrowed should 
be used (Meier and William, 1989). For instance, the World Bank provides the aid, but 
also specifies where and how this aid is to be used. As Rapley puts it: 
 
Structural adjustment yielded some positive gains in the more advanced Third 
World countries. However, in the poorer countries, those most in need of rapid 
change, it was less effective and may even have done more harm than good” 
(1997: 2-3). 
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The cotton expansion strategy in the 1990s involved substantial government 
intervention. At this stage there was “contract farming” (Kaminski et al., 2009), an 
arrangement in which the State controlled cotton companies by providing research, 
loans, marketing and farmers’ education. In the graph below, cotton production per ha 
has been around 1000 kg/ha since the 1990s. It was until 2004 that we can notice a rise 
in the quantity of cotton produced per ha. The highest quantity of the period was 2800 
kg/ha between 2005 and 2006; then, it dropped the following year to 1500kg/ha from 
graph 7.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Processed by author from: 
DGCOOP, SP/CPSA, SP/COTON, (2007), Diagnostic de la filière coton et 
identification d’axes stratégiques and FAO (2014) Analyse Des Incitations Par Les 
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Prix Pour Le Coton Au Burkina Faso Pour La Période 2005-2013, Ouagadougou : 
Ministry of Trade 
 
One can clearly notice that the quantity of cotton between 1986 and 1987 was around 
1,400 kg/ha (graph 8). This achievement did not happen again until 2004-2005. 
However, as graph 7 shows, while actors in the cotton sector were debating on Bt 
cotton, it is obvious that, the production between 2004 and 2005 reaches its level of 
1986-1987 (graph 8). Such achievement was unique in the history of cotton production 
in Burkina Faso. This raises the question of the technical relevance of the Bt cotton 
adoption which will be discussed later in the following Chapter 7.   
 
 
 
 
Source: processed by author from:  
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Schwartz, A. (1993). Brève histoire de la culture du coton au Burkina Faso, Paris : 
ORSTOM. 
http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exldoc/pleins_textes/pleins_textes_6/b_fdi_43-
44/010005872.pdf 
 
However, by the late 1980s under SAP, the State-led strategy had become widely 
criticised by financial backers (World Bank, 1990; World Bank and United Nations 
Development Program, 1989). Therefore, in 1991, within a liberalisation context, 
cotton was left in the hands of private institutions (Zoungrana, 2003). In this new 
system (SAP), State capital was reduced and government actions limited. According to 
the financial backers, these new socio-technical and political conditions would give a 
new strategy to cotton farming, with an increase in receipts and allow the country to 
achieve economic independence (World Bank, 1999). The Structural Adjustment 
Program in Agriculture (SAPA) considered that such privatisation would also help 
counter the difficulties that cotton cultivation faced at the end of the 1980s (World 
Bank, 1981; 1986; 1988; 1990). For the promoters, the SAPA was supposed to make 
Burkina Faso’s cotton more attractive to the world market. The World Bank and 
French Aid (AFD) strongly supported a reform process, acknowledging that the cotton 
sector was too important to ignore (World Bank, 1999; Kaminski et al. 2009). The 
ideology of the market economy was the leading force in this agreement between the 
State and financial backers such as the World Bank and IMF (Sissao, 2003).  
 
The organisational dimension with regards to labour distribution did not undergo any 
significant changes, except for the growing number of structures or institutions 
(Zoungrana, 2003). Additionally, the tools and cultivation techniques, including the 
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use of tractors, were good enough to grow cash crops on the large tracts of land 
cultivated by farmers. The National Union of Cotton producers (UNPCB) was created 
in 1997 to reinforce the collaboration between farmers and industry (Gray, 2008), 
since small village-based teams could not do this efficiently. A union was needed to 
represent small farmers in the different debates around cotton including price fixing, 
loans and State subsidies (Kaminski et al., 2009). The success of Burkina Faso’s 
reform approach hinged, to a large extent, on government policies, as well as on the 
ability of the Cotton Producer Groups (GPC) and the cotton union to manage the 
responsibilities which the government transferred to them.  
 
However, falling cotton prices in the late 1980s led to serious structural problems that 
were not adequately addressed. As a result, the prices paid to producers declined from 
1988 to 1992. GVs accumulated large debts, and at the beginning of the 1990s, 
production started to collapse. In collaboration with donors, the government initiated a 
series of financial and management audits of the cotton sectors. There was deemed to 
be an urgent need to reform the sector, exacerbated on the political side by the 
“Dédougou riot” and the partial boycotting of production by growers in 1991, which 
eventually led to the establishment of the first national growers’ union, the FENOP, to 
defend their interests against growing corruption among officials and SOFITEX 
(cotton industry) executives. Another key development was the increasing problem of 
insect damage to crops, which over time had a significant impact on productivity. 
However, the common shared argument among proponents of the innovation 
regarding the fall in price and productivity cannot be substantiated as the data showed 
from graph 9 that between 2004 and 2005 the price of cotton increased two times 
compared to the period from 1980 onwards, as graph 6 above shows. 
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Source: Processed by author from: 
Evolution de la production et des rendements moyens par région cotonnière de 97/98 à 
99/00, SODITEX Site web ; Evolution de la production et des rendements moyens par 
région cotonnière de 2000 à 2004, Ouagadougou : SOFITEX. 
David L. Tschirley, Colin Poulton, and Patrick Labaste, (2009) ‘Organization and 
performance of cotton sectors in Africa: Learning from reform experience, World 
Bank, Washington, pp.180–1. 
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Table 14: Summary of the conventional cotton growth system in post-colonial 
Burkina Faso (1991-2003) 
Actors involved in 
cotton growth 
Variety of cotton Organisation Tools and tool 
makers 
Cotton usages 
Cotton farmers 
Blacksmiths still 
present, Technical 
agents, More 
industries for 
spinning weaving, 
Financial backers 
Still improved 
varieties of 
Gossypium 
arboretum”, 
“Gossypium 
hirsutum and 
Gossypium 
barbadense 
Men growing 
Industries weaving 
and spinning. 
Research institutes 
doing research  
Griots till present,  
Blacksmith, till 
present 
(hoes, knives, 
picks, axes, 
ploughs),  
Tractors, 
Insecticides and 
fertilizers 
Exclusively 
commercial on 
the world 
market  
 
Source: Processed by author  
The privatisation of 1991 did not significantly change cotton growth systems with 
regards to the actors involved. The existing ST-System was not significantly affected. 
From 1991 the government re-configured cotton as an artefact and reduced its own 
involvement in cotton production. From then on, farmers became greater participants 
in decision making related to cotton and to aid them, created a national farmers’ union 
(UNPC-B) in 1997 (Bassett, 2008). The interaction of the different actors, who 
constituted the new system, gave new consideration to the artefact (cotton). 
Meanwhile, the government intervened again to recapitalize 94 cotton firms as a 
means of shoring up the sector before new private investors came on board. This 
shows that “although decision-making under the new institutional structures in the 
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sector has not been error free, problems have been addressed relatively quickly and in 
an appropriately consultative manner” (Kaminski et al., 2009: 94).  
  
At that time there was close collaboration among SOFITEX, the cotton farmers’ 
union, researchers, and the private sector in the process of searching for sustainable 
solutions for the cotton sector. This evolution was one of the most significant 
outcomes of the entire reform process. This was the context into which Bt cotton (the 
new artefact) was introduced. The strategy of its introduction will be described in the 
following chapter.  
 
6.6. The Sectoral Innovation System of Cotton   
Before around 2000 there was a successful, sophisticated (sectoral) cotton innovation 
system in Burkina Faso, as well as a sophisticated contract research system. This 
system was developed before colonization. Cotton farming is a vertically integrated 
sector where the SOFITEX which is a public enterprise was established and granted a 
monopoly over cotton production for the purchase of seed cotton and its inputs (seeds, 
fertilizers and pesticides).  It also provided technical support to farmers and financed 
cotton research. One result was that farmers could only sell their seed cotton to 
SOFITEX. This system also allowed small farmers to obtain credit easily. In addition, 
as demonstrated in chapter 4, there were successive innovation systems which evolved 
over time. In terms of actors, the cotton sector has its own specific program, a specific 
financial system, a well-defined research system as well as cotton producers. Since 
independence, this system of actors has worked well and achieved economic growth as 
shown in graphs 5 to 9 in Chapter 6. The existing cotton system has reached a level 
were the different actors, farmers, industries, researchers and the State, were in a sort 
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of platform where decisions regarding the sector were discussed and agreed by actors’ 
representatives. However, as can be seen, even with remarkable economic growth in 
the sector, in such a closed system, the more powerful actors such as the industries, 
gained more than the farmers, most of whom had small farms. In other words, the 
existing cotton systems were empowered by strong actors such as industries.  
6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the three main ST-Systems or regimes in relation to cotton 
growth in Burkina Faso – prior to 2003 - and explored the ways in which the shift 
from one system to another took place. These regimes are: the pre-colonial; the 
colonial; and the postcolonial (which officially ended in 2003) leaving the way to Bt 
cotton system. The analysis reveals that the co-evolution of cotton production, the 
political economy of Burkina Faso, forms of social organisation, and institutions with 
human actors, gave specificity to each ST-System at a given time. In other words, the 
type of cotton, the growing techniques, the organisation, the involved actors and the 
purpose of cotton growth were all specific to each historical epoch.  
 
The findings enable us to evaluate the impact of colonisation on the development of 
modern economy in Burkina Faso. The analysis illustrates the usefulness of the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter two in understanding the shift in regimes 
and how human and non-human actors are all part of the process of regime shift. It 
attests that there is a strong relationship between social actors and the knowledge they 
produce, as seen in the way techniques, tools and knowledge became embodied within 
a specific regime. This suggests that some ST-Systems are influenced by the 
knowledge and the interests put forward by social actors. For example, in the colonial 
and post-colonial ST-Systems, the economic interest in cotton growth was more 
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dominant, while in the pre-colonial ST-System, local and familial subsistence interests 
tended to dominate. As can also be seen, cotton production techniques and methods 
are related to the context and the period they develop in. 
  
Each of the ST-Systems had characteristics which were formative in relation to the 
next ST-System. Each system proved to be vulnerable to external interventions, 
whether it was political or economic or a combination of both. Each new system 
produced initial and quite dramatic improvements, just as each new system 
experienced subsequent falls in production and productivity. The last ST-System of 
conventional cotton, the postcolonial regime, faced increasingly severe insect-
resistance difficulties which undermined the system. It was a problem for which 
conventional approaches –greater use of increasingly powerful insecticides – were not 
providing an effective solution. This circumstance was ripe for a search for new 
developments at niche level.  
 
These developments are important to understand because of their effect on the context 
and process through which Bt cotton came to be introduced. Biotechnology emerged 
in the early 1970s and came to maturity with the demonstration of possibility of 
genetic manipulation and with biotechnology industry in 1980s (Wright, 1994). 
Herbicide-resistant plants and seeds are engineered to combine and produce their own 
nutrients. Bt (Bacillus Thuringiensis) cotton portrayed the new seed as a cure-all for 
the many challenges farmers face. Bt cotton was created by genetically altering the 
cotton genome to express a microbial protein from the bacterium Bacillus 
thuringiensis. It is an insect-resistant transgenic crop designed to combat the 
bollworm. In short, the transgene inserted into the plant's genome produces toxin 
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crystals that the plant would not normally produce which, when ingested by a certain 
population of organisms, dissolves the gut lining, leading to the organism's death 
(http://cottonaustralia.com.au/cotton-library/fact-sheets/cotton-fact-file-
biotechnology). These genes encode for the production of insecticidal proteins, and 
thus, genetically transformed plants produce one or more toxins as they grow. There 
are three different types of Bt cotton:  
- Bollgard I contain one gene from the naturally occurring soil bacterium 
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)  
- Bollgard II Contain two genes from the naturally occurring soil bacterium 
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) 
- Bollgard III contain three genes from the naturally occurring soil bacterium 
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) 
These genes are supposed to give the plant an in-built tolerance. Monsanto, one of the 
America leading biotechnology company in agricultural research is the owner of the 
Bt cotton seeds gene and is widely promoting its great positive impact on cotton 
production and poverty alleviation.   
 
The analysis of this phenomenon is central because the introduction of Bt Cotton, 
while disrupting the existing ST-System, relied upon features of the last conventional 
cotton system in the successful development of a new ST-System. Specifically, the 
ST-System of Bt cotton built on the institutional model, structures and organisational 
capacities already developed by the State, resulting in the formation of the 
biotechnology innovation strategy. By analysing the mechanism underlying the 
network of actors and their behaviour in the Bt cotton innovation diffusion processes, 
it will shed light on the kind of innovation diffusion approach used to adopt and 
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implement it, in a context where the NIS policy tool was adopted, implemented and 
diffused at national level in Burkina Faso. 
 
 
Chapter 7: Assessing the NIS Diffusion in Bt Cotton 
Implementation in Burkina Faso 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 has identified three main ST-Systems in relation to cotton growth in 
Burkina Faso – prior to 2003 - and explored the ways in which the shift from one 
system to another took place. Continuing this analysis, the present chapter is about the 
shift to the Bt cotton innovation system. In doing so, it will investigate the innovation 
diffusion approach which informed Bt cotton implementation. This will help answer 
the following question: to what extent can it, or can it not be claimed that the National 
Innovation Systems (NIS) policy tool was diffused at operational level with particular 
reference to the cotton sector and the introduction of Bt cotton. This chapter will then 
evaluate the outcome of the implementation of the NIS policy tool at operational level. 
This will involve an analysis of the way different actors actively or passively 
intervened in the construction of the Bt cotton system.  
 
Taking the two projects, NIS as a policy tool and Bt cotton innovation, as an 
operational case study, this chapter argues that the NIS as an innovation diffusion tool 
did not manage to build a socio-technical system strong enough to uproot the existing 
socio-technical system of ‘training and visits’ which had been used as an innovation 
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diffusion approach in cotton sector since the end of the 1980s. For reasons that will be 
explained, the NIS policy tool, which was not fully implemented at the strategic policy 
level (Chapter 5), has not been implemented at all at operational level in the cotton 
sector. This was the result of complex factors independent of the intrinsic qualities of 
the NIS policy tool.  
 
The analysis in this chapter begins by describing the difficulties in conventional cotton 
growth and by characterising the evolution of the problem in cotton production for 
which the development of Bt cotton technology was intended to provide a radically 
new solution. It describes the emergence and stabilisation of the ST-Regime of Bt 
cotton by addressing the way in which the transition comes about through actors’ 
network building and the construction of expectations around technology 
development. Then, it describes the underlying innovation approach which justifies 
the way that Bt innovation was adopted and implemented through the way the 
involved actors behaved. The outcome of such a process will be clearly defined at the 
end of the chapter. 
 
7.2. The Emergence of Bt Cotton in the Context of Persisting Development 
Problems 
Productivity decreased dramatically after the end of the1980s, and declined further 
during the 1990s as the land for cotton growth expended (CNRST, 2007), because 
cotton farmers, related industries and the government were failing to control cotton 
pests and thereby risked losing Burkina Faso’s leading role in cotton cultivation in 
Africa. It became imperative that researchers looked for efficient solutions (Schwartz, 
1999; CNRST, 1994; 1995; 2007; CES, 2011). 
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Other persistent and related problems, such as soil degradation and climate variation, 
combined with a lack of crucial rainfall, hindered cotton growth development 
(CNRST, 1994). Conventional cotton, which had been cultivated since the colonial 
era, and expanded in the post-independence era, was no longer a very promising 
prospect (Schwartz, 1997, Gray, 2008).  
 
Once again, the problem was seen from a technological perspective. From the 1980s, 
it was argued that a “specific cotton research sector was necessary to increase its 
productivity” (CNRST, 2007: 26). INERA, the national agricultural research centre 
was formed and carried out intensive research through the creation of a specific cotton 
research programme (CNRST, 2007; Gray, 2008; World Bank, 2007). In doing so, 
they hoped to remedy the disasters relating to insect resistance which cotton farmers in 
Burkina Faso were facing (CES, 2011).  
 
Production became increasingly susceptible to frequent drought and insect infestation, 
which damaged up to 90% of the country’s cotton crop despite great efforts made by 
the research programme on cotton growth (Goreux and Macrae, 2003; CNRST, 2007; 
CES, 2011). In the 1990s, Burkina Faso was therefore witnessing a drop in its cotton 
production, just like its neighbouring countries, Mali and Ivory Coast (Roberts, 1995; 
Baffes, 2007). The problems discouraged many actors involved in cotton growth, 
specifically cotton farmers who were losing hope over the future of their cash crop.  
 
In Burkina Faso, as in other West African countries, cotton growth became dependent 
on more frequent insecticide treatments. The six to eight treatments recommended 
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took more time and the additional expense significantly reduced Burkina Faso’s 
competitiveness in the world market (CNRST, 2007). Farmers, as well as researchers 
and industries, were looking for an alternative crop to redress the decline (Schwartz, 
1991; 1993; Gray, 1999; 2005; 2008; Roberts, 1995). As a result, though highly 
contested, biotechnology41 was seen as a solution which would increase cotton 
production and allow Burkina Faso to be competitive on the world market (Illy and 
Zangre, 2003; CES, 2011). A meeting with Monsanto in 1999 in Cameroon created an 
opportunity to establish a new platform for solutions to cotton productivity problems. 
Bt cotton, an insect-protected cotton contains a protein from Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt). It protects cotton plants from specific lepidopteron insect pests 
(ISAAA, 2006; CNRST, 2007, CES, 2011). The company is also doing research on 
many other crops such as Bt maize, Bt soy bean, and so on. With respect to Bt cotton, 
Monsanto believes that its technology is able to fight against insects, environmental 
pollution and climate variation, and therefore enhance economic development through 
a much-needed increase in the quality and quantity of conventional cotton 
productivity. Monsanto remains one of the top leading industries in agricultural 
biotechnology in the world. Bt cotton was considered to be effective in controlling the 
bollworms [type of insects] that destroyed the cotton plants and negatively impacted 
on the harvest. It was also known as Bollgard II, which literally translates as ‘capsule 
guardian’.  However, Bt cotton was regarded as controversial because of division in 
public opinion regarding its adoption.  
 
                                                 
41 the exploitation of biological processes for industrial and other purposes, especially the genetic manipulation 
of microorganisms for the production of antibiotics, hormones, etc. – in my case it refers to genetic modified 
crops 
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7.3. The Opening of Windows of Opportunity for Bt Cotton 
The meeting in Cameroon in 1999 on biotechnology, in which Burkina Faso took part, 
marks a decisive step in the adoption of biotechnology cotton by the actors involved in 
cotton production in Burkina Faso. The government sent the director of the National 
Agency for the Use of Research Results (ANVAR) to make a presentation on 
traditional biotechnology and the problem of insect resistance in cotton growth in 
Burkina Faso. This led to his first contact with Monsanto, who made a presentation on 
Bt cotton. The relationship between research activities and agricultural problems 
particularly with specific regard to cotton was presented by the director of ANVAR, 
and the proposed solutions put forward by Monsanto brought the apparently mutual 
interests of both actors to the fore.  
 
In the history of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso, this conference can be considered as the 
beginning of a long process of negotiation between Monsanto and the different local 
actors. A major participant from Burkina Faso stated the context of their meeting with 
Monsanto and he underlines how their mutual interest came to meet together during 
that conference. He attests that: 
 
After our presentation, Monsanto met us to discuss. He was interested in 
Burkina Faso. So Monsanto is already therefore an actor, a main actor. Me, I 
was representing the research, but I was the interface, because I was there 
under the Agency [ANVAR] for the use of the results of research. Then we 
were two actors. He [Monsanto’ officer] said he was interested in Burkina 
Faso, Mali and Ivory Coast. I said there is no problem, but, because I’m an 
individual representing the country, I cannot make any decision of such 
importance. But I suggest that he can come to Burkina, we are going to 
organise a national forum where he is going to present his Bt cotton. And this 
happened in 2000. (Interview#1) 
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The Cameroon conference in 1999 ended with Monsanto expressing interest in 
transferring its Bt cotton (a type of GM cotton)42 to Burkina Faso, and the ANVAR 
director indicating interest in that technology being used in Burkina Faso. As a 
researcher and a national innovation institute director, his personal interest would 
probably be shared by the institution he represented. As can be seen, Bt cotton had 
already been developed at niche level at Monsanto’s laboratory in USA. The meeting 
in Cameroon opened up opportunities to interest actors in Burkina Faso because of the 
problems the cotton sector was facing.  
 
The first meeting with Monsanto in Cameroon in 1999 was followed by official 
meetings with Monsanto in 2000 and then in 2003 in Burkina Faso. In those meetings, 
the different interested parties (researchers, industries, farmers and government 
representatives) were concentrating on the problem of insect damage to conventional 
cotton and the solution brought forward by Bt cotton. “All the actors present at the 
first and second meeting had shown an interest towards biotechnology cotton to fight 
against the insect damage” (Interview#1). Additionally, during the workshop 
organized by the President’s advisors, held between 29th of March and 19th of April 
2011, the National Union of Farmers, industries and government representatives 
agreed that biotechnology cotton was one alternative in the fight against insect 
resistance. The details of the problematisation by the different interested parties are 
described below. 
                                                 
42 It is cotton in which we insert a bacterial gene, and this bacteria is from the soil and was even known to be an 
insecticide. It means that this bacteria, if we grow it in big quantities and transformed it into powder, could be 
used as insecticide. On a scientific level, all the plants, animals…have the same DNA, it is only the succession of 
the unity which is different and which makes the difference between men, monkeys and plants. So [Monsanto 
researchers] did the test and noticed that if they insert the gene into the plant, the plant develops the toxin like the 
gene that was in the bacteria from interview data 
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 Cotton farmers 
Farmers produce cotton and therefore were directly affected by the problems which 
plagued the crop from the end of the 1980s relating to pest control and soil 
degradation combined with changes in the climate. This grave situation discouraged 
many farmers, dashing their hopes and raising doubts about whether they should 
continue to grow cotton (Tiendrebeogo, 2011). Yameogo, during the 2011 workshop 
on biotechnology summarised: 
 
…cotton farmers at this time wanted to stop cotton growth due to the fact that 
it was so difficult for them to control the insects by using the usual insecticides 
[…] the adoption of Bt cotton was imposed on the actor[s] of the sector. 
(Yameogo, 2011: 12) 
 
Farmers in this journey of cotton growth were spending more and more money on the 
care of cotton. Additionally, they were accused by the industry and researchers of not 
using the insecticides properly and of diverting the use of insecticides from cotton to 
other crops or selling it at the local market (Tiendrebeogo, 2011). A social scientific 
awareness would have alerted researchers to the ways that farmers would look for 
other options to offset the losses from cotton growth, which had started to have 
adverse effects on their life. For instance, they could not send their children to school, 
fulfil their social needs or repay their debts to industry. Even if the shift from 
conventional to Bt cotton would not be without difficulties, it is important to consider 
the reasons – social and economic – why the average farmer would welcome the 
promised benefits of Bt technology. 
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 Cotton industries 
Cotton industries are the key elements in the cotton growth process in Burkina Faso. 
They have a monopoly on the materials required for cotton growth and processing and 
since farmers cannot afford to grow cotton at their own expense, provide them with 
loans, insecticides, chemicals, tools, etc. for cotton cultivation. In addition, they buy 
all the cotton from the farmers and process it for world trade. Therefore, the 
commercialisation of cotton relies not on farmers but on the industries.  
 
The high dependence of cotton on insecticide treatments greatly reduced the 
industries’ competitiveness. They were accused by farmers of giving out ineffective 
insecticides and other products: “We [the industries] were accused by farmers that our 
insecticides were not good enough” (Interview#41). Industries could not realise high 
profits with infested conventional cotton. Given the situation, it became vital for them 
to find a solution to their economic and social problems. Bt technology, which was 
supposed to control insect infestation, would be acceptable to this relevant social 
group as it would help them regain their worldwide reputation. Indeed, “this 
technology has allowed the countries from the North to face the resistance 
phenomenon and regain their competitiveness” (Interview #48)  
 
 Cotton researchers 
Among the actors involved in conventional cotton growth, researchers played an 
important role through their quest to find solutions to the different problems faced by 
the conventional cotton plant. Indeed, from 1991, INERA, the agricultural research 
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centre, identified laboratory and field research as the key to solving the problems that 
farmers, industry and the whole country were facing. The reason behind the fall in 
production was a combination of irregular climate, soil degradation and insect 
damage. In 1997, researchers decided that the problem that affected conventional 
cotton was ‘insect resistance’ (Interwiew#44). After a long period of using the same 
insecticides, the insects got used to them and no longer died, so, spraying became less 
effective. Farmers and industry became angry and accused researchers of doing poor 
research since they were unable to find a solution to the problem. As clearly stated by 
one of them: “At this point, us researchers were seen as useless by the farmers and the 
industry which for long time have relied on us in the process of finding appropriate 
solutions to their cotton growth issues” (Interview#54) 
 
Agricultural researchers were also using traditional methods of biotechnology. 
Researchers in Burkina Faso knew nothing about modern biotechnology, particularly 
in relation to cotton and were keen to find out about this new technology to help them 
solve the problem of insect damage to cotton. Research conducted by Zangre and 
Massimbo (2002) revealed the huge interest in emerging biotechnology among 
research institutes and researchers.  
 
 Civil society 
Biotechnology translation in Burkina Faso includes civil society since, for the first 
time, it had an important place in technology adoption processes and could positively 
or negatively affect the process and implementation of innovation, especially of 
biotechnology cotton. Civil society could be affected by the environmental, health, 
social, cultural, economic and ethical issues, which are frequently raised in the debate 
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around biotechnology. This relevant social group sees biotechnology as highly 
controversial and therefore, felt the need to consider it as part of the process of 
implementation. During the early stage of ‘problematisation’ (Callon, 1986), civil 
society was considered as one of the key actors. Monsanto was aware of the 
complexity of the social context described above and therefore sought to integrate this 
group at its first official meeting with actors in Burkina Faso. 
 
Civil society in Burkina Faso is complex and its composition heterogeneous. It 
includes people engaged in biodiversity protection, researchers and scientists and the 
lay public. With regard to Bt cotton implementation, some elements of civil society 
were involved in the process of technology adoption and made its voice heard. One of 
the civil society leaders stated that: “It [cotton] was trialled in the country [Burkina 
Faso] without any rules […] we were those who said no, it was not possible. We said 
that regulatory framework needed to be put in place before hand […] (Interview#55) 
 
 The government of Burkina Faso 
In Burkina Faso about 90% of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture 
(Gray, 2008). Cotton production constitutes the pillar of the country’s economy 
(ISAAA, 2006; Tiendrebeogo, 2011). Cotton income contributes to the livelihoods of 
more than 3 million people, representing around 20% of the population, helping them 
to sustain their family and send their children to school (ISAAA, 2006). However, as 
explained above, this main export crop was susceptible to frequent drought and insect 
damage, making cotton extremely dependent on insecticides. In addition, the 
government’s subsidies to farmers remained insignificant (Bassett, 2001; 2008). These 
issues significantly reduced Burkina Faso’s competitiveness on the world market 
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(Gray, 2008; Bassett, 2008). Bt cotton certainly interested state actors, who envisaged 
the industry becoming increasingly competitive on the world market through adopting 
new technology, and the country obtaining a top position in Africa and the world 
(CES, 2011).  
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Source: Processed by author 
 
The figure 9 gives a map of different actors showing the different actors and their 
perception of the cause of the issue they were facing in cotton production and which 
justified a need for them to accept the new technology, Bt cotton. This was the context 
within which Monsanto found the niches translated through the insect resistance. The 
biggest issue which derived from that was the mutual accusations among farmers, 
industry and researchers. This explicitly shows the problematisation of the birth of 
interest of the relevant social group toward Bt cotton’s introduction 
 
-Resistance problems: 
 destroyed farmers crops 
 uncontrolled by 
researchers 
 putting pressure on the 
industry’s production 
-Accusations between farmers, 
industry and researchers 
 
Researchers 
Industry Farmers  
-More treatments to 
fight against insects 
-Use of cotton’ 
chemical products 
for others purposes -Lack of profit 
-spending more money on 
insecticides 
-decrease in productivity 
State 
Loss of 
Competitiveness 
-Subvention 
-No positive impact on 
the country’s economy   
Lack of 
modern 
biotechnology 
research 
Figure 9: Actors and their perspectives about cotton production in Burkina Faso 
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Through this problematisation, the different relevant actors directly concerned with Bt 
cotton were identified. There remained a presumption that these potential actors would 
be interested in that technology but the remaining challenge for Monsanto was to 
confirm these interests and place itself as an “an obligatory passage point” in Callon’s 
(1986) terms. That is, to convince these relevant actors (farmers, industries, 
researchers, civil society, and the government) that their interests lay in admitting Bt 
cotton as an alternative solution to the problem of conventional cotton production. 
Two conferences which took place in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in 2000 and later in 
2003 were used by Monsanto as a platform to provide the information and arguments 
designed to persuade local actors of the potential of their solution. 
 
The first official meeting held in 2000 was an opportunity for Monsanto to describe 
the mechanism of Bt cotton and prove its technology’s benefits for all the relevant 
actors in the ST-System of Bt cotton under construction. According to Monsanto: 
 
Bt cotton is cotton in which we insert a bacterial gene, and this bacterium is 
from the soil and was even known to be an insecticide. It means that the 
bacteria, if we grow it in big quantities and transformed it into powder, could 
be used as insecticide. On a scientific level, all the plants, animals…have the 
same DNA, it is only the succession of the unity which is different and which 
makes the difference between men, monkeys and plants. So [Monsanto 
researchers] did the test and noticed that if they insert the gene into the plant, 
the plant develops the toxin like the gene that was in the bacteria43.  
                                                 
43 A film made by ISAAA in Burkina Faso, ‘Seeing is Believing’ to show to the different 
actors in the cotton sector how promising Bt cotton farms are in comparison to conventional 
cotton. This definition was given by a researcher to the journalist/speaker 
http://www.naturalnews.tv/v.asp?v=B345F5800F780785C335DF9917F05501 [access date  
24/08/2010]  
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One can see that Monsanto’s definition of its technology was well matched to the 
relevant social groups’ worries, suggesting a solution through which farmers and 
industries would definitely fight against insect resistance without any major changes, 
given that the technology is part of the normal process of living species.  
 
Monsanto clearly described the benefits of its technology for the different actors. 
Firstly, for farmers, Monsanto aimed to deliver a product with more potential for 
insect control thereby providing them with potentially greater productivity in the field. 
In Burkina Faso, the yield would, it was claimed, increase and the number of pesticide 
treatments fall from six or eight to two. Secondly, industry would gain more profit and 
increased competitiveness on the world market. Thirdly, researchers would acquire 
new knowledge, skills and techniques. They would benefit from the extensive 
educational programmes for students around the world – particularly in science and 
agriculture. Monsanto suggested that it would fund numerous research grants for 
graduate students; work in partnership with government bodies, non-profit agencies 
and advocacy groups to make agriculture more sustainable (Monsanto, 2011). The 
State, from Monsanto’s perspective, would benefit from being more competitive in the 
cotton market.  
The starting point here is Monsanto, which appears to bring forward a new and 
promising solution to the crucial problem of insect resistance that the country has been 
facing since the 1990s. By targeting the relevant actors in this way, Monsanto, as the 
owner of the technology (Bt cotton), fulfilled the key role as an ‘obligatory passage 
point’ (Callon, 1986) within the set of actors in the translation process. As a result, 
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Monsanto put itself in the position of being indispensable in the translation process. 
This locates the Monsanto laboratory as a technological niche, a place where practical 
solutions are developed to meet the needs created by the landscape (Geels, 2004). 
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Figure 10: Benefits of Bt cotton from Monsanto's perspective: How Monsanto 
places itself as an 'obligatory passage point' 
 
 
Source: Processed by author  
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7.4. The Formation of the ST-Regime of Bt Cotton 
The different relevant actors were offered reasons to accept that Monsanto’s 
technology would be beneficial to them in many ways, including their own safety 
[because of reduced pesticide spraying] (Tiendrebeogo, 2011; CES, 2011; INERA, 
2011). They were convinced also that Monsanto’s technology would conserve energy; 
reduce greenhouse gases; minimize use of toxic herbicides; conserve soil fertility and 
natural resources and enable farmers to produce higher quality cotton while 
conserving more natural resources44. During the workshop organised by the 
President’s advisors in 2011, UNPC-B’s president to justify their choice and full 
adhesion to Bt cotton used the same argument that is commonly agreed. He stated that: 
 
We knew that Bt cotton was very beneficial to us. As farmers, we were 
suffering a lot, because most of us are manual cotton farmers and we used to 
walk for several km to spray the insecticides. Now this work load is reduced 
and [there is] no toxicity due to this product [insecticides] (Interview#57) 
 
It is not surprising that, in particular, farmers’ representatives, who participated in the 
different meetings from the early stages of Bt cotton processes, felt that this 
technology, by reducing the use of the insecticides, would positively impact on their 
living conditions in terms of time saved, release from hard labour, the reduction of 
                                                 
44Monsanto’s definition of its technology, Cotton Trait Performance 
https://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages/benefits-of-plant-biotechnology.aspx [access date  
13/07/2011] 
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environmental pollution and specifically by safeguarding their health by not requiring 
them to be in permanent in contact with insect control products (ISAAA, 2006; Gross, 
2007; Smith, 2005). It appeared that Bt cotton would enable farmers to protect cotton 
crops from certain target insects and allow growers to increase both their yield and 
revenue, while decreasing the use of pesticides by two thirds in Burkina Faso (ISAAA, 
2012). An influential representative of cotton farmers summarises these advantages as 
follows:  
It would reduce our hard work; it was so tiring […] it is not easy because we 
are [still] doing manual farming [that is to say farmers are still using the 
traditional tool in the growing systems] so another advantage is related to our 
health issues because we are not in touch with the insecticides all the time. So 
this helps a lot (Interview#33). 
 
Many farmers were impressed by the claims made about Monsanto’s technology, and 
became confident of its benefits following the presentation of its advantages in 
relation to increased yield and productivity. A small farmer says: 
 
So far, we do not have access to this new crop. If we get it, it will be good […] 
this is my dearest hope, because pesticides alone eat up a large portion of our 
profits. […] Since there is no need for pesticide with transgenic cotton, it is 
something positive for our health and the environment as well (Interview#38).  
 
Other farmers interviewed claimed that Bt cotton would be a better solution for them 
than the intensive use of insecticides. As its name, Bollgard II, which literally 
translates as ‘capsule guardian’ implies, it would help them obtain better harvests and 
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products, and therefore better prices. Additionally, the work was meant to become less 
exhausting for farmers. So they found that they would be able to rest and spend their 
time doing other things than growing only cotton (CES, 2011; Tiendrebeoge, 2011).  
 
Bt cotton farming was therefore expected to be a more relaxed job. A farmer confirms 
that: “If we no longer have to spray the cotton, it is a good thing for us” 
(Interview#37). Bt cotton was considered to be effective in controlling the bollworms 
that destroyed the cotton plants and negatively impacted on the harvest. Some farmers 
were therefore hopeful that they will soon be able to grow biotechnology cotton.  
However, before any real ‘interessement’ (Callon, 1986:1), actors still raised questions 
and worries related to the solidity of biotechnology cotton in the context of Burkina 
Faso. This dimension implies the interessement that the relevant social groups have to 
the technology. 
 
At the first workshop held in 2000, local relevant actors in Burkina Faso raised health-
related issues, and, referring to the 1990s resistance issues, the possibility of a new 
insect resistance were discussed. Some farmers were very concerned about their 
safety. “We were hearing that it [Bt cotton] makes men sterile” (Interview#20). The 
important issue of dependency, the concern that farmers would be relying on 
Monsanto for supplies was also raised.  Environmental issues, biodiversity and 
national rules constituted the preoccupations of the relevant actors regarding the 
technology. 
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Relevant groups are still not fully convinced of the short and long-term consequences 
of the health-related issues. A farmer recalls “It wasn’t easy because even the firms 
who produce the insecticides do not want GM because it will destroy their business, 
people said it kills people, it kills men, makes them sterile, it kills animals even now” 
(Interview#40). Most of the different actors, though they were interested in the 
technology, worried about the human and animal health aspect. 
 
As a GM product, biotechnology cotton would be in direct contact with human and 
animal food especially in the Burkinabe context. Cotton grain is used in local dishes 
and there remains anxiety about the impact of Bt cotton grain on people’s wellbeing 
(ISAAA, 2006; Gray, 2008). For example, a participant, during the field visit of 
ISAAA, 2006, raised this question. “I would like to know if Bt cotton grain is safe, 
given that in Burkina Faso people use it for oil or soup for consumption. Is the grain 
safe for these purposes?”45. 
 
From the interviews that researchers, industries, civil society and farmers gave, 
however, it was clear that they were mainly worried about the risk of insect resistance 
to Bt cotton in the long term. The actors concerned were using their previous 
experiences of insect resistance to evaluate Bt cotton and believed that what happened 
with conventional cotton could happen again. In fact, when the resistance occurred in 
the 1990s, it did so following the long term use of the same product, which made 
insects used to it and unaffected by it (CNRST, 2007). A farmer illustrates this in his 
                                                 
45A film was made by ISAAA in Burkina Faso: “Seeing is Believing” to show to the different 
actors of cotton sector how promising Bt cotton farms are in comparison to conventional 
cotton. http://www.naturalnews.tv/v.asp?v=B345F5800F780785C335DF9917F05501 [access 
date  24/08/2010] 
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own words, saying that: “even now we can see that many people used to take 
paracetamol for malaria, now we can see this [paracetemol] cannot fight against 
malaria anymore. It is the same with the long term use of Bt cotton” (Interview#5).  
 
Thus, there was the fear that what happened with the insects’ resistance to insecticides 
could be repeated with Bt cotton through its use in the long run (Tiendrebeogo, 2011), 
so that the problems of the relevant social groups could recur. A researcher remembers 
discussing this issue in the process of adopting Bt cotton, for him, “The technology 
was good, but we worried about the resistance aspect that was so important in the 
1990s and we did not hesitate to discuss this issue with it [Monsanto]” (Interview#6). 
 
Another important focus for the relevant actors was the environmental and 
biodiversity issue. This was discussed by civil society in the technology’s early stages. 
Researchers, farmers and the industry raised this aspect as well. Because the non-
targeted insects, especially the bees, are useful pollinators, the actors were concerned 
about their reaction to the new technology. A researcher insists that: 
 
Until now, there is no, no, no, negative impact on the environment. I can tell 
you with documents and the conclusion is that GM crops do not pose higher 
risks than the conventional ones. It shows even that it is the contrary. 
Conventional cotton impacts negatively on the environment (Interview#8). 
 
By this he meant that Bt is safe and do not present any danger for the environment. 
The lack of a national regulatory framework was underlined by some of the actors, 
such as researchers and civil society. They believed the trans-boundary movement of 
GM crops was something which must follow national rules and the Cartagena 
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Protocol, the agreement based on the precautionary principle, which the country must 
adopt before accepting any GM crop in the country. Based on the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and then the Cartagena Protocol, there was a need for Burkina 
Faso to be a signatory to the protocol, to establish its national rules on GM 
(Interview#36). The rules anticipate the potential hazards of genetic engineering 
applications before the country gives its approval. Employment of the Precautionary 
Principle (PP) entails identification of risk, scientific uncertainty and ignorance, and 
involves a transparent and inclusive decision-making processes. A researcher from a 
civil society organisation suggests that “Burkina Faso needs to abstain for at least 
three years before any decision [to accept or not Bt cotton] could be taken” [because 
of the country’s lack of a regulatory framework] (Interview#45).  
 
This regulatory issue was raised during the first official meeting held in 2000 during 
which actors thought that the development of a regulatory framework was the most 
important point to start from. One of the proponents of Bt cotton has used a defensive 
argument to show that Burkina Faso was quite aware and familiar with the Cartagena 
Protocol, he insists that: 
 
As a member of the Cartagena Protocol and having signed up to it, Burkina 
Faso needs to set up its own national rules and regulations following the 
protocol, before any biotechnology adoption […] The actors who were present 
agreed that this is essential (Interview#42).  
 
 
 The issue of Dependency for Access to Bt Cotton 
Civil society, farmers, researchers and the industry expressed worries related to the 
issue of dependency. By accepting Bt cotton, Burkina Faso farmers and the country as 
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a whole would be dependent on Monsanto for their cotton growth in the future, and 
the local cotton variety could eventually disappear. An interviewee, a member of a 
civil society group and the president of an organisation which promotes traditional 
farming, insisted that: 
 
GM products are more dangerous than good. It will lead Burkina Faso to total 
dependence and loss of food sovereignty. As a poor country, BF will be 
dependent for research and crops. Monsanto, Syngenta and Dupont possess 
47% of world GM crops. The country using GM would depend on them for 
their crop supply (Interview#56). 
 
Finally, some specific worries were raised mainly by farmers and supported by civil 
society, with regard to the cost of the technology. In the past, farmers spent $8,033 to 
grow cotton on 1ha. Now for the same amount of land farmers may need to spend 
more money. This would make the technology inaccessible to small farmers who were 
originally considered to be the first group to gain advantages from it.  
 
 Capacity Building and Bt Cotton Adoption 
Some researchers had a specific anxiety related to the capacity building that is needed 
for the technology to be well assessed before implementation. As one researcher 
underlines:  
 
Capacity building was one important condition for this technology. Training 
first: […] for the use of the technology such as isolating the DNA and 
introducing it. Now what was missing, […] [was] this capacity building, […] 
at the end of the experimentation we need to have land, infrastructures, a 
laboratory with adequate equipment which will allow us to cut the DNA and 
stick it (Interview#1).   
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For the above interviewee, there was an important need to reinforce the local research 
capacity before welcoming biotechnology cotton. This idea was supported by a civil 
society actor who maintained that “scientific capacity for doing such research needs to 
be reinforced before decisions can be made” (Interview#1). At the time it was only 
traditional biotechnology which was examined in the different research centres in 
Burkina Faso since modern biotechnology was unknown to them. Therefore, some 
researchers and some civil society actors believed it was high time the country 
strengthened its capacity for the better use and manipulation of modern biotechnology. 
Figure 3 below gives a summary of the anxieties expressed by the local actors towards 
biotechnology cotton. 
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Source: Processed by author  
The above figure 11 gives a map of different actors showing the different actors and 
their shared concerns regarding Bt cotton technology.  
 
7.5. Stabilising the Bt cotton ST-Regime 
The landscape development which created pressure on the regime created the space 
and opportunity for innovation at niche level to uproot the existing regime. Bt cotton, 
from this perspective, contained features Geels identified as fundamental to the 
chances of successful innovation: “A specific mechanism in the breakthrough of 
-Human and animal 
health-related issues 
-being dependent on 
Monsanto for the 
seeds 
 
Researchers 
Industry 
Farmers  
Civil 
society 
Biodiversity and 
environment 
safety 
Resistance due to 
long term use 
Figure 11: Bt cotton according to local actors in response to Monsanto 
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radical innovations is technological add-on and hybridisation.” (Geels, 2002:1271). 
This section analyses this reconfiguration of the new technology by way of the series 
of adaptations and changes that Monsanto went through in order to get its technology 
accepted by addressing the issues raised by the interested parties. In the case of Bt 
cotton, the original plan of the owner of the technology needed to change in order to 
fit into the relevant actors’ problematisation of Bt cotton. Monsanto re-evaluated its 
technology from different angles to enable it to fit the context. 
 
7.5.1. The interplay between Monsanto and the local actors 
In the case of Burkina Faso, the initial plan for Monsanto was to transfer its pre-
existing Bt cotton to Burkina Faso, but during the first meeting in 2000, this plan was 
reoriented and led to a second meeting held in 2003 where more issues about bio-
security were discussed (Ouedraogo, 2003). The different stabilizing changes 
negotiated by researchers, farmers, industry and civil society actors are addressed 
below. 
 
First of all, to allay concerns regarding the possible resistance of insects to Bt cotton, 
Monsanto designed an alternative with the relevant group to sustain its technology and 
enable it to fit local conditions. For instance, to avoid the issue of resistance, the 
growing method in the specific case of Burkina Faso consisted of 20% conventional 
cotton and 80% Bt cotton. A farmers’ representative affirms that “Each farmer needs 
to respect this; the 20% helps as a refuge zone for the pests. Each Bt cotton farmer 
needs 80% Bt and 20% conventional.” (Interview#49). 
 
This option was agreed and accepted by this set of actors, specifically the government 
which saw its role as protecting farmers’ interests and the cotton sector as a whole. “In 
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government policy Bt cotton can be grown on a maximum 80% of the land to avoid 
any uncontrollable situation. A minimum of 20% of the land is used for the 
conventional one which is also very important” (Interview#51). Many farmers thought 
that this solution would fit into the specific context of Burkina Faso and some other 
countries. It was interpreted to mean also that, if Bt cotton happens to lose its quality 
in Burkina Faso, going back to the local conventional variety would be a possibility. 
 
Secondly, the experience of local researchers and industries was that the American 
variety of conventional cotton was not successful in the growing conditions in Burkina 
Faso. Therefore, they were inclined to use the local conventional cotton for Bt 
engineering. A researcher at the national institute for agricultural research said that 
“America conventional cotton was not successful in Burkina Faso farming and it 
would be more practical thinking about an alternative” (Hema, 2011). In other words, 
they were sure that the Bt cotton engineered from conventional American cotton 
would not be efficient. This shows that even though modern biotechnology had not yet 
been implemented in Burkina Faso, the experience of the relevant group combined 
with their scientific knowledge had already influenced Monsanto’s process and initial 
plan of transferring its technology to Burkina Faso. Both the non-scientific societal 
pressure groups and the scientific outsider professionals such as members of a civil 
society community, CV-OGM, who possessed knowledge of biotechnology, made 
their voices heard on this matter.  Therefore, the relevant social groups requested that 
Monsanto’s technology be derived from the local variety of cotton.  
 
Their reason for the request was twofold: on the one hand, to avoid the sector 
becoming fully reliant on an agro-business company such as Monsanto; on the other, 
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to make the technology more successful and beneficial for Burkina Faso by co-sharing 
the technology. A leading cotton researcher states that: 
 
[The] America conventional variety wasn’t appropriate in Burkina […].  
Thus the discussion ends up at the combination of the gene to the local variety 
which is meant to be more productive. For this reason, the agreement was to 
introduce the gene into the local variety (Interview#53).  
 
This was also an opportunity for a shared partnership. The SOFITEX director 
confirms this when he summarised that: “If we have to accept it [Bt cotton], it should 
be our local variety that we know is good. So if one day it doesn’t work, we just get 
back to it without any big trouble” (Tiendrebeogo, 2006:4801). Civil society actors 
had been very critical of this issue of dependency that biotechnology cotton could 
provoke. Nacoulma (2011) underlines that Burkina farmers, by accepting the 
technology, could lock themselves into a vicious circle. It was therefore agreed that 
the gene would be introduced in Burkina Faso’s local variety. This shows the extent to 
which the technology was being shaped by the Burkina Faso context. 
 
Moreover, it promotes a collaborative agreement between Burkina Faso and Monsanto 
in order to share technology’s benefits and reduce the dependency issue. Therefore, 
the gene from Monsanto was used in combination with the cotton seeds of cotton of 
Burkina Faso to make the Bt seed for distribution according to location. As an 
example of how this has worked in practice, the variety of seed used in the central 
region may be different from the one used in the west of the country.  
 
However, there was a need to do trials on the effectiveness of the local variety in 
which Bt genes are inserted, and which required the contribution of local researchers. 
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Therefore, the local researchers, in collaboration with Monsanto used two 
experimental stations to examine the effectiveness of Bt cotton (CNRST, 2007). The 
conventional research system was not appropriate for biotechnology cotton. Indeed, 
before getting to trials, researchers needed the appropriate skills, abilities and 
knowledge of modern biotechnology in order to do the research. This presupposed a 
need for training in biotechnology research for local researchers. Monsanto included 
this training in its strategy and a few researchers received training at Monsanto’s 
institute in the America for this purpose (Traore, 2011). 
 
Finally, civil society actors, researchers and those industries with relevant ministries 
emphasized the need for a national regulatory framework which seems to fit in with 
Monsanto’s plan. The company stated that this was the first condition it needed: the 
establishment of national rule. The interest of Burkina Faso in Bt cotton was a reason 
to go back to the Cartagena Protocol in order to establish some rules and regulations at 
the national level because of the specificity of the technology. The ANVAR director 
states that:  
 
If people think that Bt cotton came here [Burkina Faso] hazardously, [it] is to 
see [only] a bit of the story. I participated in Cartagena Protocol processes. We 
started to think, to make an international protocol where the signatories are 
going to talk the same language. If you want to bring GM, you need to be 
prepared and adopt national rules based on that Protocol (Interview#1).  
 
The countries who were signatories to the Protocol had shown their willingness to take 
legal action regarding the new biotechnology in terms of use, transport and GM 
manipulation. It was high time for Burkina Faso to prepare to control GM movement 
through the country’s borders.  
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Many people and structures were optimistic about the GM initiative in Burkina 
Faso and wished that legislative and regulative rules could be settled to prevent 
risks and for the capacity building of biotechnology that is promoted by the 
Cartagena Protocol (Zangre and Massimbo, 2002:15).  
 
Burkina Faso adopted the Cartagena Protocol, which arose from a situation of 
insecurity, in September 2003. Monsanto stated that its strategy “consists only in 
working with countries which have their rules on bio-security” (Burkina Biotech 
Association, 27: 2008). As a result of that the idea of bio-security was welcomed by 
both teams (Monsanto and the relevant actors). Two years of work was needed by 
researchers, relevant ministries and civil society actors to work out this issue. The 
rules relate to the environmental and human and animal health issues (Zangre and 
Mazimbo, 2002). A two-year project was initiated which was meant to culminate in a 
national regulatory framework based on the Cartagena Protocol. Rules were also 
adopted to respond to the need for the confinement of biotechnology products during 
the trials.  
 
7.5.2. The Stabilisation in Bt cotton Adoption Process 
There is therefore a relative stabilisation of the artefact in question – Bt cotton - as 
Monsanto managed to meet some requirements of the relevant social groups’. Callon 
(1986) calls this feedback of relationships which shape and align Monsanto with the 
relevant actors in Burkina Faso, “the triangle of interessement”. The corners of this 
triangle are: Monsanto, Bt cotton and Burkina Faso. 
 
 
 293 
 Alliance Construction and the ST-Regime of Bt cotton 
In the case of Bt cotton implementation, the interessement was followed by a number 
of training sessions to acquire knowledge and skills in order to trial and test the 
technology’s efficacy locally. As underlined by a researcher: “The capacity building 
was one important condition for this technology. Training first, for this we trained a 
certain number of researchers on the use of technology such as isolating the DNA and 
introducing it [to conventional Burkinabe cotton] (Interview#1). One can conclude 
that researchers, farmers, industries and the state were all enrolled but civil society 
actors remained very critical and reticent, making the process of stabilisation difficult 
to fulfil. 
 
Monsanto’s Bt cotton and Burkina Faso’s conventional cotton would be trialled in 
order to test, on the one hand, the effectiveness of the technology and on the other, the 
behaviour of the gene in the Burkina Faso local variety. The gene coding for Bt toxin 
has been inserted into cotton as a transgene, causing it to produce this natural 
insecticide in its tissues. This first process involved researchers and Monsanto who 
had to lead these trials in direct collaboration with researchers and industries. It 
appears that Burkina Faso’s conventional cotton had adapted to the Bt cotton gene. 
However, researchers needed to deal with other obstacles related to non-target, 
possibly beneficial insects which were not dangerous for the cotton plant, especially 
bees.  
 
When we did our first trial in Burkina Faso at the two research stations, it came 
out that Bt cotton fights against some specific insects very dangerous to the 
cotton plant, and our local variety is very well behaved with the gene. 
(Interview#59) 
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The first official trials received a number of visitors such as farmers and civil 
dignitaries at the national and international level who wanted to observe and attest to 
the technology’s effectiveness (ISAAA, 2006). A farmer corroborates the efficacy of 
Bt cotton after a field visit: “We can attest that this new technology will really increase 
our productivity.” (Interview#50). The National Agriculture and Environment 
Research Institute (INERA) conducted its first research trials in two locations: Farako-
Ba in the west and Kouare in the east. To provide growers with more options for insect 
control and potentially greater productivity in the field, Burkina Faso began field trial 
evaluations with biotechnology cotton crops officially in 2003 (Ouedraogo, 2003). 
The objectives of the experiments and tests were to assess the effectiveness of the Bt 
cotton gene on the insects that infest fields, to analyse the financial issue of Bt 
technology for Burkinabe farmers and its impact on the environment. The research 
evaluated the effectiveness of Bollgard II in the climate and insect conditions specific 
to Burkina Faso. Bollgard II was tested in three different local varieties: FK37, FK290 
and STAM 59 (Hema, 2011, Konate, 2011). 
 
The concluding results from the trials46 were: 
 
- A yield increases averaging between 35% and 48%, in local varieties containing 
Bollgard II 
- A reduction in the number of pesticide treatments per field from 6 to 2. 
- A reduction in both pesticides used and number of treatments making it possible to 
save (€20) per hectare, a 62% cost reduction 
                                                 
46 Data from papers presented by Hema and Konate during worshop on Biotechnologie et le Development 
Economic du Burkina Faso, Burkina Faso." Premiere Session extra-ordinaire, CES: 28 Mars- 19 Avril 2011. 
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- A practical proposition of 80% Bt against 20% conventional refuge zone was set to 
help fight against the insects’ resistance.  
- The coexistence of Bt cotton with neighbouring fields was proven 
 
At this step, the actors, except civil society actors, were enrolled without any other 
resistance and they were apparently impressed by Monsanto’s technology. Geels 
(2007) described such a long process as ‘transformation’ processes where feedback, 
modifications and conclusions were made. Most of the different allied actors saw the 
problem as solved, but, civil society actors remained immutable regarding its beliefs 
about the technology. This resistance within a key sector makes stabilization pending 
to some extent.  
 
7.6. The Underlying Innovation Diffusion Approach in Bt Cotton Implementation 
A close analysis of the way the different actors involved themselves in Bt cotton 
implementation reveals that there was no change in the way actors were networking to 
previous ST-Systems. The way different actors interacted in the implementation and 
diffusion of Bt cotton does not reflect the NIS diffusion tool. Instead it is similar to 
another approach which has been used in the cotton sector since the end of the 1980s. 
This diffusion approach is known as ‘Training and Visits’. Therefore, the above 
description of the process of Bt cotton adoption and implementation in Burkina Faso 
appears to show that the underlying innovation diffusion approach which shapes the 
actors’ behaviour in this process is the ‘Training and Visits’. 
 
This Training and Visits approach is described by Daniel Benor through the World 
Bank (Interview#17). In this approach, there is a possibility for information to travel 
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between researchers, technical agents and farmers. In the present case of Bt cotton, 
what is evident is that farmers could directly exchange ideas, information, and 
anxieties with researchers and technical agents involved in Bt cotton growth. 
Researchers went down the farms and directly explained and assisted farmers on what 
to do. What was also specific in this process was that Monsanto, an international firm, 
the owner of the technology, was part of the network. It assisted research with training 
to increase understanding in order to support the other actors in the system. Both 
researchers and technical agents worked closely with farmers in the diffusion process 
of Bt cotton under the supervision of Monsanto. As can be seen, in this strategy, 
researchers were not doing research in laboratories on the technology. Instead, they 
were like technicians whose job was to multiply Bt seeds with local varieties and 
assist agents and farmers technically on Bt cotton growth through their visits and 
assistance at every step in the process. Such technical support is carried out by training 
and frequent visits to farms as in conventional cotton. As with the conventional cotton, 
with Bt cotton Innovation, farmers are in touch with researchers and technical agents. 
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Figure 12: Training and Visits approach in the implementation of Bt cotton in 
Burkina Faso 
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Source: processed by author 
 
7.7. Assessing the Benefits from Bt cotton ST-Regime 
The benefits derived by the key actors in the ST-Regime of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso 
are discussed here. These actors are: Monsanto, the owner of Bt cotton technology; 
farmers, who grow cotton, using Monsanto’s Bt technological innovation through the 
sponsorship of the cotton companies; cotton companies which sponsor Bt cotton 
growth; researchers, (technicians), who are at the cross-roads of biotechnology cotton 
innovation adoption and development; and the state which is supposed to legislate and 
regulate the relationships between the different actors on the national cotton market. In 
practice a few actors obtained the right to express and represent the many silent actors 
in the process of Bt cotton adoption and the construction of its ST-System in Burkina 
Faso. In the case of Burkina Faso, network formation involved a few individuals, 
mainly researchers and farmers who played a representative role. When Monsanto 
negotiates with the national union of farmers’ representatives and researchers, it 
considers this to be representative of all the farmers and all researchers. The green 
light for Bt cotton is not given by researchers and/or farmers, but by their 
representatives. They are those who allow the trials and welcome the new technology 
on behalf of the others 
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Source: Processed by author 
 
The above figure 13 summarises the way involved actors are linked to one another in 
the ST-System of Bt cotton. This specific enrolment and network of actors helps to 
understand the benefits’ distribution of the technology. In addition, the main change 
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Figure 13: ST-System of Bt cotton 
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that occurred in the Bt system was safety regulation which matched the nature of the 
technology. This means that in Burkina Faso, the institutional regulation, if it does 
exist, is very limited and does not consider the extent to which an innovation could 
benefit both the owner and the adopter. 
 
7.7.1. Monsanto’s Benefits from Bt Cotton 
Monsanto occupies a unique position in the ST-System of Bt cotton innovation 
because its leading position allows it to influence the ST-System. On the one hand, it 
is in an indirect relationship with the state, through the public cotton researchers of the 
Agricultural Research Institute (INERA) (Gerard, 2009). On the other hand, it is 
directly related to the Inter-Professional Cotton Association (AIC-B), an influential 
body for innovation decision making, and for economic strategies in the cotton sector 
(Zagre, 1994; CNRST, 2007; Gray, 2008). AIC-B is composed of the cotton industries 
union (APPROCO-B) and the National Union of Farmers (UNPC-B) (Gray, 2008). 
Monsanto’s link with local cotton industries and researchers enables it to secure the 
quick diffusion of its technology down to the single cotton farmer (Gerard, 2009). In 
addition, in Burkina Faso, the lack of an innovation policy leaves room for informal 
negotiations between Monsanto and the state. Monsanto puts forward the view that its 
technology will benefit mainly poor farmers in BF. With its high quality seed 
production, it intends to alleviate poverty by giving farmers the opportunity to fight 
against poverty and hunger by using fewer resources. (James, 2002; 2009; ISAAA, 
2006; Gross, 2007; Traore, 2011). In the light of this, one might conclude that 
Monsanto’s aims have a strong philanthropic element. 
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However, the data in Burkina Faso suggests that the reality is more complicated. For 
instance, Monsanto technology is licensed at a high price (Shiva, 2001; 2003), which 
has introduced a major new and non-agricultural element to traditional cotton 
production in Burkina Faso (Benbrook et al., 2000; Tiendrebeogo, 2006). As stated by 
one interviewee farmer, “We have to buy it at a very high price because of Monsanto 
royalties as the owner.” (Interviewee#15).  
 
Industry interviewees in general were not willing to provide data on the amount earned 
by Monsanto from its Bt cotton technology, but a local newspaper gave the following 
details: 
 
The negotiations have been done between Monsanto in collaboration with 
researchers […] where Burkina Faso is getting the most important profit. 60% 
for farmers, 28% for Monsanto, 12% for research and industries for farmers 
training” (Burkina Biotech Association, 2008:1). 
 
This was contested by one of the interviewees: 
 
Monsanto, in any case is not going to lose, when they told you [you=me, the 
researcher] we are gaining, it is just a fake information, you can see by 
yourself …[If] this would have been true and all cotton farmers will be driving 
motorbikes” (Interviewee#26).  
 
According to Monsanto spokesman Traore, the cost of the insecticide that farmers 
normally use needs to be included in the cost of the technology. One farmer gives here 
a very clear calculation on what Monsanto earns as the owner of the technology.   
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For the seeds, it is charging the same price for Bollgard (the toxin) as in South 
Africa, that is to say $60/25kg or 60x540=1296CFA. The cost for 1ha is 
1296x36= 46556/ha. For the IPRs, it is charging the same taxes for Bollgard 
applied in US, $99/ha, or 540x99=53460CFA/ha. [Then] Seeds cost and IPRs 
combined give 53460+46556=100016CFA/ha. In addition to the other 
expenses in inputs, the total amount is 199015+100016= 299031CFA/ha. As 
we can see only the seeds cost increase 1ha cotton growth at 98246CFA more 
than the conventional cotton (Interview#21).  
 
These figures give a clear indication that the new technology is significantly more 
costly for the farmer, to the extent that it is largely out of reach of the poorest farmers, 
who were paraded in the early stages as one of the beneficiary groups of the new 
technology, while healthy profits for Monsanto look assured. 
 
7.7.2. The Local Cotton Industries’ Benefits from Bt cotton Innovation 
The transition from the conventional cotton ST-System to the Bt cotton ST-System did 
not result in major changes to the pre-existing institutional arrangements (CNRST, 
2007; Gray, 2008). The current private cotton companies inherited the public cotton 
industry whose institutional structure encompassed all of the country’s cotton farmers. 
If the ownership changed with liberalisation, the integrated institutional structure 
remained, only it was now under the monopoly of private industries. The West region 
is dominated by SOFITEX with 80%, the East by SOCOMA with 12% and the Centre 
by Faso Cotton with 8% (CNRST, 2007). These industries have a monopoly on 
farmers’ loans, insecticides and chemical input supply (Gray, 2008). A technical agent 
from SOFITEX confirms that: “Everything used in cotton cultivation: seeds, 
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insecticides, chemical inputs etc. are lent by the industry to the farmers” 
(Interview#24). For instance: 
These small groups [of farmers] will evaluate their financial needs and they 
will get a loan from the cotton industry. This money will be distributed 
between them as well as chemical inputs and insecticides. The procedure of 
selling their cotton is an internal process agreed between them [UNPC-B 
(Farmers) and APPRO-B (industries)] (Interview#18).  
 
Farmers’ needs are evaluated with the support of technical assistants employed by the 
cotton companies for this purpose and are then reported to the companies which 
borrow the appropriate amount of money required for cotton production during the 
season for the input (cotton seeds, insecticides, and chemicals), so they act as sole 
input providers to farmers. Farmers have the obligation, based on their agreement with 
the cotton companies, to sell all their cotton to them. The loans (chemicals input, 
seeds, insecticides) are deducted from the income from the cotton that they sell to the 
companies at the harvest. Even if a farmer does not harvest anything because of lack 
of appropriate rain, he still has to pay the required amount, so whatever the harvest, 
the cotton industries do not lose their income stream. The field work revealed that the 
companies are also maximising profits by forbidding farmers to make any local use of 
the cotton. The agreement made with conventional cotton, to sell all their cotton 
including the seeds to the cotton companies, was sustained with Bt cotton arrival.  
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A former SOFITEX director, Celestin Tiendrebeogo, confirmed an additional reason 
for the cotton industries making great profits with Bt cotton, because they are 
spending less on imported insecticides. In his words: 
[Bt was] a real alternative, a very big change; this upcoming technology would 
save the huge amount of money spent annually on insecticides which is about 
30 billion CFA; 20 billion for chemicals and 10 billion for insecticides. If 
SOFITEX is interested, it is because it constitutes an alternative for insect 
control. (Tiendrebeogo, 2006: 234) 
In addition, another leading actor confirms that: 
We found it has many advantages, its quality, more white, it does not have any 
insects’ attack. Visually, when one look at both, Bt cotton is more white. So 
this is one advantage for the companies on the world market with less seeds 
weight meaning more fibre and less weight. (Interview#12) 
 
Hence, from the big producers’ point of view, the new ST-System maintained their 
monopolistic advantages, while Bt cotton, the new artefact, added value through lower 
costs and a better, more saleable product. 
 
7.7.3. Cotton Producers’ Benefits from Bt cotton Innovation 
In the ST-System of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso, the farmers represent the weakest link 
in terms of producer benefits, power and influence. The institutional arrangement of 
the national cotton market subordinates farmers to the cotton industries (Kaminski et 
al., 2009). Although this is the general picture, some differences exist between large 
and small scale farmers. In general, the large scale farmers benefit from having 
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representation at the different level of the national cotton farmers’ organisations 
(Gray, 2008). The National Union of Farmers (UNPC-B) and the cotton industries 
together form the inter-professional association of Cotton Producers of Burkina Faso 
(AIC-B) (Interview#12). A general analysis of the benefits for the farmers is first 
undertaken, and then examined separately for large farmers representing 1% and small 
scale farmers representing 99%. 
 
Historically, farmers are organised in GPC (village teams to receive credits, inputs 
loans etc. from the industries), then they are organised at departmental level to UDPC 
(Departmental Union of Cotton Producers) then UPPC (Provincial Union of Cotton 
Producers) and finally at the top UNPC-B (the National Union of Cotton Producers). 
Some of these representatives enjoy relationships which allow them to benefit from 
opportunities to travel and attend conferences, for example, rather than from the cotton 
itself.  The analysis of the farmers’ benefits includes two aspects: economic and health 
benefits.  
 
First, although the benefits from the trials appear tangible and relevant, in reality they 
remain questionable for farmers. For instance, despite the benefits that farmers 
recognise from the reduction of insecticide use, which means energy and time saving 
in addition to less toxic exposure, the high price of Bt cotton seeds which is about 5 
times more than that of conventional seeds ($55 for Bt as opposed to $12 for 
conventional) means that the saving from the reduced cost of insecticides is less than 
the money spent on Bt seeds. Below is a detailed picture drawn by an activist farmer 
in Burkina Faso during a conference: 
 
We are opposed to GMOs for several obvious reasons. The first reason is the 
catastrophic economic impact that the adoption of GMOs has had on farmers. 
The increase in the cost of the seed, from 1600 FCFA [24 Euros/34 USD] per 
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hectare for conventional seeds last year to 54000 FCFA [82 Euros/115 USD] 
per hectare for GM seeds this year, is not accompanied by increasing yield as 
was promised. Worse, the Bt cotton produces fewer seeds than the 
conventional variety, and is thus two times lighter in weight for the same 
output of fibre. Thus, peasant farmers, who are paid by the weight of their 
harvest, are the losers, whereas SOFITEX is the winner. 
To take a concrete example: a truck full of conventional fibre weighed about 
12 tons and generated 1.8 million FCFA [2748 euros] in revenue for the 
farmers. This same truck today, filled with the same amount of fibre, but from 
GM cotton, weighs 6 tons [50% less] and generates 900 000 FCFA [1374 
euros, 50% less] for the farmers. This has caused significant financial losses 
for farmers during the first harvest of Bt cotton. Indebted farmers may have to 
sell their land, which will likely be bought by multinationals for monoculture 
export or bio-fuel. (Tiendrebeogo, 2011:12) 
 
These outcomes signal a significant change at the agricultural, economic and social 
levels for small, local farmers, and not all of these changes will figure in cost-benefit 
calculations in relation to the introduction of Bt cotton. 
 
Additionally, farmers and technical agents in Burkina Faso recognise that with Bt 
cotton, although they use less insecticides, they have to spend more on chemical input 
compared with conventional cotton. A farmers’ representative said that “Bt cotton is 
more demanding, It is like a lady with twins, she needs to eat more in order to produce 
milk” (Interviewee#27). With respect to these realities, it is important to underline that 
the total cost of the chemical inputs used for Bt cotton is greater than for conventional 
cotton. This will make the total expense higher than what is claimed by proponents of 
Bt cotton. However, large scale farmers who are often members of UNPC-B 
appreciate Bt cotton because of benefits which appear unrelated to cotton growth. An 
activist has criticised the way UNPC-B farmers have advantages and privileges due to 
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their position and sometimes do not defend the cotton farmers, but their individual 
interests, as demonstrates in the following quote:  
 
[W]hat is deplorable is the coalition between [UNPC-B and Cotton Industries] 
we always tell him [name] that this is not good, they are two different 
structures and he has to look at the research and judge good or bad and then 
make his own decision […] and they are in coalition. [name] is driving a 
special car, a cotton farmer, you can understand […] (Interview#29). 
 
An article published by the Burkinabè daily paper SIDWAYA, n° 6923 (Audet, 2011) 
shows that farmers do not speak the same language and that the loyalty of the national 
union representatives towards the other farmers is questionable. 
 
7.7.4. Cotton Researchers’ Benefits from Bt cotton 
A key actor among researchers who followed the process of Bt cotton introduction in 
Burkina Faso clarified the benefits for researchers in relation to this scientific project 
when he said: 
Capacity building was one important condition for this technology to be 
accepted. Training first: From this they trained a certain number of researchers 
for the use of the technology such as isolating the DNA and reintroducing it. 
Now what was missing is to include this aspect, and it is because I was fighting 
for this that I’m not in the circle! Yes, I was fighting for this capacity building, 
unfortunately those who were there and had the power of the research did not 
understand this and it wasn’t well developed. Otherwise, normally at the end of 
the experimentation we need to have land, infrastructure, a laboratory with 
adequate equipment which will allow us to cut the DNA and stock it but 
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people let this opportunity evaporate. Me, even the training of researchers by 
Monsanto, I found it very quiet (Interview#1) 
After the event, then, of the introduction of Bt cotton as an innovative technology, 
many researchers seem not to have achieved any sustainable gain from Bt cotton at the 
time of writing up this thesis. These findings confirm earlier work by (Dowd-Uribe, 
2011 and Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr, 2016). In contrast, some researchers who were 
collaborating with cotton industries for a long time in order to improve the quality of 
the cotton crop have been transformed into technicians by the arrival of Bt cotton. The 
benefits for researchers are more individual and limited to a few people who received 
training abroad at Monsanto’s laboratory in USA. There is less profit for research 
institutes from a long term-perspective, and research institutes remain without 
appropriate tools for local biotechnology research. This reveals a lack of development 
of the independent research capacity in relation to cotton necessary for further 
research in the field of biotechnology. 
 
Finally, at regional and international level, Burkina Faso became a key passage point 
for biotechnology in the sub-region (Zoungrana, 2011). First of all, the country has 
been shown to be the first to have rules and regulations in biotechnology with respect 
to GM in West Africa, therefore, the country is considered as being more experienced 
than other countries. Second, Burkina Faso became a source of knowledge and 
learning for other neighbouring countries (ibid). For instance, farmers from Mali came 
to Burkina Faso to witness biotechnology cotton cultivation in 2006 (ISAAA, 2006; 
2012). Researchers, policy makers, and civil society actors from Europe and Africa 
have been visiting Burkina Faso because of its Bt cotton. In 2006, national and 
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international visitors came along to see Bt cotton farms. For them, ‘seeing is 
believing’ (ISAAA, 2006). According to a State representative “Burkina Faso is very 
experienced and in advance compared to the neighbouring countries, in fact, by the 
time they realise that they are late, we [the country] are already far away” 
(Interview#31).  
Another researcher highlighted that:  
 
ABNE [African Bio-safety Network of Expertise] in Burkina is a result of the 
adoption of Bt cotton making the country the first in West Africa. For them 
they can benefit from the country’s experiences and expertise in biotechnology 
(Interview#34) 
 
Burkina Faso’s experience led to the NEPAD Bio-safety Network of Expertise being 
located in the country. 
 
When it was decided that it will be put in West Africa, automatically, the most 
technologically advanced centre has been chosen, in this part of Africa it is 
Burkina Faso, because it was and is the first country in the sub region which 
has grown and commercialised biotechnology products. It makes sense for the 
agency to be here (Interview#34). 
 
7.8. Implication of Bt cotton adoption in Burkina Faso  
The story of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso raises important questions about the quality of 
conventional cotton and the position that the country occupied on the world market 
with conventional cotton productivity and commercialisation. The exclusive “focus on 
pest mitigation contrasts sharply with the Francophone West African breeding 
programs, which spent decades integrating a broad spectrum of adaptability to 
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growing conditions alongside multiple characteristics of ﬁbre quality” (Dowd-Uribe 
and Schnurr (2016:10). In effect, by solving the problem of insect damage to Bt 
cotton, another problem was created, namely one where the high quality and yield of 
conventional cotton was compromised. Recent studies conducted by David L. 
Tschirley, Colin Poulton, and Patrick Labaste (2009) and Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr 
(2016) showed that one of the most important traits distinguishing cotton from West 
African from others is the ‘quality’ of its fibre and the fact that cotton is manually 
picked. These qualities had put the country among the top cotton producers in West 
Africa and in Africa more generally. Since the introduction of Bt cotton Burkina Faso 
is losing its leading role as one of top cotton producers because although Bt cotton 
requires less pesticides its fibres are shorter and less desirable than the long, uniform 
fibres of conventional cotton. Yields are also variable because conventional cotton has 
been designed for local weather conditions and is more drought resistant than Bt 
cotton. 
 As Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr report (2016: 6)  
 
Burkinabè cultivars [conventional cotton] are the product of decades of careful 
breeding that has resulted in premium cotton ﬁbres, which are long, strong, and 
uniform. These traits are highly sought after for the production of high-end 
textiles and fetch a premium on the global market. The second reason why 
Burkinabè cotton ﬁbre is of such high quality stems from it being hand-picked, 
which ensures that the ﬁbre is free of other organic matter. 
 
Such qualities have given Burkinabè cotton not only an international reputation but 
also and most importantly a premium price. As shown in graph 9, the price of 
conventional cotton was quite high between 2004 and 2005, when Bt cotton was being 
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trialled in the country and despite issues related to insect damage, sold well on the 
international market compared to previous years.  
The quality of Burkinabè conventional cotton is the result of a “very successful 
breeding programme that has spanned almost seventy years” (Dowd-Uribe and 
Schnurr, 2016:6). The “cultivation of breeding techniques began by ICRT which 
became part of the French agricultural research organization, CIRAD, in1984, and was 
eventually absorbed into national research institutes [such as the National Centre for 
Science and Technology (CNRST)]. The main goal of the ICRT-CIRAD breeding 
programme was to create cultivars that were well adapted to the growing conditions in 
West Africa” (Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr, 2016: 6-7).  They clearly highlighted that 
between the “1970s and 2006/7, the average ginning ratio for Burkinabè cotton 
increased from 36 to 42 percent [which is] the distinguishing feature that made them 
more competitive in the global market” (Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr, 2016: 7). The 
percentage of Burkinabè cotton which has been classiﬁed as longer than this 
benchmark rose from 20 percent in 1995/6 to 80 percent of total cotton production in 
2005/2006 (Tschirley, Poulton, and Labaste, 2009). 
 
The arrival of Bt cotton seemed to solve the problem regarding insect damage, but 
created other problems such as the poorer quality of the fibre when compared with 
conventional cotton, which suggests that adopting Bt cotton could jeopardize Burkina 
Faso’s advantage in the world cotton market.  
 
7.9. Outcome of the Implementation and Interaction of Both (NIS and Bt Cotton) 
Projects in Burkina Faso 
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As demonstrated above, in the adoption of the Bt cotton innovation in the agricultural 
sector in Burkina Faso, the NIS diffusion tool was undermined by the involved actors 
through their behaviour in network building and their interaction. As a result of that 
the outcome for actors remains the same with Bt cotton as with conventional cotton. 
Indeed, despite the fact that Bt cotton was a new technology in the sector, the system 
in place remained the old conventional cotton system with the same behaviour and 
inequality in the distribution of benefits. The following statement from an interviewee 
explains this fact. For him, “[...] As you know the cotton sector has already been well 
organised and everything has been set, it is integrated through Training and Visits 
innovation diffusion strategies.” (Interview#10). As will be shown below, this idea of 
‘well organised’ is in fact apparent, because compared with the dynamics in other 
areas of agriculture the cotton sector is using an inefficient approach in relation to the 
advances in innovation diffusion approaches. In terms of returns, as for the 
conventional cotton, Bt cotton benefits were distributed among involved actors 
following their position in the system of actors; because, as described above, it is the 
‘Training and Visits’ approach, put in place from the end of the 1980s, which shapes 
the outcome for Bt cotton. An officer at the Permanent Secretary for cotton growth in 
Burkina Faso has clearly stated the above claim. For him,  
 
You know, in fact, the case of cotton is particular. As a cash crop, the cotton 
sector has been consistent with its organisational framework. Such a 
framework which was adopted in the 1980s, remains dominant until now. You 
see the way farmers are organised, the way they [farmers] and the industries 
and the researchers work together is something which was built since that time 
and it still is now [...] (Interview#17)   
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As the findings show, the role of the state in such a system has not facilitated an 
equitable benefit distribution. If the technical environment had shifted, the human 
environment remained the same and it could not generate a better outcome for those 
who did not have a better position before, even with a new technology. With the 
exception of the regulatory framework adoption due to the fact that the technology (Bt 
cotton) calls for caution, the entire previous picture of actors’ relationships remains the 
same. In conclusion the study has shown that as at policy level, the NIS diffusion tool 
has failed to be diffused at operational level.  
 
Several different reasons can help explain this situation. First of all, the full 
implementation of the NIS diffusion tool at operational level did not come after its 
introduction at policy level. That is to say, in Burkina Faso, when the innovation 
approach left the niche level, it can either simultaneously or successively be adopted at 
both policy and operational levels. As the results have shown, when the NIS diffusion 
tool was looking for windows of opportunity at policy level, Training and Visits’ 
approach was still being implemented at operational level with Bt cotton innovation. 
At the same time, in other areas in agriculture sector, it was the Multi-Actors Platform 
approach which was implemented. My research findings suggest that this latter 
evolved from the ‘Training and Visits’ approach, through ‘farming system’ approach. 
In effect, considering advances in innovation diffusion approach the cotton sector was 
stuck with traditional approaches. 
   
The second reason of the failure of NIS policy tool diffusion at operational level, as is 
shown through the different shift in innovation approaches in Parts two, is that the NIS 
policy tool is itself an innovation; it is a diffusion tool which does not have any pre-
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existing national or local root. Such a diffusion tool completely broke with the old 
approaches to innovation diffusion implemented in Burkina Faso before the 2000s. As 
a result, its success would be a matter of completely uprooting the old successive 
diffusion approaches in order to settle on a totally new one. Such a reality has 
contributed to making the diffusion of the NIS policy tool unsuccessful, because of the 
lack of attention to the type of implementation actions needed to embed and develop 
it.  
 
However, the Multi-Actor Platform, the improved form of ‘Training and Visits’ 
approach, contained elements of continuity from previous approaches, and was 
therefore more in line with the implementation activities taking place. It was an 
improvement over – rather than a direct replacement of old approaches to innovation 
diffusion already known in Burkina Faso, which gave it more credibility when 
compared to the NIS diffusion tool, which lacked history in Burkina Faso context. 
Additionally, the promoters of the Multi-Actor Platform approach were established in 
the agricultural sector, and had more secure funding. Analysis of the policy document 
shows that it was one considered as the tool for the implementation of the innovation.  
 
The NIS policy tool attempted a diffusion strategy that goes from policy level to 
operational level, whereas the Multi-Actor Platform approach was established at 
operational level, and then took advantage of the position of its promoters at policy 
level to negotiate its adoption as a general framework for innovation diffusion in all 
sectors. Thus, the intended introduction of the NIS policy tool did not intersect as 
much as hoped with the original cotton innovation system and did not disrupt older 
research and training systems either. 
 315 
 
7. 10. Conclusion 
This Chapter has analysed the adoption process and implementation of Bt cotton in 
order to highlight the ways from which the Bt cotton innovation diffusion in Burkina 
Faso challenge the existing NIS diffusion tool. In other is has examine the underlying 
innovation diffusion approach which is used in such processes and the outcome 
derived from such diffusion approach and Bt cotton innovation. What emerges is that 
the NIS diffusion tool did not manage to displace the existing innovation diffusion 
approach in cotton sector in order to establish itself as the new approach which would 
increase productivity through new innovation implementation strategies (NIS policy 
tool). The ‘Training and Visits’ approach which has been used for more than two 
decades remains the most dominant approach with Bt cotton. Therefore, similarly to 
the case of integrated approach around cash crop in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.2), this 
approach builds strong links between technical agents, researchers and pilot farmers. 
Sometimes farmers’ proposals are not well transmitted to researchers by the 
intermediary technical support agent. This aspect has seen some improvement with the 
Bt cotton innovation. The conclusion of all these has shown that it was not the NIS 
diffusion tool which informed Bt cotton implementation but instead an old approach to 
innovation which emerged at the end of the 1980s known as ‘Training and Visits’. 
 
Finally, at the time of the submission of this thesis, in early 2016, Bt cotton was 
abandoned by Burkina Faso. At that time, the country counted totally 7 years of 
commercialization and more than 10 years in Bt cotton implementation. The main 
reason found from published papers and local as well as international newspapers, is 
related to the quality of the fibre which is not competitive on the world market 
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compare to the conventional one. According to Dowd-Uribe, and Schnurr, (2016), 
there is a decline concerning the length of the cotton fiber which “has undermined the 
reputation of Burkinabè cotton and cut into its value on the international market. 
When coupled with the decline in overall lint due to the lower ginning ratio, the 
inferior quality characteristics of the Bt cultivars have compromised the economic 
position of Burkinabè cotton companies.” (Dowd-Uribe, and Schnurr, 2016: Online). 
Burkina Faso which was spearheading of transgenic cotton in West Africa has decided 
to return this year to the conventional cotton. In addition, local news also revealed that 
the industry is suing Monsanto ($84 million) for compensation toward lost and 
damage caused by its technology. However, to my point of view the technical aspect 
of this reversal may not be actually the fundamental reason that has led Burkina Faso 
to abandon Bt cotton because, the adoption of the Bt cotton was not actually technical; 
as the data from Chapter 6 can show. Indeed, there was a functional conventional 
cotton system and the outcome in terms of productivity and economic gain were 
steady before Bt cotton (Chapter 6). It appears to me that the reason for the suspension 
of Bt cotton could be political instead of technical. Recent intervention of policy 
makers on the matter reveals that Burkina Faso hasn’t abandon the Bt cotton; instead, 
it suspended its growth for the time being in order to push further the reflexion 
through research, said the SOFITEX director early this year in local newspapers. Thus, 
this current trend on cotton growth in Burkina Faso remains very interesting and open 
up new research paths to investigate.  
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Chapter 8: General Conclusion 
Policy makers around the world are pressed, in the context of knowledge-centred 
development policy, to look for the best tools for knowledge-oriented development 
strategies, as part of a strategy to bring benefits to the majority of the population. This 
is true for less-developed countries as much as it is for more economically developed 
countries. Over time, the NIS policy tool has gained popularity in policy circles. 
However, only a few studies have examined the diffusion of the NIS as a policy tool. 
This thesis is among the first to have looked at it in the context of an African country.  
 
The thesis argued that changes to the policy framework for innovation diffusion in 
Burkina Faso were poorly implemented, resulting in a failure to achieve key goals in 
relation to technological developments in the cotton sector, and also failed to bring 
about significant improvements for the majority of the people involved with and 
reliant on the cotton industry for their livelihood. In order to establish the efficacy of 
innovation diffusion policy, two projects were investigated - the NIS inspired policy 
framework; and the Bt cotton innovation system – in order to assess how and to what 
extent they facilitated development in Burkina Faso at both strategic policy and 
operational levels. In particular it set the aim to: 
 investigate the introduction, development and implementation of a National 
Innovation Systems (NIS) for innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso, 
 demonstrate the application of the NIS with particular reference to the cotton 
industry, prior to 2003, 
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 investigate the introduction of Bt cotton, as a case study of an attempt to 
address the shortcomings of the existing innovation system, and innovate it.  
 evaluate the outcome of the implementation and interaction of both projects in 
Burkina Faso 
The findings established that the implementation of the NIS policy for innovation 
diffusion for socio-economic development in Burkina Faso was shaped by local actors 
competing for control of financial resources and power positions. The new tool also 
had to compete with older, more familiar tools. In the end, it failed to bring about the 
expected improvements in policy design and practice at sectoral level, with negative 
consequences for the expected benefits for those most in need of assistance in that 
sector. 
 
The thesis takes Burkina Faso and its cotton industry as a case study to investigate the 
implementation of the NIS as a policy tool. Policy makers in Burkina Faso saw the 
NIS policy tool as an opportunity to improve living conditions in their country. In 
2006, a project was developed by both the FRSIT (representing the government) and 
the IRDC with the aim to introduce the NIS as a policy tool in government practice in 
order to improve what this thesis refers to as the existing NIS of the country. As 
demonstrated, methodologically, the study of the introduction of the NIS as a policy 
tool cannot be limited to the investigation of its diffusion at the strategic level. One 
also needs to take into account the appropriation of such a policy tool at the 
operational level. From this perspective, it was therefore important, regardless of the 
state of the diffusion of the NIS policy tool at strategic level, to study its diffusion at 
operational level, which in this case is the agricultural sector in general and the 
cultivation of Bt cotton in particular. These two levels shared the same niche, namely 
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the Forum for Scientific Research and Technological Innovation, (FRSIT), the place 
within which the NIS policy tool was tried out and from which it was diffused.  
 
Based on a broader definition of technology that covers social technologies, this thesis 
used the ST-Systems analytical concept to examine the diffusion (or not) of the NIS. 
This conceptual framework was operationalized through a qualitative approach 
involving ethnographic methods for the data collection and analysis. This thesis found 
that the introduction of the NIS as an innovation diffusion tool did not manage to 
create a new and sufficiently favorable socio-technical system capable of improving 
the living conditions of the population in Burkina Faso. These findings emerged from 
a detailed study of the country-specific process of the appropriation of the NIS at both 
the strategic policy design level and the operational level through the case of Bt cotton 
innovation system. Based on a broader definition of technology that covers social 
technologies, this thesis used the ST-Systems analytical concept to examine the 
diffusion (or not) of the NIS. This conceptual framework was operationalized through 
a qualitative approach involving ethnographic methods for the data collection and 
analysis. 
 
8.1. Policy level  
As shown in Chapter 5, the full implementation of the NIS did not happen at policy 
level. One key aspect which hindered such institutionalization was the fact that 
conflicts between researchers from CNRST and Universities resulted in institutional 
changes and the removal of the NIS policy tool promoters from their posts within the 
system. When considering the content of the National Science and Innovation policy, 
there is little evidence to support the claim that the NIS tool was used by policy 
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makers in the design of policies. Although the creation of the Ministry of Scientific 
Research and Innovation on the 16th of January 2011 is a result of significant changes 
at institutional level following the NIS policy tool adoption, the text in the ministry 
policy documents indicate that the NIS tool for innovation diffusion has not informed 
the policy design. One explanation of this failure is the exclusion from FRIST of the 
national team at FRSIT, the members of which had been involved in the learning 
processes for the transfer of the NIS policy tool to Burkina Faso. They would have had 
policy proposals based on the NIS policy tool. However, their exclusion was a 
contributory factor leading to the tool not being adopted. Indeed, the new actors who 
took over the lead of the Ministry wanted to promote another well-funded approach - 
known as innovation platform - that they were implementing even before they joined 
the ministry. This conflict is a continuation of a deeper long-standing conflict between 
university and research centre scholars. It was an important factor in shaping the NIS 
policy tool adoption in Burkina Faso. Consequently, the NIS initially adopted as a tool 
for innovation diffusion in Burkina Faso was not diffused as it should have been, as 
individual interests took over the country’s socio-economic development.  
 
To understand such processes at the operational level, there was a need to go back to 
the policy level and see how the NIS policy tool was adopted. Indeed, the findings 
show that the NIS policy tool has not been fully institutionalized at policy level. Its 
diffusion at policy level had failed. In the diffusion process, the national team’s 
strategy was to involve policy makers. These policy makers were therefore invited to 
take part in a range of different activities in order to encourage them to become 
interested in the policy tool and then play an active role in the diffusion network 
process, in contrast with previous processes involving the diffusion of innovation 
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policy, where policy makers had played a passive role. The national team at FRSIT 
was aware of this necessity to create conditions for the active involvement of the 
relevant actors, as a result of their own learning process at niche level. Policy makers 
were key components. Such involvement aimed to sensitize decision makers to take 
appropriate decisions and to facilitate the flow of knowledge between the different 
actors involved in innovation. Within this framework, policy makers were considered 
as the creators of a favorable social and political context in which actors could 
network appropriately in a formal way (Geels and Kemp, 2007). Therefore, the 
national team strategy was to involve them in order to encourage their collaboration 
with the other relevant actors.  
 
The outcome of the diffusion process at policy level was the creation, on the 16th of 
January 2011, of the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation (MRSI). The 
focus on this new dimension of ‘innovation’ became important following the activities 
around the NIS tool at niche level by the national team at FRSIT. The creation of the 
new Ministry is intrinsically linked to the CNRST’s aim to give more visibility to 
research and innovation activities in Burkina Faso and to optimize the results of 
scientific research and inventions. As demonstrated in Chapter 5 (section, 5.3.3) there 
is a clear similarity between the objectives of FRSIT, which played the role of niche 
for the NIS policy tool, and the MRSI. The influence of such a tool on the 
organizational design of the Ministry (MRSI) is clear. The FRSIT’s function was 
being generalized in the MRSI to make a national framework for innovation and 
research 
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When considering the content of the National Science and Innovation policy, there is 
little evidence to support the claim that the NIS has been used by policy makers in the 
design of policies, although significant changes in the vocabulary (policy languages or 
texts) could give the impression that the NIS policy tool has informed the policy 
design. The presence of key words such as ‘innovation’, ‘national research and 
innovation systems’, ‘innovation systems’, ‘science and innovation policy’, 
‘intellectual property rights’, undoubtedly contrasts with wording in previous policy 
documents on science policy and innovation approaches.  
 
However, on further examination, it is hard to reconstruct a complete policy 
framework which reflects the underlying assumptions of the NIS framework. As the 
analysis in Chapter 5 attests, the diffusion of the NIS policy tool has failed.  
 
This failure to adopt the NIS as a policy tool for innovation diffusion is the result of 
complex factors. One of them is linked to a lack of understanding by the actors who 
took the lead in the diffusion process at the MRSI. They excluded the national team at 
FRSIT which had been involved in the learning processes for the transfer of the NIS 
policy tool in Burkina Faso. This national team would have had policy proposals 
based on the NIS framework. In contrast, the new actors who took over the lead did 
not really understand fully the idea behind the NIS policy tool that needed to be 
promoted, so they were unable to carry out their mission successfully. This limited 
knowledge of this policy tool by the new actors in the ministry (MRSI) was an 
important factor in shaping the NIS adoption as a policy tool in Burkina Faso.  
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Another factor which hindered the full implementation of the NIS tool at policy level 
was financial. This appears to be more or less the case for all sectors in the country. A 
relevant factor was that the country had been for a long time – and still is – under an 
authoritarian regime, and had been strongly dependent on external financial support 
from international institutions. The dependence of the State on external funding for the 
implementation of its development policies constituted an obstacle for previous 
approaches as it did for the NIS policy tool for innovation diffusion. When the funding 
for the NIS ended in 2011, a competing approach named ‘Multi-Actor Platform 
approach for innovation’, which emerged around the same time as the NIS tool in 
Burkina Faso, was thriving. This competing approach (Multi-Actor Platform) was and 
is regularly well-funded by international agencies such as FARA; whereas the NIS 
funding from IDRC finished.  
 
Another factor which helps to explain the displacement of the NIS tool in favour of the 
Multi-Actor Platform -at policy level- is that in contrast to the NIS tool, the Multi-
Actor Platform diffusion approach has been adopted and directly implemented at an 
operational level by the Agricultural and Environmental Research Institute (INERA). 
Such an approach was therefore well known by the new actors at the Ministry who 
were members of this Research Institute before the creation of the Ministry. The 
approach focused more on the agricultural sector.   
 
8.2. Operational Level  
  
Several different reasons can help to explain the failure of the diffusion of the NIS tool 
for innovation diffusion at operational level. First of all, the full implementation of the 
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NIS policy tool for innovation diffusion at operational level did not happen after the 
failure to adopt it at policy level. That is to say, in Burkina Faso, when the innovation 
approach left the niche level, it could either simultaneously or successively be adopted 
at both policy and operational levels. As the results have shown, when the NIS tool 
was looking for windows of opportunity at policy level the Training and Visits 
approach was still being implemented at the operational level with Bt cotton 
innovation.  
 
The second reason of the failure of the diffusion of the NIS tool at the operational 
level, as is shown through the different shift in innovation approaches in Parts two and 
three, is that the NIS tool is itself an innovation; it is an approach which does not have 
any pre-existing national or local root. Such a framework completely broke with the 
old approaches to innovation implemented in Burkina Faso before the 2000s. As a 
result, its success would be a matter of completely uprooting the old successive 
approaches in order to settle on a totally new one. Such a reality has contributed to 
making the diffusion of the NIS tool for innovation diffusion unsuccessful, because of 
the lack of attention to the type of implementation actions needed to embed and 
develop this approach.  
 
By focusing on the agricultural sector, the Multi-Actor Platform diffusion approach 
not only took advantage of the regular funding of the sector, but also benefited from 
an already established socio-technical network.  The NIS tool funding, which was 
fully supported by the IDRC, ended in 2011; a key time when finances were needed to 
enable its adopters and experimenters to take control of the newly created MRSI. In 
doing so, these adopters and experimenters of the NIS tool would have built 
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appropriate innovation policies in line with the NIS framework. Furthermore, as 
explained in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.4), in Burkina Faso many development projects do 
not have sustainable follow-up support at the end of the funding period. Most of the 
time, when a funding grant finishes, its supported project ends without further action 
being taken by the national actors to keep it alive. To an extent this is what happened 
with the NIS policy tool. Nevertheless, such a tool would not have survived even if 
funding had not ceased. Continued funding would have helped, but that alone would 
have been insufficient to ensure the widespread diffusion and use of the NIS tool. 
Finally, the long standing conflict between the public universities (University of 
Ouagadougou and its branches) and the public research centre (CNRST with its four 
institutes), whose members are key actors in the design and implementation of 
development policies, was another crucial problem which impacted on the full 
diffusion of the NIS tool. Such a conflict, detailed in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.4), 
militated against the NIS policy tool diffusion. Instead it helped the Multi-Actor 
Platform to become the most widely used approach in the agriculture sector. In fact, 
actors involved in the Multi-Actor Platform were exclusively from the CNRST and 
were also leaders of the new MRSI which was created exclusively for researchers. 
FRSIT which was a niche for both researchers and teaching researchers lost its power 
as permanent secretary to become a small department of the MRSI. The NIS policy 
tool initial actors were thus excluded from vital policy making circles.  
 
8.3. Some reflection on the NIS Tool compare to Previous Diffusion Approaches 
From this study one of the possible questions would be weather technically the NIS 
tool for innovation diffusion is capable of being more effective than the previous ones.  
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Based on the above findings, I am inclined to support an affirmative view for several 
reasons:   
 
Indeed, I believe that potentially, the NIS tool is more comprehensive for the diffusion 
of innovation when compared to the integrated approach around cash crops, Training 
and Visits, and even to the more recently used approaches such as Farming Systems 
and Multi-Actor Platform.  Drawing from Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, the following 
compares the different diffusion approaches.  
 
 Table 15: comparison of previous and existing innovation diffusion approaches with NIS tool 
 
 Components Potential for participation Wealth creation from 
Knowledge47 
Innovation diffusion 
approaches  
 
Government 
(role)  
University 
(role) 
Firms (role)  
 
1 2 
 
 
3 4 5 6 
Top-Down    
 
X No participation  
 
 X     
Top-Down 
Bottom-Up  
  
 
X Limited participation  X     
                                                 
47 1-Enterpreneurs trying to create new start-up businesses that deploy knowledge in new ways; 
2- Managers in established businesses trying to improve productivity through the effective application of new knowledge and who are also concerned with the ‘re-invention’ of the business 
through a form of corporate entrepreneurship;  
3-R&D managers in the public and private sectors trying to improve the take-up of knowledge created in their groups;  
4-Knowledge intensive business service providers trying to build a business through enabling connections and flows within the knowledge system;  
 
 
5-Governement policy agents at local, regional and national level charged with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the innovation system;  
6-Supply chain ‘owners’ concerned to upgrade the system-level efficiency and effectiveness of their networks through innovation.  
 
 Farming 
Systems  
  
 
X Participative  X  X   
Multi-Actor 
Platform 
  
 
X Participative  X X X  X 
National 
Innovation 
Systems 
X X X Participatory methods not 
adapted to all settings in 
developing countries 
X X X X X X 
 
‘X’ means that the element exists 
Source: Processed by author from Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
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More specifically, as it appears on the above table, the NIS is an innovation diffusion 
tool in which the role of the government is prominently stated and tested. Many of the 
innovation system scholars made the role of government in innovation dynamics 
explicit (Freeman, 1995). For instance, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the acquisition 
of technology, its use and diffusion involve the government whose role in the system 
is essential. It is clearly set out there that through policymakers, government plays a 
key role by making choices which inform strategies at national level (Freeman, 1987). 
The government is considered as a lead actor which influences through policy and 
institutional design. In addition, governance influences Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) because, “despite their limited size, FDI inflows have had a positive impact, in 
as much as they generated employment in the formal sector and generated local value-
addition” (United Nations, 2009:2). On the other hand, such a flow is supported within 
the framework of government Intellectual Property Right (IPR) regulation; by 
designing the IPR system for the sake of business and government direct scientific 
research such as financing universities, supporting business R&D, “the Government 
has a responsibility to contribute to the formation of the human and social capital 
needed to evaluate, choose, implement and modify foreign technologies” (Feinson, 
2003: 23).  
 
The commitment of the government to provide actors with such a context is thus 
required in order to produce a favourable social and political context for the 
networking of firms and knowledge producers. None of the previous approaches has 
made this explicit as is done in the NIS policy tool.  The wording in the Farming 
Systems and Multi-Actor Platform approaches should not mislead one as to their 
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consideration of this macro level aspect. In neither case is there a comparable 
documentation of the working of the State within the system as there is in the NIS 
framework. An application of the NIS tool for innovation diffusion would have at least 
resulted in the creation of institutions and other resources for which the government is 
the best actor. While the Multi-Actor Platform approach is mentioned in Burkina Faso 
innovation policy, the reality is that this approach unlike the NIS tool has not tested 
and approved the standards and mechanisms of the best ways for government 
intervention in the innovation system.  
 
An application of the NIS would have at least sensitized the government and other 
relevant actors to the need for building research infrastructures; because the NIS 
policy tool for innovation diffusion has demonstrated that domestic resources are key 
to sustainable successful innovation diffusion.  
 
The only aspect around which the NIS tool for innovation diffusion and the previous 
approaches meet is the instrumental role of industry as the user of research results. 
Enterprises/firms/industries are all considered as business actors who are the users of 
the knowledge created by the knowledge producers, from universities and research 
centres (OECD, 1999). As demonstrated by the OECD (1999), business or industry 
does not function alone because government as well as university are all integral parts 
of the system in the innovation process. As for the firms/industries, they are 
considered as business actors: their role is to conduct and support R&D for the 
purpose of developing products for the commercialization. They are those who launch 
the different innovative products and exploit the new scientific discoveries (OECD, 
1999). Even at this industrial level, the NIS policy tool has the potential to do more 
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than the previous approaches. These latter have been developed for economic 
purposes which predate the establishment of the NIS tool; they have not been 
developed mainly for the knowledge economy. The NIS tool to diffuse innovation has 
not only the potential to support manufacturing, but more importantly to generate a 
whole industry around the creation of wealth from knowledge. This weakness of the 
previous approaches is particularly apparent regarding their potential to promote the 
development of a knowledge economy as the NIS policy tool is potentially designed to 
do.   
  
However, due to the local realities where there is a huge inequality between the key 
actors involved in the system in terms of knowledge, skills and even the poverty of the 
broader social context, it is important to adapt the NIS’s communication channels. In 
fact, the NIS could benefit from the other diffusion approaches’ communication 
channels. From this perspective, the NIS tool could learn from the communication 
strategies of previous innovation approaches. For instance, the way in previous 
approaches where participation helped to bring actors with shared interests together 
for a successful innovation diffusion among mainly rural actors in Burkina Faso as 
shown in previous approaches could be exploited while using the NIS policy tool for 
innovation diffusion, should it be generalised in Burkina Faso.  
 
In a favourable socio-technical context, the NIS policy tool could generate better 
outcomes if it was widely understood and diffused with appropriate communication 
strategies from previous approaches. Nevertheless, one should still keep in mind that 
the NIS tool’s outcome depends on the socio-technical environment of its 
implementation. In this respect, the weaknesses of the previous approaches as in the 
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shaping of innovation outcomes in the interest of the weaker actors of the system 
could also occur with the NIS tool. The reason is the socio-technically embedded 
character of any technology. For instance, if innovation is to bring welfare to the 
majority, it needs a democratic society with a strong and well informed civil society to 
play a role of countervailing power against exploitation and bad governance.  
 
8.4. Contributions to the Literature 
A number of studies on the diffusion of NIS have focused on policy design. This 
thesis is not only the first to have looked at this in an African context, but also it goes 
further by empirically investigating its implementation as an innovation diffusion tool 
in Bt cotton adoption including the evaluation of its outcome. Despite its relative 
advantage compared to previous approaches, the NIS tool has failed to displace the old 
innovation diffusion approach (training and visits) in Bt cotton implementation. As 
such, its role in facilitating socio-economic development in Burkina Faso cannot be 
substantiated. Findings show how these two innovation projects, NIS and the Bt 
cotton, proved to be incompatible and incapable of enhancing Burkina Faso’s 
innovation policy. Rather than using and building on each other’s strengths, the two 
projects were prevented from inspiring each other, largely as a result of the way that 
the socio-technical and organisational systems in place in Burkina Faso were set up 
and operated. This suggests a key lesson for developing countries such as Burkina 
Faso in the context of the knowledge-centred development policy, that technological 
innovation is not in itself or necessarily a panacea for development problems. Any 
debate about the relationship between innovation and development has to take into 
account the pattern of socio-technical arrangements within which new technologies 
are to be deployed. This includes social ‘technologies’ such as the NIS policy tool. 
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Second, this thesis is among the first to have studied empirically the transfer processes 
of the NIS framework as an innovation diffusion tool in an African country through a 
case study. Up to now, there have been very few empirical studies of the kind which 
have been reviewed in this thesis. Some studies were undertaken by Cambrosio, 
Limoges and Pronovost (1990) who focused on the way the NIS framework has been 
used to develop science policy implementation in Quebec, Canada, while Albert and 
Caberge (2007) were also interested in the fact that the NIS framework was embedded 
in science policy in Quebec, Canada. Sharif (2009) explores the ways in which the 
NIS framework has shaped innovation policy making in Hong-Kong. Other studies 
investigate the use of the NIS framework as an “analytical tool” in African countries. 
For instance, Ecuru et al., (2012) looked at the NIS as an analytical tool in Uganda, a 
similar focus to that found in the collected Putting Africa first: the making of African 
innovation systems by Mammo Muchie and collaborators (Muchie et al. 2003). 
However, all these empirical studies have only looked the NIS concept at policy 
strategic level. This thesis went beyond to investigate its appropriation at operational 
level in the agricultural sector with a focus on the introduction of Bt cotton. It is also 
important to note that others PhD studies were conducted on Bt cotton innovation in 
Burkina Faso. For instance, Renaudin (2011) compares Bt cotton yield and incomes 
with that of the conventional one by looking at the outcomes of Bt cotton in relation to 
its technical itinerary that farmers do not follow. In addition, Dowd-Uribe (2011) in 
his PhD thesis looked at the agricultural reforms and its outcomes while studying Bt 
cotton in Burkina Faso. This present study is to date unique because it focuses more 
specifically on evaluating the Bt cotton diffusion approach which has played a very 
key role in its outcome.   
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Another theoretical contribution relates to the use in this thesis of the Socio-Technical 
Systems analytical framework promoted by Frank Geels to study a social technology 
of the kind of the NIS policy tool. The few studies which looked at the NIS framework 
as a policy tool have also used other STS approaches such the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) (Sharif, 2009). It has been demonstrated that SCOT is a useful 
framework for the study of the National Innovation Systems as a policy tool, and 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) has also been shown to have some applicability. Sharif 
(2009) considered that Law’s (1992) and Callon’s (1986) analyses are also applicable 
to the innovation systems development tool because they agree that ANT as a 
theoretical lens is used to examine the socio-technical means through which 
agreements are reached during standard making and adoption.  In the same way, 
Cambrosio et al (1990) have used ANT to study the science policy episodes. However, 
this thesis could not use these frameworks because of their unsatisfactory integration 
of the outcomes component in technology diffusion. As a result, it uses the ST-
Systems analytical concept which not only looked at the processes but also the 
acknowledge the outcome derived from such a process. 
 
Finally, another contribution relates to the fact that this thesis is one of the first which 
has studied the implementation of the NIS tool through the case of Bt cotton. Yet, 
from an STS perspective, the diffusion approach used to implement innovations such 
as Bt cotton is important if the innovations are to be successful. As this thesis has 
shown, the unequal distribution of Bt cotton benefit is intrinsically linked to the 
approach used to diffused it.  
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8.5. Research Limitations  
The limitations of this research are related to the fact that this thesis is not restricted to 
the choice of Bt cotton innovation as an innovation for socio-economic development 
as it stands; instead, Bt cotton here only serves to highlight the underlying innovation 
diffusion approach which is used for Bt cotton implementation in the cotton sector. 
Thus, I would like to state that my exclusive intention here is neither to enter into the 
controversy surrounding Bt technology in particular nor the fierce debate around GM 
crops in general, nor, to propose the NIS tool as a best innovation diffusion tool for 
Burkina Faso; but instead, my exclusive concern was to investigate the organisational 
system, which was put in place to implement the NIS as a policy tool for innovation 
diffusion for human development purposes.  
 
Possible future research in relation to my thesis would initially focus on assessing 
more in-depth the weaknesses of the previous and existing approaches to innovation. I 
would like to investigate the communication methods used in these approaches in 
order to improve them and see how they can be used to improve the weaknesses of the 
NIS tool for innovation diffusion (initially conceived for developed countries) in 
context of Burkina Faso. At the same time, the study of these participative methods 
will shed light on how they can be improved and integrated. 
 
Second I am planning to conduct some studies in relation to the strengths of the NIS 
policy tool for innovation diffusion in comparison to the weaknesses of the other 
previous approaches. In doing so, I would like to fully prepare myself to build a clear 
case in support of the NIS policy tool to inform policy makers when there is a more 
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informed debate about the choice of an innovation diffusion tool. I am convinced that 
the NIS tool for innovation diffusion is going to make a comeback in the near future 
with regards to the current trend at policy level in Burkina Faso.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview between 1 to 2 hours  
 
Code of the 
person 
interviewed 
Role and Institutional 
afﬁliation at the time of the 
interview 
Date and 
location of 
interview 
Consent 
type  
Interview # 
1 
Researcher at CNRST 20/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
2 
MRSI Policy maker 20/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
3 
Researcher at University  22/03/2011 Written 
Interview # 
4 
Civil society 23/03/2011 Written 
Interview # 
5 
Small farmer 23/03/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
6 
Small farmer 23/03/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
7  
Researcher CNRST  24/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
8 
Big farmer 24/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
9 
A political official in 
parliament  
26/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
10 
Policy maker  26/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
11 
IDRC adviser 26/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
12 
Big farmer 27/03/2011 Oral  
Interview # 
13 
Policy maker on project NIS 28/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
14 
Policy maker  28/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
15 
Small farmer 29/03/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
16 
President adviser  30/03/2011 Written  
Interview # 
17 
Researcher CNRST  1/04/2011 Written  
Interview # Small farmer 2/04/2011 Oral  
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18 
Interview # 
19 
Ministry advisor  2/04/2011 Written  
Interview 
#20 
Small farmer 3/04/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
21 
Big farmer activist 3/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
22 
Ministry advisor 4/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
23 
Researcher at University 4/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
24 
Activist  4/04/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
25 
Activist  4/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
26 
Small farmer activist 5/04/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
27 
Small farmer 5/04/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
28 
Researcher University  6/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
29 
Activist researcher 7/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
30 
Activist 8/04/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
31 
State representative  9/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
32 
Policy maker parliament  10/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
33 
Small farmer 1 1/04/2011 Oral  
Interview # 
34 
ABNE director 12/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
35 
Small farmer 20/04/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
36 
Big farmer  20/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
37 
Small farmer 20/04/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
38 
Small farmer 20/04/2011 Oral  
Interview # 
39 
Researcher IDRC based in 
Burkina 
21/04/2011 Written  
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Interview # 
40 
Small farmer 22/04/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
41 
Cotton industry 23/04/2011 Written 
Interview # 
42 
Researcher UEMOA 24/01/2011 Written  
Interview # 
43 
Activist  24/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
44 
Cotton industry 25/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
45 
Activist cotton 26/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
46 
Small farmer 26/04/2011 Oral  
Interview # 
47 
IDRC representative 27/04/2011 Oral  
Interview # 
48 
Cotton industry 28/04/2011 Written  
Interview # 
49 
Big farmer 5/05/2011 Written  
Interview # 
50 
Small farmer 5/05/2011 Oral 
Interview # 
51 
Big farmer 5/05/2011 Written  
Interview # 
52 
Research University  10/11/2014 Written  
Interview # 
53 
Researcher CNRST  10/11/2014 Written  
Interview # 
54 
Researcher University 10/11/2014 Written  
Interview # 
55 
Activist cotton 12/11/2014 Written  
Interview # 
56 
Big farmer activist 26/11/2014 Oral  
Interview # 
57 
Big farmer 26/11/2014 Written  
Interview # 
58 
Civil Society Activist 29/11/2014 Written  
Interview # 
59 
ANB  10/12/2015 Written  
Interview # 
60 
Monsanto national 
representative 
15/12/2015 Written  
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Short discussion 10-20mn (note taken)   
Institutional 
affiliation 
and role 
Role in NIS 
or Bt cotton 
adoption  
Date of the 
meeting  
Statement  
Member of 
parliament  
Passing laws 
on GMO  
 28/04/2011 None 
Member of 
parliament  
Passing laws 
on GMO 
28/04/2011 None  
Monsanto 
representative 
Corporate 
interest  
29/04/2011 None  
Member of 
parliament  
Passing laws 
on GMO 
30/05/2011 None  
ANB officer Regulator of 
GMO 
31/05/2011 None  
ANB officer Regulator of 
GMO 
04/05/2011 None  
UNPCB 
officer 
Cotton 
farmers’ 
organisation 
administrator  
05/05/2011 None  
Faso cotton 
officer 
Corporate 
interest  
06/05/2011 None  
SOCOMA 
officer  
Corporate 
interest 
06/05/2011 None  
SOFITEX 
officer  
Corporate 
interest  
07/05/2011 None  
SOFITEX 
technical 
agent  
Corporate 
interest  
11/05/2011 None 
Monsanto 
representative 
national level  
Corporate 
interest  
12/05/2011 None  
Monsanto 
representative 
regional level 
Corporate 
interest  
14/05/2011 None 
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Appendix 3 
 
Guide for interview questions 
Farmers 
The role of cotton in the past in Burkina Faso 
economic 
social, cultural/ family  
 
length of your involvement time in cotton growth 
justification and reasons for being cotton farmers 
family, cultural or self-initiative 
 
Actors involved in cotton growth with you in the past  
Actors 
Their function  
Your relation with them 
Before, during and after colonisation 
Their linkages and collaborations with you at this time 
  
Transitional period: from indigenous to BT cotton 
Explanation: justification of any shifts or changes you have made  
date of enrolment in this new technology 
explain the process of your enrolment  
  
Actors involved in BT cotton growth with you 
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actors in contact with you (your collaborators, and possible partners) 
type of collaborations and cooperation 
collaboration’s interests and advantages for you 
actors not directly in contact with you. Their existence and role in BT cotton 
implementation is known 
type of relationships between you and them 
What do you think about your role and collaboration/cooperation with all the other 
actors in BT cotton implementation? 
 
Changes with BT cotton growth 
positives 
negatives 
in order to step outside this either/or approach, also ask what is interesting, i.e., neither 
a plus or a minus, but thought-provoking 
 
7- Relationship with industries and researchers 
relationship before  
relationship now 
impression on such a relationship  
knowledge on the NIS 
 
Scientists/researchers 
On Bt cotton  
Background information 
research in indigenous cotton 
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start date 
specific role 
collaborators/partners (national and international level) 
type of collaborations and interests/advantages 
 
Transitional period: from indigenous to Bt cotton 
Description and justification 
date of enrolment 
explain the process of this transition in your research with BT cotton 
 
The other actors in BT cotton 
actors directly in contact with you in your research process 
other type of collaborations 
reasons/interests  
actors indirectly in contact with you 
type of relationship between you and these other actors 
regulation of Bt cotton 
date of adoption 
your view and comment about it  
 
changes in research on Bt cotton 
positives 
negatives 
 
5-Linkages and their mechanisms 
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Mechanisms  
Objectives  
Set up date 
Initiators 
Reasons/circumstances  
Mode of coordination 
Previous mechanisms  
Reasons for changes in the mechanisms 
Involved actors in the implementation of current mechanisms 
Difficulties 
Mode of resolution 
Support from another actor in the network  
Actor’ reaction 
 
On The NIS  
FRSIT-CRDI’s Project 
Project development 
Justification of project  
Composition of project team 
Organisation set up for project implementation in  
Trainings based in BF 
Content  
Objectives 
Trainers 
Trainees  
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Training justification  
Trainings which took place outside the country 
Place/country of training  
Institutions of training  
Mode of knowledge of the institutions   
Reason for choice of training institutions 
Content of training 
Objectives of training  
Trainers 
Trainees 
Training justification  
The initiators of training  
7-Project implementation  
Activities undertaken 
Justification of implemented activities 
Objectives of these activities  
Involved actors 
Justification of actors’ selection  
8-Project evolution to date  
Project duration  
Project’s institutional affiliation 
Lessons learnt from project  
Appreciation of project’s achievement  
Project’s contribution to policy formulation 
Justification of achievement  
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Interaction between key actors in BF with UNIT-MERIT and CRDI’s actors 
Existence of other innovation approaches in BF 
Content of the approaches,  
9-Similarities and difference with regard to the NIS 
10-At policy makers level  
Existence of innovation policy 
State of research 
State of higher education  
Existence of sectoral innovation policy 
Agricultural higher education  
11-System performance 
 
Interview guide for Government officials and industrials  
On Bt cotton  
Background information 
role in indigenous cotton growth and research 
partners in indigenous cotton (national and international) 
type of cooperation and partnership that you had during that period before Bt cotton, 
interests/ advantages 
Transitional period: from indigenous to Bt cotton 
date of enrolment 
Description of the process of your involvement  
reasons 
Actors in Bt cotton 
actors directly in contact with you in BT cotton implementation 
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type of cooperation 
reasons/ interests 
actors indirectly in contact with you 
type of relationship between you and these other actors 
Regulation of Bt cotton  
Period of adoption 
reasons    
changes with Bt cotton policies compare to indigenous cotton 
positives 
negatives  
6-Linkages and their mechanisms 
Mechanisms  
Objectives  
Set up date 
Initiators 
Reasons/circumstances  
Mode of coordination 
Previous mechanisms  
Reasons for changes in the mechanisms 
Involved actors in the implementation of current mechanisms 
Difficulties 
Mode of resolution 
Support from another actor in the network  
Actor’ reaction 
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Interview guide for Activists/civil society NGO 
Background information 
research in indigenous cotton 
start date 
specific role 
collaborators/partners (national and international level) 
type of collaborations and interests/advantages 
focus  
Transitional period: from indigenous to Bt cotton 
Description and justification 
date of enrolment 
explain the process of this transition in your research with BT cotton 
The other actors in Bt cotton 
actors directly in contact with you 
other type of collaborations 
reasons/interests  
actors indirectly in contact with you 
type of relationship between you and these other actors 
regulation of Bt cotton 
date of adoption 
your view and comment about it  
changes on BT cotton 
positives 
negatives 
10-relationship with industry, cotton farmers and the State 
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on the NIS project 
FRSIT-CRDI’s Project 
Project development 
Justification of project  
Composition of project team 
Organisation set up for project implementation in  
Trainings based in BF 
Content  
Objectives 
Trainers 
Trainees  
Training justification  
Trainings which took place outside the country 
Place/country of training  
Institutions of training  
Mode of knowledge of the institutions   
Reason for choice of training institutions 
Content of training 
Objectives of training  
Trainers 
Trainees 
Training justification  
The initiators of training  
Project implementation  
Activities undertaken 
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Justification of implemented activities 
Objectives of these activities  
Involved actors 
Justification of actors’ selection  
Project evolution to date  
Project duration  
Project’s institutional affiliation 
Lessons learnt from project  
Appreciation of project’s achievement  
Project’s contribution to policy formulation 
Justification of achievement  
Interaction between key actors in BF with UNIT-MERIT and CRDI’s actors 
Existence of other innovation approaches in BF 
Content of the approaches,  
Similarities and difference with regard to the NIS 
At policy makers level  
Existence of innovation policy 
State of research 
State of higher education  
Existence of sectoral innovation policy 
Agricultural higher education  
System performance 
 
Interview guide for Monsanto representatives 
 393 
type of cooperation and partnership that you had during that period before Bt cotton, 
interests/ advantages 
Transitional period: from indigenous to Bt cotton 
date of enrolment 
Description of the process of your involvement  
reasons 
Actors in Bt cotton 
actors directly in contact with you in BT cotton implementation 
type of cooperation 
reasons/ interests 
actors indirectly in contact with you 
type of relationship between you and these other actors 
Regulation of Bt cotton  
Period of adoption 
reasons    
changes with Bt cotton policies compare to indigenous cotton 
positives 
negatives  
Linkages and their mechanisms 
Mechanisms  
Objectives  
Set up date 
Initiators 
Reasons/circumstances  
Mode of coordination 
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Previous mechanisms  
Reasons for changes in the mechanisms 
Involved actors in the implementation of current mechanisms 
Difficulties 
Mode of resolution 
Support from another actor in the network  
Actor’ reaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
